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1824
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THE

CHARACTERS OF THEOPHRASTUS.

Printed by A. J. Valpy,
Red Lion Court, Fleet Street.

J. H. 1825

THE CHARACTERS

OF

THEOPHRASTUS;

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,

AND ILLUSTRATED BY

PHYSIOGNOMICAL SKETCHES.

TO WHICH ARE SUBJOINED

THE GREEK TEXT, WITH NOTES,

AND HINTS ON THE

INDIVIDUAL VARIETIES OF HUMAN NATURE.

BY

FRANCIS HOWELL.

PUBLISHED BY JOSIAH TAYLOR,

ARCHITECTURAL LIBRARY, LONDON.

1824.

733

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PREFACE.

The marble that has retained upon its fleshy surface the frolic smile, or the pettish frown, or the haughty glance, that was fixed there by the hand of art twenty centuries ago, awakens in our bosoms a more vivid sympathy with the distant and forgotten members of the great family of man,—gives us a fuller conviction of the permanent and perfect identity of our species, and places us in nearer communion with past ages, than volumes of the grave records of history. In proportion as the aim of the artist was lower, and his subject more familiar, the interest of this kind which the work excites is enhanced. The super-

human forms of ancient art, and the personages of history, and the heroes of poetry, stand as far from our sympathies as the beings of another world. But in the more playful and simply imitative creations of the chisel, the eye is attracted by an irresistible claim of family relationship, which we are delighted to perceive and to acknowledge.

Their intrinsic beauty, therefore, is not the sole source of the pleasurable emotions that seem to cluster about these precious relics of early ages.—They come down to us as monuments of the unimpaired sameness of human nature, and of the entireness of its lesser, as well as of its stronger impulses.—They are evidences of the perpetuity of all its fine varieties of transient feeling, and of all its diversities of original disposition.

The Characters of Theophrastus possess an interest and a value of the same kind, and in a degree beyond most of the remains of Grecian

literature. They are inartificial and exact portraitures of the very peculiarities of temper that are every day passing under our own observation. The phrases and the actions of the beings described by the Successor of Aristotle, are precisely the phrases and the actions of the beings with whom we are ourselves conversant. These faithful records of human nature serve to prove that, under every changing influence of time, and climate, of institutions, and opinions, and manners, Mind, with all its shades of difference, is the same.

In this view, these brief but accurate descriptions of some leading varieties of character, will have a peculiar value in the estimation of the student of human nature; and it is chiefly in this light that they are now presented to the reader.

Theophrastus has been called,—not, I think, with strict propriety, the father of the dramatic style. It is true that his Characters have

always been considered as standard models in their kind; and the numberless imitations they have produced have chiefly been of a comic or satiric cast. Yet I am strongly disposed to think, that he has been placed at the head of a class to which he had no intention that his writings should belong. There are many reasons for believing that, far from proposing to furnish merely dramatic or satirical pictures of manners, he designed to collect materials for a comprehensive, and a scientific Natural History of Man. The style of the work itself,—the terms in which he announces his design in the prefatory epistle to his friend,—the scientific character of his other works,—his known habits and pursuits, and the place he occupied as the appointed successor of Aristotle, are circumstances that strongly favour this opinion. I am aware that such is not the view that has been taken of the Characters by former editors and trans-

lators. But the prevailing opinion has plainly been derived, rather from the use made of these descriptions by imitators, than from the nature of the work itself. This matter, however, is by no means of sufficient importance to make it worthy of a lengthened discussion.

The Characters of Theophrastus have been known to modern readers through the medium of innumerable translations; but,—I know not from what cause,—much less so in England, than in Germany, Italy, or France. In this country they have been read chiefly in the loose paraphrase of Bruyere. This acute and ingenious writer had far too much originality to allow his author to be fairly seen: and in perusing his entertaining volumes, the last things the reader thinks of are 'The Characters of Theophrastus.' They served him, as they have served some other distinguished writers, as the mere text of his own thoughts.

On the supposition that the design of

Theophrastus was scientific, not dramatic, his work, if he had lived to complete it, would have formed a systematic Nosology of Mind, consisting of concise *diagnostics* of all the most frequent morbid affections of the understanding and the temper. In the Notes subjoined to the translation, this idea has been pursued; and, as occasion presented itself, I have endeavoured to point out the use that might be made of such descriptions of *symptoms* by the student of human nature. I have also, in the course of these desultory hints, suggested some methods, in the adoption of which the Science of Mind might, as I believe, be prosecuted with a prospect of important advancements.

The nature of the subjects to which the notes relate has led me to advert to the crude, fantastic, and not altogether harmless theories which, at present, attract a degree of popular attention to the science of human nature.

And having gone so far, I have ventured, in the concluding pages of the volume, to draw a comparison between the too timid and scrupulous course pursued by the reputed authorities in the Science of Mind; and the unbounded temerity displayed by those who have aspired to occupy the ground that has been abandoned to them.

Verbal criticisms, or classical illustrations of my author, I have not attempted; though nothing is easier than to collect matter of this sort. But the point and propriety of the descriptions are perfectly intelligible without this kind of aid; or if it be desired, it may readily be found in works that occupy a place in most domestic libraries. For verbal criticism and learned elucidation, the text of my author does, indeed, afford inexhaustible occasions. — His style is abrupt; his allusions to local circumstances and customs are frequent; he employs several phrases that are found in no other

writer; and besides these sources of obscurity, the text of the Characters has come down to us in a very corrupted state.

The increasing taste for the study of the richest and the noblest of all languages,—that of ancient Greece, and the wide diffusion of a respectable measure of classical learning in this country, may justify the presumption that, in appending the Greek text to the translation, the volume will be rendered more interesting to many of those who may be its readers.

No scientific value is attached by the artist, or the editor, to the graphic illustrations that accompany the translation and the notes. They are, it is true, the products of long-continued observation of faces and of tempers. Yet they are presented without the protection of any claim to physiognomical authority. The same may be said of the few physiognomical hints that are dispersed in the notes. Any one who has studied forms and minds, during a

number of years, might find it easy to fill volumes with specious rules for discriminating faculties and dispositions through their external symbols. But the cautious observer will be disposed to enjoin upon himself a great degree of reserve on this topic; not only from his experience of the uncertainty of such rules; but chiefly because, when given in a popular form, they are peculiarly liable to be misunderstood, and injuriously misapplied. Every man must be left to gain by his own observation as much physiognomical skill as he can:—or as much as he thinks convertible to any useful purpose.

If the correspondence between external forms and the qualities of mind shall ever be better understood than it is at present, this addition to our knowledge will assume a form that, while it renders it available to the student in the explication and arrangement of the individual varieties of human nature, will remove it from the danger of popular misuse.

THE

CHARACTERS OF THEOPHRASTUS.

THEOPHRASTUS TO POLYCLES.

I HAVE always been perplexed when I have endeavoured to account for the fact, that, among a people, who, like the Greeks, inhabit the same climate, and are reared under the same system of education, there should prevail so great a diversity of manners.

You know, my friend, that I have long been an attentive observer of Human Nature: I am now in the ninety-ninth year of my age; and during the whole course of my life I have conversed familiarly with men of all classes, and of various climes; nor have I neglected closely to watch the actions of

individuals,—as well the profligate as the virtuous. With these qualifications I have thought myself fitted for the task of describing those habitual peculiarities by which the manners of every one are distinguished. I shall therefore present to your view, in succession, the domestic conduct, and, what may be termed, the *besetting practices* of various characters.

I am willing, my friend Polycles, to believe that a work of this kind may be beneficial to the succeeding generation, who, by consulting these patterns of good and of evil, may learn, at once, to avoid what is base, and to assimilate their sentiments and their habits to what is noble; and thus become not unworthy of their virtuous ancestors.

I now turn to my task: it will be your part to follow my steps, and to judge of the correctness of my observations. Omitting therefore any further

prefatory matter, I commence by describing the DISSEMBLER; and in conformity with the plan which I propose to pursue throughout the work, I shall first briefly define the term; and then pourtray the manners of the supposed individual to whom the character is attributed. It is in this way that I shall endeavour to exhibit, according to their specific differences, the several dispositions incident to Human Nature.

I.

THE DISSEMBLER.

EVERY word, and every action of the Dissembler is an artifice by which he labours to conceal some evil intention. A man of this sort approaches his enemy with professions of friendship; he flatters those against whom he is secretly plotting mischief; and he condoles with them in the day of their calamity: to one who has defamed him, he proffers his forgiveness: he receives contumely with patience; or he soothes with blandishments those who resent the injuries they have sustained from his villany.

The Dissembler, from mere habit, will evade any direct application that may be made to him: 'Call upon me to-morrow,'—says he, to one who seeks to

1.

THE DISSEMBLER.

He profeſses not to have obſerved what paſsed before his eyes.

converse with him on business that admits of no delay. To elude inquiry, he will pretend that he is but just returned from a journey,—that he came home only last evening,—or that he is too ill to attend to business. He never acknowledges that he has actually commenced an undertaking; but professes to be still deliberating upon the affair. He tells those who would borrow money of him, or who demand the sum he has subscribed to a contribution, that he has not taken a sixpence of late: but when trade is dull, he boasts of his dealings. He feigns not to have attended to what he has heard; he professes not to have observed what passed before his eyes, and he takes care to forget his promises. He is fertile in evasions;—now, he purposes to take an affair into consideration;—now, he knows nothing of the business:—he is amazed at what is told him; or it accords exactly with his own opinion. He makes himself remarkable by his frequent use of certain phrases, such as—'I am fain to doubt it;'—

'I don't take your meaning;'—'I'm vastly surprised:'—or, if it suits his purpose, he will say,—'I am not the man you take me for;—no such thing has been said to *me* before;—what you say is incredible:—Prithee find some one else to whom you may tell this tale:—truly, I know not whether to think you or him the impostor.'

But beware thou of one who employs these artfully woven and often repeated phrases, which commonly serve to cloak the worst designs. A man in whose manners there is no simplicity, and whose every word seems to have been studied, is more to be shunned than a viper.

II.

THE ADULATOR.

Stooping forward, he whispers in his Patron's ear.

II.

THE ADULATOR.

ADULATION is the base converse of an inferior with one from whom he seeks some sordid advantage. The Adulator, walking with his Patron, says,—'Mark you not how the eyes of all are turned towards you? —There is not another man in the city, who attracts so much attention.—It was but yesterday that the estimation in which you are held was publicly acknowledged in the Portico:—there were more than thirty persons sitting together; and in the course of conversation it was inquired,—who merited to be called the most worthy citizen of the state; when, one and all agreed that you were the man.' While he proceeds with discourse of this sort, he employs

himself in picking some particle of down from the great man's cloak; or if a gust of wind has lodged an atom of straw in his curls, he carefully removes it; and smiling, adds,—'See now,—because these two days I have not been with you, your beard is filled with grey hairs:—and yet, to say truth, no man of your years has a head of hair so black.'

When his Patron is about to speak, the Parasite imposes silence upon all present; and he himself, while he listens, gives signals of applause; and at every pause exclaims,—'well said!—well said!' If the speaker is pleased to be facetious, he forces a grin; or puts his cloak to his mouth, as if striving to suppress a burst of laughter. He commands those whom they may meet in a narrow way to give place, while his Friend passes on. He provides himself with apples and pears, which he presents to the children of the family in the presence of the Father; and kissing them, exclaims,—'Worthy offspring of a noble stock!'

'The foot,'—says the humble companion, when the great man would fit himself with a pair of shoes, 'the foot is of a handsomer make than the pair you are trying.' He runs before his Patron when he visits his friends, to give notice of his approach; saying,—'He comes to thee:'—then he returns with some such formality as—'I have announced you.'

When occasion offers he is ready to give his help in the smallest matters;—he will run to the market, in a twinkling, for a bunch of kitchen herbs. At table, he is the first to praise the wine: leaning upon the flattered man, he says,—'You eat but delicately:' and, taking a morsel from the table, exclaims—'How exquisite is this!' Then he inquires,—'Are you cold? —Do, you wish for your cloak?'—and forthwith he throws it about him. Stooping forward, he whispers in his ear; or while speaking to others, he rolls his eyes upon his patron. At the Theatre,—taking the cushions from the servant whose business it is to

adjust them for his master, he performs this office himself. In a word, he is always ready to declare —that the house is well built, the grounds well planted, or that the portrait is an exact likeness. And truly, you will find such a fellow willing to say or to do any thing by which he may hope to curry favour.

III.

THE GARRULOUS.

If you will bear with him he will never let you go.

III.

THE GARRULOUS.

GARRULITY is an effusion of prolix and unpremeditated discourse. The garrulous man happening to sit beside one with whom he has no acquaintance, begins by recounting the various excellencies of his wife:—then he says that last night he dreamed a dream, which he narrates at length;—this leads him to mention, one by one, the dishes that were placed within his reach at supper. By this time his tongue has gained velocity in going; and he proceeds in a loftier strain:—'Alas!' saith he, 'how much more depraved are the men of our times than were their ancestors!—and what a price has corn fallen to now, in the markets! and how the city swarms with

strangers!—By the time the Baccanalia are well over the sea will be covered again with ships:—should it please heaven, just now, to send rain, it would be a vast benefit to the wheats.' Anon, he announces his determination to farm his own land the ensuing year. 'But how hard is it,' says he, 'in these times to get a living.—I must tell you,—being, as I perceive, a stranger,—that it was Damippus who displayed the largest torch in the late festival.—By the bye,—can you tell me now, how many pillars there are in the Odeum?—Yesterday I was sick: hem! What day of the month is this?'

If you will bear with a fellow of this sort he will never let you go: for rather than that talk should fail, he will inform you of all the festivals that happen throughout the year,—gravely telling you that in September is celebrated the feast in honour of Ceres;—in October, the Apaturia: the rural Baccanalia in December;—and so forth. But if you would not be worried into a fever, you must shake him off, and

make your escape as fast as possible. In truth, it is hard to consort with those who have no perception of what is proper either to moments of relaxation, or to hours of business.

IV.

THE RUSTIC.

RUSTICITY is an unconsciousness of things indecorous. The Rustic, after having taken an offensive drug, forthwith goes into company. Smelling some exquisite perfume, he exclaims,—'Tis not a whit sweeter than a sprig of thyme.' The shoes he wears are too large for his feet. He talks in a bawling tone; and his posture as he sits is indecent. Distrusting his friends and nearest relatives, he converses on the most important concerns with his servants; or, returning from the city, he reports all that has passed in council to the labourers on his farm. In travelling, he admires nothing that is beautiful, he is affected by no-

IV.

THE DUNCE.

He admires nothing that is beautiful; he is affected by nothing that is sublime.

thing that is sublime; but if he encounters an ox, or an ass, or a goat, he makes a halt, and stares at it. He will filch a morsel from the pantry,—devour it voraciously; then swallow a dram; and withal seek to conceal the theft from his own cookmaid: at another time he will grind with her at the mill; and himself measure out the day's provisions for the family. During dinner he throws morsels to the domestic animals that are suffered to range through the house; or he runs to the door when any one knocks. Instead of noticing his visitor, he calls the house-dog from his kennel, and, holding him by the muzzle, exclaims,—'Here is he that takes care of house, and farm, and family!' When he receives money, he affirms it to be bad, and demands that it may be changed. If he has lent a plough, or a basket, or a sickle, or a sack, to a neighbour, he wakes, perhaps in the middle of the night, and remembering the loan, will go and ask for

it. On his way to the city he accosts any one he may meet with abrupt questions,—'How are hides selling now? and what is bacon in the market?—Tell me, do the Games to-day bring us a new moon?'—and then he adds,—'As soon as I get to town I mean to be shaved.' This man sings aloud while he is in the bath: he drives nails into his shoes; and you may meet him with a ham on his shoulders, which he has bought as he chanced to pass through the market.

V.

THE PLAUSIBLE.

"—*Most excellent Sir!*"

V.

THE PLAUSIBLE.

He who would fain please all the world is one who habitually sacrifices virtues to blandishments.

The man of compliments bows long before he comes up to the person whom he means to salute: then, accosting him with—'Most excellent Sir!' and some egregious flattery, he holds him by both hands, and will hardly release him; but turns back with him, inquiring when they shall meet again: at length, but not without another preposterous compliment, he lets him go. If he is employed in an arbitration, he labours to gratify his friend's opponent, that, if possible, he may appear to be equally concerned for both parties. He will as-

sure foreigners that they talk more reasonably than his fellow citizens. When he dines with his friend, he intreats that the children may be called in; and, as they enter, he protests that one fig is not so like another as they are to their father: he brings them about him,—kisses them,—babbles nursery nonsense with them; and allows himself to be incommoded by their sleeping upon his bosom.

A man of this temper is usually a fop: he is distinguished by his trimly-dressed hair,—his white teeth,—the frequent change of his dress, and his excessive use of perfumes. He saunters about the stalls in the Exchange; lounges in the Gymnasium while the youth are engaged in their exercises; and at the Theatre he pushes up as near as he can to the seat of the Prætors. It is his affectation to appear to be making purchases—not for himself, but for his friends at Byzantium, or elsewhere:—he is sending a present of Spartan dogs

to Cyzicus; or the honey of Hymettus to Rhodes: nor does he suffer his neighbours to be ignorant of all this munificence. His house abounds with rarities:—he is skilful in training apes and monkeys;—he keeps Sicilian doves;—he cannot play at dice unless they are carved from the finest buck's-horn;—he displays curiously-turned crewets;—his walking stick is a twisted Spartan staff: his rooms are hung with the figured tapestry of Persia;—he has a court always prepared for wrestling; and adjoining to it a billiard room: hither he is wont to invite those whom he may meet in his rambles,—Philosophers, Sophists, Prize-fighters, or Musicians; and here they find accommodations for exercising their various arts. All this he does, that when he enters the hall one of the spectators may say to another, 'That is the master of the Palæstra.'

VI.

THE RUFFIAN.

The Ruffian is distinguished by the recklessness with which he perpetrates or witnesses atrocities.

A man of this sort takes his oath without a moment's reflection; he hears the foulest obloquies without offence; and he is insensible to reproach. His habits of life are those of a vagabond; his manners are obscene; and he is apt for every mischief. He is not ashamed, even while sober, to exhibit himself in the lascivious dance, or to play a part in comedy unmasked. He will undertake the office of collecting the money at a show; and will wrangle with those who produce tickets for the spectacle. He keeps open house for com-

VI.

THE DUENNA.

challenging the mob in a hoarse and brawling voice.

pany of all sorts; he maintains courtezans; and he will farm the taxes: in truth, there is not an occupation by which he will think himself disgraced: he will be town crier, or cook at a tavern; and while he squanders his money in gambling, he refuses to maintain his mother: he is committed to prison for theft; and spends more of his time in jail than at home.

It is some fellow of this sort whom you may see gathering a crowd about him in the highway, —challenging the mob in a hoarse and brawling voice; while he vociferates angry and contumelious ravings: meantime some are joining the circle, while others leave it before they have learned what he has to say; and no one knows what he means; for some have heard only the beginning, some the middle, and some scarce a syllable of his harangue. It is especially on days of public business, when crowds are easily collected, that he delights to make the full display of his mad

insolence. He is perpetually either Plaintiff or Defendant in a law-suit; and he is ever prepared to carry his point where perjury or audacity can avail him. Litigation is his element; and he is to be seen carrying a casket stuffed with depositions in his bosom, and a file of indictments under his arm.

He never declines the honour of being a leader of the rabble; and when he has gained followers he lends them money,—exacting the enormous usury of a quarter of the principal, which he collects daily at the stalls and shops of his debtors; and as he gathers his pence he lodges them in his mouth. Men of this sort, whose throats are sewers, flowing with scurrility, and who make taverns and markets resound with their brawling, are the most troublesome of all public nuisances.

VII.

THE LOQUACIOUS.

"How profitable is talk!"

VII.

THE LOQUACIOUS.

LOQUACITY is an incontinence of the tongue. The Loquacious man, whatever you may be talking of, presently interrupts you by telling you that —'You say nothing to the point:—I know the whole story; and if you listen to me, you will learn the real state of the case.' If you take up the subject again, he breaks in upon you;—'Ah—don't you forget what you were about to say: truly you did well to remind me of that:—See how profitable is talk!—Right!—that part of the affair I had forgotten.—You have taken my meaning at once:—I have been waiting to see if you would think as I do.' In this way he seizes

upon every opportunity of talking, so that one who would confer with him knows not when to take breath. When he has thus worried, one by one, all who may have fallen in his way, he will thrust himself into a group of persons, occupied with some important business, and fairly put them to flight. He enters the public schools and the Palæstras, interrupting the youth in their studies, or their exercises, while he chatters with the masters. If any one, to escape from him, takes his leave, he will rise at the same time, and follow him home. He is informed of all that passes in the assembly of the people, which he makes it his business to repeat wherever he goes. The retailing of such news gives him occasion to describe at great length the battle between the Lacedæmonians and the Macedonians, which, he informs you, took place during the magistracy of the orator Aristophon:—thence he goes back to the war with the Lacedæmonians under Lysander; nor does he forget

to repeat a much applauded speech which he himself made on a certain occasion in the assembly: with this discourse, however, he intermingles invectives against the populace: meanwhile, some of his audience are utterly unconscious of what he is saying, —some are dozing,—and some make their escape.

A man of this sort puts a stop, alike to business and to pleasure. When he sits on the bench he distracts his colleagues: when he is at the theatre he prevents those near him from seeing the spectacle; and at table he almost hinders his neighbour from eating. He will frankly confess that it is hard for a talker to hold his peace: the tongue, he says, is hung so loose that it must needs be moving: and he owns that he would rather seem more noisy than a flight of swallows, than be silent. He will bear to be laughed at for his folly, even by his own children, who, when they would sleep, are wont to say—'Come, father, now tell us a tale, that we may all begin to nod.'

VIII.

THE FABRICATOR OF NEWS.

It is to gratify his love of the marvellous that this man spends his life in the invention and propagation of falsehoods. The Newsmonger, meeting an acquaintance, puts on a grimace to suit the occasion, and grinning, asks—'Whence come you—what say you—have you any fresh news of this affair?' Going on with these questions, he adds,—'What! no later intelligence abroad?—Truly the current report is surprising!'—without allowing a reply, he proceeds,—'What say you to it? Is it possible that you have not yet heard of it? Then I fancy I have a feast of news for you.' Whereupon he never fails to have as his author some nobody knows who—a soldier, or a piper's boy, or a sutler, just re-

VIII.

THE NARRATOR OF NEWS

Have you not heard the news?
"... Cassander is taken alive!"

turned from the field of battle, from whom he has heard the whole story: thus he takes care that his authorities are such as no one can lay hold of. He then says that these persons affirm, that—Polysperchon and the King have gained a complete victory; and furthermore, that Cassander is taken alive. If any one asks—'and do you really believe this?'—he replies,—'The rumour is already noised through the town;—and it gains credit every hour: besides,—all accounts agree as to the fact of the battle, and that there has been a vast slaughter. But if there could be any doubt, you have only need to look in the faces of men in power, and you may read the news in their altered looks: and, to tell you a secret,—it is whispered that some one from Macedonia, who was an eye-witness of the fight, has been now five days concealed in the office of state.' When he has thus finished his tale,—as he thinks, very plausibly, he puts on a pathetic air;—'Unhappy Cassander! luck-

less man! behold the caprices of fortune!—Yet truly he was a mighty captain! But remember now,' he adds, 'I have told you this in confidence,—keep it to yourself.' But this whispered secret is what he has already been telling in all parts of the town.

I have always been at a loss to find a sufficient motive for the conduct of men of this sort. They not only lie,—but they lie most unprofitably to themselves. How often, for example, while gathering hearers about them in the bath, do they lose their clothes; how often, while in the Portico they are gaining victories by sea and land, do they incur fines by neglecting their affairs in court; how often, after valiantly taking cities with their tongues, do they go home supperless. Truly theirs seems to me a most wearisome mode of life,—passing entire days, as they do, in running from shop to shop;—from the Portico to the Forum,—with no other business than to promulgate idle tales, by which to afflict the ears of all they meet.

IX.

THE SORDID.

He exacts discount from a Servant.

IX.

THE SORDID.

THAT man is justly called a lover of filthy lucre, to whom the relish and value of a gain is enhanced by the baseness of the means that have been employed in its acquisition.

If a fellow of this sort invites you to a feast, you will do wisely to carry a morsel with you, to make up for his scanty fare. He will borrow money of a stranger who lodges for a night in his house. At an ordinary he is the carver, and while he loads his own plate, says,—'It is fair that he who toils for others should have the portion of two.' He sells wine; and he does not scruple to send what is adulterated, even to his friend. He goes

to the theatre, and takes his sons, only on those occasions when the house is thrown open to the populace. If he is employed on an embassy, he leaves at home the provision made at the public cost for his journey; and on the road borrows what he needs from his colleagues. The slave who follows him he loads with a burden beyond his strength; and at the same time gives him less than the customary allowance of food. He demands his share of the presents made to the embassy at a foreign court, and sells it.

In the bath he declares that the oil brought to him by his servant is rancid; and on this pretence he uses what belongs to another person. If his servants chance to find money on the road, he claims his share,—using the vulgar proverb,—'Luck is common.' When he sends his cloak to the fuller, he borrows one from a neighbour, which he continues to wear till it is asked for. Nor are these the worst of his practices.—He metes out

provisions to his household in a measure that has a false bottom: and even from this he strikes off the top. Through the indulgence of a friend he purchases some article much below its value, which he presently sells at an exorbitant price. Having a debt of thirty pounds to pay, he contrives that the silver shall be deficient in weight by four drachms. If his children have been prevented from attending their school by sickness, he makes a deduction, according to the time they have been absent, from the salaries of their masters: and because many public holidays occur in February, he keeps them at home the whole month, that he may not have to pay for days in which they are not actually at school. In settling accounts with a servant, or in receiving rent from a tenant, he exacts a discount, on pretence of the difference in value between one kind of coin and another. When it falls to his lot to give a feast to the citizens of his ward, he supplies his own family out of

the provision made for the public dinner: and of all that is left upon the table he takes strict account; lest the half of a bunch of radishes should be purloined by the waiters. If he goes a journey with companions, he employs their attendants; having let out his own footman for the time; without, however, bringing the hire to account in the common purse. If provisions for a club-dinner are lodged at his house, he cribs a part from every article,—even from the wood,—the lentils,—the vinegar,—the salt, and the oil for the lamps. In order to avoid making a marriage-offering when a wedding takes place in a friend's family, he will leave his home for a time, to be out of the way. He is ever borrowing those petty articles from his friends, which no one would choose to ask for again; and for which, if payment were offered, it would hardly be received.

X.

THE SHAMELESS.

He asks a loan of one whom he has just defrauded.

X.

THE SHAMELESS.

The union of avarice and audacity produces a total disregard of decency and reputation. A man of this temper is not ashamed to ask a loan of one whom he has just defrauded. When he sacrifices to the gods, instead of making a feast at home, he puts the flesh of the victim in salt, and goes to sup with a neighbour: while there, he calls up one of his followers, and taking bread and meat from the table, says, in the hearing of all,—'There, my man, make a good supper.'—When he is buying provisions, he admonishes the butcher, if ever he has done him any service, to requite the favour in the bargain he is

making: as he stands by the scales, if he can, he will throw in a piece of flesh,—or at any rate, a bone,—after the meat is weighed: if this is allowed, it is well: if not, he snatches some scrap of offal from the bench, and runs off grinning. When he treats his visitors to the theatre, he will slip in himself, without paying, and even the next day bring in his children and their tutor. If he meets any one carrying home a bargain, he begs or demands a morsel for himself. He is wont to enter the farm-yard of a neighbour, of whom he borrows corn or straw, which he obliges the lender to send home. In the bath, he will fill the pitcher for himself from the cistern, in spite of the outcries of the bather: and when he retires exclaims, —'There now, I have washed, and I owe you nothing.'

XI.

THE PARSIMONIOUS.

'These little matters make a great sum in the year.'

XI.

THE PARSIMONIOUS.

PARSIMONY is an excessive and unreasonable sparing of expence. The parsimonious man calls at the house of his debtor to demand a halfpenny of interest, left over in the last month's payment. At a banquet he carefully notes how many cups of wine are drank by each guest: and of all the offerings to Diana, usual on such occasions, his will be the least. If the smallest article be purchased for his use, however low may be the price, he will say it is too dear. When a servant breaks a pot or a pan, he deducts the value of it from his daily allowance; or if his wife chances to lose a brass button or a farthing, he causes tables, chairs,

beds, boxes, to be moved, and the wardrobe to be hunted over in search of it. Whoever would deal with him, must be content to lose by the transaction. He suffers no one to taste a fig from his garden; nor even to pass through his fields; no, —nor to gather a fallen date or olive from the ground. He inspects the boundaries of his farm every day, to assure himself that the hedges and the fences remain in their places. He demands interest upon interest, if payment is delayed a day beyond the appointed time. If he gives a public dinner to his ward, he carves out a scanty portion for each, and himself places his allowance before every guest. He goes to market, and often returns without having purchased an article. He strictly charges his wife to lend nothing to her neighbours;— no, not even a little salt, nor a wick for a lamp, nor a bit of cummin, nor a sprig of marjoram, nor a barley cake, nor a fillet for the victim, nor a wafer for the altar; 'for,' saith he, 'these little

matters put together make a great sum in the year.'

In a word, you may see the coffers of such a fellow covered with mould; and himself,—with a bunch of rusty keys at his girdle,—clad in a scanty garb,—sparingly anointed,—shorn to the scalp, and slipshod at noon: and you may find him in the fuller's shop, whom he is charging not to spare earth in cleaning his cloak, that it may not so soon require dressing again.

XII.

THE IMPURE.

THIS man is every where to be known by the open and scandalous grossness of his manners:—he wilfully offends the eye of modesty. At the theatre it is his delight to clap his hands after the rest of the audience is still; and to hiss those actors whom others applaud: and in an interval of silence, he eructates so loudly as to attract the notice of all about him. He frequents the fruit stalls in the open market, from which he helps himself,—munching nuts, apples, or almonds,—while he feigns to chat with the vender. He calls to some one by his name, in public, with whom he has no acquaintance; or commands a person to wait for him, whom he

XII.

THE IMPURE.

Standing at the tavern door, he proclaims that he is about to get drunk.

perceives to be hastening on business. He will accost a man with mock congratulations who is leaving court after having lost a cause, and incurred a heavy fine. As he returns from market, laden with eatables, he hires musicians,—displays what he has bought to all he may meet,—and invites them to the revel: or, standing at a shop or tavern door, he proclaims that he is about to get drunk. He will wish ill-luck to his mother, as he sees her going to consult the augur. He overthrows the cups of the worshippers who are about to perform their libations; and then stares and grins as if the accident were portentous. If a female performer is playing upon the hautboy,—first he claps while others would fain listen; then thrums the tune; and presently rudely commands her to be silent. At supper he heedlessly spits across the table upon the butler.

XIII.

THE BLUNDERER.

He whose words and actions, though they may be well intended, are never well timed, is a most troublesome companion. The Blunderer, having some affair on which he wishes to confer with his friend, calls at the very hour when he is most busily engaged. He comes to sup with his mistress while she is ill of a fever. He solicits one who has just forfeited bail to be surety for him; or appears to give his evidence at the moment when a cause is adjudged. He will rail at womankind at a wedding dinner. He asks persons to join him on the parade whom he meets as they are returning from a long journey. He will offer to find you a better



XIII.

THE BLUNDERER.

He appears to give his evidence at the moment when a cause is adjudged.

purchaser for an article which you assure him is already sold. He stands up in a company to explain some business from the very beginning, which every one perfectly understands already. He is forward to meddle in some affair which those most nearly concerned heartily wish he would let alone, and which is yet of such a nature that they are ashamed to forbid his interference. He will come and demand interest from his debtors, at the moment when they are engaged in a sacrifice and feast. If he happens to be present at a neighbour's house while a slave is beaten, he recounts an instance which occurred in his own family, of a servant who, being thus corrected, went and hanged himself. Should he be chosen to arbitrate between parties who wish to be reconciled, he will, by his bungling interference, set them at variance again. He calls upon a partner to dance, who has not yet supped.

XIV.

THE BUSYBODY.

In the proffered services of the Busybody there is much of the affectation of kind-heartedness, and little efficient aid. When the execution of some project is in agitation, he will undertake a part that greatly exceeds his ability. After a point in dispute has been settled to the satisfaction of all parties, he starts up, and insists upon some trivial objection. He directs the waiter at a banquet to mix more liquor than the company present can possibly drink. He interferes in a quarrel between parties of whom he knows nothing. He offers to be guide in a forest; and presently he is bewildered, and obliged to confess that he is ignorant of the way. He will accost



XIV.

THE BUSYBODY.

He undertakes a part that greatly exceeds his ability.

a general at the head of his troops, and inquire when battle is to be given; or what orders he intends to issue for the next day. He is wont to give his father information of his mother's movements. Although the physician has forbidden wine to his patient, he will, nevertheless, administer some; just,—as he says,—by way of making an experiment. When his wife dies, he inscribes on her monument, not only her name and quality, but those also of her husband, father, and mother; and adds,—'All these were persons of extraordinary virtue.' He cannot take an oath in court without informing the by-standers that it is not the first time his evidence has been called for.

XV.

THE STUPID.

THERE is a sluggishness of mind in some persons which occasions them perpetually to stumble into absurdities of language or behaviour. It is a man of this sort who, after he has made and proved a calculation, turns to his neighbour to ask what is the amount. Being defendant in an action for damages,—on the day when his defence should be made, he utterly forgets the affair, and goes to his farm as usual. Often it has happened to him to be left sleeping in the theatre, long after the spectators have retired. Staggering home at night, after eating an enormous supper, he wanders into his neighbour's court, instead of his own, and is bitten by the dog.

XV.

THE STUPID.

He is unable to find what he himself has hid.

Articles which himself has received and put in store, he is unable to find when they are wanted. He is informed that a friend is dead; and he goes to the house with a sorrowful face and streaming eyes; yet he salutes the first person of the family whom he meets, with—'Good luck to you!' He will, with much ado, take witnesses with him when he goes to receive payment of a debt. In the depth of winter he scolds his servant because he has not bought cucumbers. He will urge his sons to continue wrestling or running, till they are thrown into a fever. At his farm he undertakes to cook the pottage; and in doing so, he puts salt to the mess twice, so that it cannot be eaten. After a shower he exclaims, 'How sweet it smells of the stars!' If the rate of mortality in the city be asked, instead of a serious reply, he will give you an absurd jest.

XVI.

THE MOROSE.

A MALIGNANT temper sometimes vents itself chiefly in ferocity of language. The man whose tongue is thus at war with all the world, cannot reply to the simplest inquiry except by some such rejoinder as —'Trouble not me with your questions:' nor will he return a civil salutation: and so unwilling is he to give a direct answer, that even when a customer asks the price of an article, he only mutters,— 'What fault have you to find with it?' If his friends send him presents, with compliments, when he is preparing a feast, he receives them, saying—'Yes, yes;—these things are not intended for *gifts*:—(I must return as much again.)' He has no pardon for

XVI.

THE MOROSE.

If he strikes his foot against a stone, he utters a tremendous execration upon it.

those who may unwittingly shove or jostle him, or tread upon his toe. If a loan is asked of him, at first he refuses; but afterwards he brings the money, saying that he is willing to throw so much silver away. If he strikes his foot against a stone, he utters a tremendous execration upon it. He will neither wait for, nor stay with any one long: nor will he sing, or recite verses, or dance in company. It is a man of this spirit who dares to live without offering supplications to heaven.

XVII.

THE SUPERSTITIOUS.

SUPERSTITION is a desponding fear of divinities. The superstitious man having washed his hands in the sacred fount, and being well sprinkled with holy water from the temple, takes a leaf of laurel in his mouth, and walks about with it all the day. If a weasel cross his path, he will not proceed until some one has gone before him; or until he has thrown three stones across the way. If he sees a serpent in the house, he builds a chapel on the spot. When he passes the consecrated stones, placed where three ways meet, he is careful to pour oil from his crewet upon them:—then, falling upon his knees, he worships, and retires. A mouse,

XVII.

THE SUPERSTITIOUS.

If in his walks, an owl flies past, he is horror struck.

perchance, has gnawed a hole in a flour-sack:—away he goes to the seer to know what it behoves him to do: and if he is simply answered,—'Send it to the cobbler to be patched;'—he views the business in a more serious light; and running home, he devotes the sack, as an article no more to be used. He is occupied in frequent purifications of his house: saying that it has been invaded by Hecate. If in his walks an owl flies past, he is horror-struck; and exclaims, 'Thus comes the divine Minerva.' He is careful not to tread upon a tomb,—to approach a corpse, or to visit a woman in her confinement; saying that it is profitable to him to avoid every pollution. On the fourth and seventh days of the month he directs mulled wine to be prepared for the family; and going himself to purchase myrtles and frankincense, he returns and spends the day in crowning the statues of Mercury and Venus. As often as he has a dream he runs to the interpreter, the soothsayer, or the augur, to

inquire what god or goddess he ought to propitiate. Before he is initiated in the mysteries he attends to receive instruction every month, accompanied by his wife, or by the nurse and his children.

Whenever he passes a cross-way he bathes his head. For the benefit of a special purification, he invites the priestesses to his house; who, while he stands reverently in the midst of them, bear about him an onion, or a little dog. If he encounters a lunatic or a man in a fit, he shudders horrifically, and spits in his bosom.

XVIII.

THE PETULANT.

He quarrels with Heaven, not because it rains, but because the rain comes too late.

XVIII.

THE PETULANT.

A PETULANT temper will make occasion, where it cannot find reason, for murmurings and rebukes. If his friend sends the Grumbler a portion from a feast, he returns by the bearer no other answer than this—'What then,—didst thou grudge me thy broth, and thy small wine, that I was not invited to supper?' He repels the fondness of his mistress, while he mutters,—'I wonder now if you love me in truth:' He quarrels with heaven,—not, as he says, because it rains; but because the rain comes too late. If he finds a purse on the road, he exclaims,—'Copper;—ah! it is not my luck to find gold.' Having purchased a slave, after long hag-

gling with the vendor, at a very low price, he says, —'Think you I should have got him so cheap if he had been of any worth?' To the messenger who brings the happy tidings of the birth of a son, he replies,—'Aye, and if you were to add, that I have just lost the half of my fortune, you would only say what is true.' After he has gained a cause by the unanimous verdict of the judges, he turns upon his advocate, whom he upbraids for having omitted some particulars in his defence. When, on an emergency, his friends support him with ample loans, and say, 'Come now, be joyful:' he replies,—'How can I be joyful, seeing that all this money must be repaid;—and that ever after I must owe to each of you a debt of gratitude?'

XIX.

THE SUSPICIOUS.

"—Is the bar put to the hall door?"

XIX.

THE SUSPICIOUS.

THE suspicious man imputes a fraudulent intention to every one with whom he has to do. When he sends a servant to market, he presently despatches another after him, to inquire the price of the articles purchased. On a journey, he counts the money in his purse at every stage. He is scarcely in bed, before he asks his wife,—if the chests are locked, —the cupboard sealed,—and the bar put to the hall-door. In vain she assures him that all is safe:— up he jumps,—undressed and barefooted as he is; and lighting a candle, goes prying round the house; and hardly then resigns himself to sleep. He goes to receive interest for his loans, accompanied by

witnesses, lest his debtors should deny their bonds. He sends his cloak to be cleaned,—not to the best fuller; but to him whose surety he thinks the most responsible. He will invent any excuse rather than lend plate to a neighbour. He suffers not his slave to follow him; but commands him to walk before; lest he should make his escape. If a customer who comes into his shop takes up an article, and intimates that he wishes for credit; he says,—'No: if you have not the money, leave the article; for I shall have no opportunity to send for the money.'

XX.

THE FILTHY.

—an unapproachable and most unsavoury personage.

XX.

THE FILTHY.

THIS fellow neglects his person till he becomes a nuisance to all about him. Leprous, covered with ulcers, and having his finger-nails unpared, he frequents society; and he thinks to excuse the offensiveness of his disorders, by saying, that these infirmities are constitutional; and that his father and grandfather before him were afflicted in the same way. He applies no remedies to the sores and wounds which cover his legs and fingers; but suffers them to fester, till they become incurable: he is hairy as a bear; and his teeth are black and decayed; so that he is altogether an unapproachable and most unsavoury personage. His manners

are like his appearance. He wipes his nose with his sleeve;—talks as he eats;—lets fall his food from his mouth; and raises the wind from his stomach while he drinks. He uses rancid oil at the bath; and walks about, clad in a cloak that is covered with spots of grease.

XXI.

THE DISAGREEABLE.

—a companion whose conversation is tedious, and whose manners are unpleasing.

XXI.

THE DISAGREEABLE.

It is perhaps easier to bear with a neighbour, from whom we occasionally receive some serious injury, than with a constant companion, whose conversation is tedious, and whose manners are unpleasing. Such a one, for example, will enter the house of a friend, just as he has retired to rest, and awake him, that they may chat together: or he will almost forcibly detain persons in conversation, who are going on board a vessel, already under way in the harbour;—entreating them to pace up and down with him awhile on the pier. He takes the babe from the breast of the nurse;—chews the food, and feeds it; and though the child screams,

he persists in his endeavours to sooth it with his chirping. At dinner he will describe minutely the several effects of a dose of medicine he has lately taken; and add—'Aye,—the bile I brought up was darker than the soup you are eating.'

In a large company, he will accost his mother, saying, 'Mother, what day was it that I came into the world?' He lets us know, that he has at home a cistern of marvellous cold water:—also, that his garden is well supplied with choice herbs; and that his house is as much frequented as an inn. When he has company at home, he calls upon his jester; and wishing to make a display of the fool's talent, he says, 'Come now, Sir,—I pray you make the company merry.'

xxii

. . clad in the robe of ceremony, he stalks about in the forum.

XXII.

THE VAIN.

WHEN ambition is the ruling passion of a vulgar mind, it shows itself in the eager pursuit of frivolous distinctions. The vain and vulgar man strives always to gain a place at table next to the master of the feast. When his son is of age, instead of a private festival among his friends, usual on such occasions, he makes a solemn journey with him to Delphos,—there to consecrate to Apollo the honours of his shorn head. He takes vast pains to be provided with a black servant, who always attends him in public. If he has a considerable sum of money to pay, he provides himself with new coin for the purpose. When he slays a sa-

crifice, he fastens the front of the victim, adorned with chaplets, at the entrance of his house; that all who visit him may know that he has sacrificed an ox. If he has joined in a cavalcade, he sends his servant home with his horse and its trappings; but he retains the robe of ceremony, with which he stalks about in the forum, during the rest of the day. When his favourite dog dies, he deposits the remains in a tomb, and erects a monument over the grave, with an inscription,—'Offspring of the stock of Malta!' Having dedicated a brazen coronet to Æsculapius, he encumbers it with chaplets. He is exquisitely perfumed every day.

He is fond of being associated with the officers whose business it is to regulate the celebration of the sacred rites; in order that he may have to announce the course of the solemnities to the people. On such occasions, being crowned, and clad in a white robe,—he goes forth, proclaiming—'O ye Athenians! receive the favours of Heaven: for we,

whose office it is, have offered to the mother of the gods, sacrifices,—worthy and fair!' So said, he goes home, in great glee; and tells his wife that he has passed the day most felicitously.

XXIII.

THE PENURIOUS.

He who would rather expose himself to contempt, than incur a trifling expense, deserves not to be called frugal, but penurious. The penurious man will save a paltry sum on occasions which bring his sordid temper under general observation:—for example, if he has been declared victor in verse, he dedicates a wooden crown, as his offering to Bacchus; on which, however, he is not ashamed to inscribe his name. When, in the assembly of the people, an immediate contribution is voted; he either refuses his assent, or he slinks away from the assembly. At the marriage of his daughter, he sells all the flesh of the victims, except

XXIII.

THE PENURIOUS.

He turns his threadbare coat.

the dedicated portion; and the servants hired for the occasion, he entertains at board-wages. If he is master of a vessel, he will spread the matting of the steersman on the deck for himself; that he may spare his own bedding. He will go to market, and bring home the meat under one arm, and the vegetables under the other; rather than give a penny to a porter. Having but one cloak, he stays at home while it is cleaned. If he spies a poor neighbour at a distance, who is likely to ask a loan of him, he turns out of the way, and gets home. He will not maintain waiting-maids for his wife, as his station requires; but hires whom he can find, on occasions of ceremony. He rises early,—sweeps the house himself,—makes the beds, —and when he sits down, forgets not to turn his threadbare coat.

XXIV.

THE OSTENTATIOUS.

THE absurd vanity of the purse-proud man leads him to make as many false pretensions to wealth, as the veriest knave who lives by seeming to be what he is not. A boaster of this sort frequents the Exchange, and, while he gathers strangers around him, talks of the rich cargoes which he pretends to have upon the seas: then he tells what loans he has abroad; and what is the amount of interest upon them. Or you may see him stalking along the road, while he lolls on the arm of a chance companion, whom he informs, that he was one of those who served in the expedition into Asia under Alexander; and that, in the spoil which fell

XXIV.

THE OSTENTATIOUS.

He talks of the rich cargoes which he pretends to have upon the seas.

to his share, there were many costly vessels, studded with gems. This leads him to talk of eastern magnificence; and he stoutly contends, that the artificers of Asia are incomparably superior to those of Europe. He pretends to have received letters from Antipater, stating that the victorious king had just returned to Macedonia. He declares that, although he possesses the costly licence for exporting timber, he has forborne to make use of it; lest he should give occasion to the malicious remarks of some who would envy him his privilege. In a company of strangers he recounts, that, during the late scarcity he expended more than five talents in corn, to be distributed among the poorer citizens; and doubting whether he may not have under-rated the sum, he requests one of the company to assist him in going through a calculation, by making a list of those who were the objects of his munificence, and the relief afforded to each; when, pretending to name above six hundred persons, the result proves that,

instead of five, he must actually have expended not less than ten talents on the occasion. Nor does he include in this computation the maintenance of his galleys, nor sundry disbursements consequent upon the gratuitous discharge of public business. He goes to the stalls where the finest horses are exposed for sale; and pretends to bid for them: or, at the shop of the robe-maker, he requests a cloak to be shown to him of the value of two talents: and then takes occasion to reprove his attendant for not being furnished with gold. He lives in a hired house; yet he assures a visitor, ignorant of his affairs, that he inherited the house from his father; but that, finding it too small for the entertainment of his friends, he intends to sell it.

XXV.

THE PROUD.

He is never the first to accost any man.

XXV.

THE PROUD.

THE proud man regards the whole human race with contempt;—himself excepted. If you wait upon this arrogant personage, even upon the most urgent business, you must attend his pleasure:—'I will speak with thee,' says he, 'after supper, as I take my walk.' If he has rendered a service to a man, he will remind him of it as he meets him in the street; and in a loud voice goad him with the obligation. He is never the first to accost any man. He commands tradesmen, or others who transact business with him, to be in attendance at break of day. He returns the salute of no one in the public ways; and even en-

deavours to avoid seeing his acquaintance, by looking on the ground: or he tosses his head, as if the earth, and all who walk upon it, were unworthy of a glance. When he invites a party of his friends, he deigns not to sup with them; but commits the care of entertaining the guests to one of his servants. He is preceded in his visits by a footman, who announces his approach. He suffers no one to enter his apartment while he dresses, or while he dines. If he has monies to pay, or to receive, he calls in a servant to cast the counters, and afterwards to make out the bill. When he writes a letter of business, he condescends to employ none of the ordinary forms, as,—you will oblige me by doing so and so; but it is his manner to say,—'This is my pleasure:—I have sent one who will receive what you have to deliver:—let the business be thus ordered; and that, without delay.'

XXVI.

He declares that he has been affrighted by a certain dream.

XXVI.

THE FEARFUL.

THERE is in some men a constitutional dejection of the spirits, which renders them liable to the constant tyranny of fear. The diseased imagination of the fearful man seems to obscure his perceptions; for when he makes a voyage, he mistakes a cluster of distant promontories for a fleet of pirates. As soon as the ship begins to roll, he inquires if there be not some profane person on board:—and when she tacks, he questions the steersman,—if the ship keeps near enough the middle of the channel;—and what he thinks of the appearance of the heavens. Presently, turning to a passenger who sits near him, he declares that he has been affrighted by a certain

dream :—forthwith he puts off his heavy cloak,—delivering it to his servant, that he may be unencumbered in case of sudden danger. At length, as his fears increase, he entreats the captain to make for land, and put him ashore.

Unhappy is he who, thus haunted with terrors, spends his life amidst the perils of war. As soon as it is reported that the enemy approaches, he calls his comrades about him; and looking round, professes to doubt whether there be any hostile force within sight: but when he actually hears the shouts of the combatants, and sees some fall about him, he declares that, in his haste to join the ranks, he has forgotten his sword; and away he runs to his tent, from whence he despatches his slave,—as he says,—to watch the motions of the enemy: meanwhile he hides his weapon under the bedding; and then spends the time in searching for it. Peeping from the tent, he sees a wounded man borne into the camp by his friends; he runs out

to meet him,—bids him be of good courage; and undertakes the care of him,—sponging the wound, and driving away the flies:—in truth, he will do any thing, rather than face the enemy. As he sits in the tent by the wounded man, he hears the clang of the trumpeter, sounding to the charge;—'Wert thou given to the crows, with thy noise, this poor fellow might get a little sleep.' Besmeared with blood from another's wound, he runs out to meet those who are returning from the field; to whom he declares that, at the extreme peril of his life, he has rescued a friend from the hottest of the fight; and leading his comrades and friends into the tent, he repeats the tale to each;—'There,' he exclaims, 'behold the man whom, with my own arms, I bore from the field!'

XXVII.

THE OLD TRIFLER.

THIS foolish fellow, although he is threescore, would fain distinguish himself in accomplishments and exercises proper only to youth. He commits verses to memory; and attempting to sing them over the bottle, cannot recollect two lines together. He learns from his son to use the spear and shield,—to the right,—to the left, and behind. Making a visit in the country, he mounts a strange horse, and while he aims to display his skill and agility in riding, he is thrown and breaks his head. He may be seen fencing and thrusting at a wooden figure; or contending with his own servant for mastery in the bow and lance: and in this worthy employment he

XXVII.

THE OLD TRIFLER.

He undertakes to fiddle and dance to his own tune.

will give or receive instruction with equal condescension. Even in the bath he is the finished performer; which he makes apparent by the ridiculous alertness of his turns and capers. But to see him in perfection, you must observe him when, to please a party of ladies, he undertakes to fiddle, and dance to his own tune.

XXVIII.

THE DETRACTOR.

THE Detractor utters not a word that does not betray the malignancy of his soul. If he is asked—what sort of a person is such a one?—he replies as if the man's genealogy had been required;—'Ah, I know him:—his father's name was at first Sozias;—a name befitting his servile condition: it was while he served as a common soldier that he acquired the appellation Sosistratus:—some time afterwards he was inscribed among the citizens of the lower order. As to his mother,—she was *a noble Thracian,* no doubt,—for women of *her sort* are accounted *noble,* in that country:—The man himself is such as his origin would lead one to suppose,—he is the ve-

XXVIII.

THE DETRACTOR.

He will even speak ill of the dead.

riest scoundrel alive.' Then he adds, in explanation of what he had said of the man's mother;—'these Thracian women practise every sort of outrage upon the highway.'

If he comes into a company where a neighbour is defamed; he presently takes the lead in the conversation.—'Yes,' he begins, 'there is not a being on earth I detest so much as the man you are speaking of:—his looks are enough to condemn him: was there ever such a villain! you may take as a specimen of his character, what I know to be a fact,—that he ordinarily sends his wife to market with three halfpence to buy provisions for the whole family; and that he obliges her to bathe in cold water in the depth of winter.'

The moment any one leaves the company, the Detractor fails not to introduce some tale to his disadvantage; nor is there one of his friends, or any member of his family, who escapes the scourge of his tongue: he will even speak ill of the dead.

XXIX.

THE OLIGARCH:

OR, THE ADVOCATE OF DESPOTISM.

An arrogant desire to dominate over his fellows, appears in the opinions, the conduct, and the manners of this partizan of despotism. When the people are about to elect colleagues to the Archons for the direction of some public solemnity, he stands up to maintain that the magistracy should on no occasion be shared. And when others are voting for ten, his voice is heard exclaiming,—'One is enough.' Of all Homer's verses, he seems to have learned only this,—

——— think not here allow'd
That worst of tyrants, an usurping crowd.

XXIX.

THE OLIGARCH.

He heartily hates the demagogues.

He is often heard using expressions of this sort, —'It is advisable that *we* should withdraw to consult upon this business.—Let us separate ourselves from the mob, and from these popular meetings.—This access of the populace to the magistracy should be barred.' If he meets with any personal affront, he exclaims,—'That they and I should live within the same walls is insufferable.'

At noon he stalks abroad, sprucely dressed and trimmed, and he drives the world before him with haughty defiances, as if he could not think the city habitable until the mass of the people should be expelled from it. He loudly complains of the outrages sustained by the higher classes from the crowd of litigants in the courts of justice;—and he tells of his having been put to confusion in the assembly of the people, by the contact of a squalid, shabby fellow, who placed himself beside him. He inveighs against the popular leaders; whom he professes to hate heartily:—It was The-

seus, he adds, who was the author of all these evils in the State. Such is the discourse which he holds with foreigners, and with the few citizens whose temper is like his own.

XXX.

THE MALIGNANT.

—ever ready to head a licencious mob.

XXX.

THE MALIGNANT.

Some men love and pursue evil, purely for its own sake, with an eager relish. A man of this temper seeks his element amid the turbulencies of public life. His chosen associates are men of ruined fortune; especially those whom sequestrations and forfeitures have rendered ill-affected to the Government. In such society he thinks to become, at once, thoroughly practised in mischief, and formidable to the State. If the conduct of men of worth and principle is spoken of before him, he throws in some insinuation,—'So goes the world:' —or he boldly affirms, that there is no such thing as an honest man;—that all are knaves alike. The

good he defames and persecutes: the bad alone he applauds, as men of a liberal spirit. If a man of his own sort is candidate for an office, he will grant that there may be some truth in what is commonly reported of him; but, as to such and such charges, —he has never heard of them before: yet, be these things as they may,—'he is a fellow of a noble spirit,—a firm friend to his party—and a man of splendid talent: in short, you can no where find one so fit for the office.' He sides with any one who, in the assembly of the people, or in the courts of justice, is pleading a desperate cause. If he is on the bench when some flagitious state-prisoner is at the bar, he urges the principle, that it is not the man's character, but the mere fact in question that is to be determined. 'Be it,' says he, 'that the fellow disturbs the repose of men in power; yet is he the people's dog; he keeps watch against those who would invade their rights: and if we abandon such men, we shall no longer find

any who will concern themselves for the interests of the commonwealth.'

He is the true demagogue,—ever ready to head a licentious mob. If any measure is to be carried in court against law and equity, he will associate himself with the judges, that he may give the business his best aid. Whether he be advocate or judge, it is his rule to put the worst interpretation upon all that is said by an opponent.

We may safely say, even if such a man's personal conduct never offends the letter of the law, that he who is the professed patron and friend of knaves is himself a knave. So true is the proverb, that 'Like loves like.'

ΘΕΟΦΡΑΣΤΟΣ
ΜΕΛΑΝΤΑ
ΕΡΕΣΙΟΣ

ΘΕΟΦΡΑΣΤΟΥ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΕΣ.

ΘΕΟΦΡΑΣΤΟΣ ΠΟΛΥΚΛΕΙ.

Ἤδη μὲν καὶ πρότερον πολλάκις ἐπιστήσας τὴν διάνοιαν ἐθαύμασα, ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ παύσομαι θαυμάζων, τί γὰρ δήποτε τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀέρα κειμένης, καὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμοίως παιδευομένων, συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν τῶν τρόπων ἔχειν.

Ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὦ Πολύκλεις, συνθεωρήσας ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, καὶ βεβιωκὼς ἔτη ἐννενήκοντα ἐννέα, ἔτι δὲ ὡμιληκὼς πολλαῖς τε καὶ παντοδαπαῖς φύσεσι, καὶ παρατεθεαμένος ἐξ ἀκριβείας πολλῆς τούς τε ἀγαθοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς φαύλους, ὑπέλαβον δεῖν συγγράψαι ἃ ἑκάτεροι αὐτῶν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Ἐκθήσω δέ σοι κατὰ γένος ὅσα τε τυγχάνει γένη τρόπων τούτοις προσκείμενα, καὶ ὃν τρόπον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ χρῶνται.

Ὑπολαμβάνω γὰρ, ὦ Πολύκλεις, τοὺς υἱοὺς ἡμῶν βελτίους ἔσεσθαι, καταλειφθέντων αὐτοῖς ὑπομνημάτων τοιούτων· οἷς παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι, αἱρήσονται τοῖς εὐσχημονεστάτοις συνεῖναί τε καὶ ὁμιλεῖν, ὅπως μὴ καταδεέστεροι ὦσιν αὐτῶν.

Τρέψομαι δὲ ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· σὸν δὲ παρακολουθῆσαί τε καὶ εἰδῆσαι εἰ ὀρθῶς λέγω. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ποιήσομαι τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν εἰρωνείαν ἐζηλωκότων, ἀφεὶς τὸ προοιμιάζεσθαι, καὶ πολλὰ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν. Καὶ ἄρξομαι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρωνείας, καὶ ὁριοῦμαι αὐτήν· εἶθ' οὕτως τὸν Εἴρωνα διέξειμι, ποῖός τίς ἐστι, καὶ εἰς τίνα τρόπον κατενήνεκται· καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὴ τῶν παθημάτων, ὥσπερ ὑπεθέμην, πειράσομαι κατὰ γένος φανερὰ καταστῆσαι.

Α.

ΠΕΡΙ ΕΙΡΩΝΕΙΑΣ.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρωνεία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν, προσποίησις ἐπὶ χεῖρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων. Ὁ δὲ Εἴρων, τοιοῦτός τίς, οἷος προσελθὼν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐθέλειν λαλεῖν, οὐ μισεῖν· καὶ ἐπαινεῖν παρόντας, οἷς ἐπέθετο λάθρα, καὶ τούτοις συλλυπεῖσθαι ἡττημένοις· καὶ συγγνώμην δὲ ἔχειν τοῖς κακῶς αὐτὸν λέγουσι, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς καθ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγομένοις· καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικουμένους καὶ ἀγαναικτοῦντας πραΰως διαλέγεσθαι. Καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνειν κατὰ σπουδὴν βουλομένοις, προστάξαι ἐπανελθεῖν· καὶ προσποιήσασθαι ἄρτι παραγεγονέναι, καὶ ὀψὲ γενέσθαι αὐτὸν, καὶ μαλακισθῆναι. καὶ μηδὲν ὧν πράττει, ὁμολο-

γῆσαι, ἀλλὰ φῆσαι βουλεύεσθαι· Καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δανειζομένους καὶ ἐρανίζοντας-----ὡς οὐ πωλεῖ· καὶ μὴ πωλῶν, φήσει πωλεῖν. Καὶ ἀκούσας τὶ, μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι· καὶ ἰδὼν, φήσει μὴ ἑωρακέναι, καὶ ὁμολογήσας μὴ μεμνῆσθαι. Καὶ τὰ μὲν σκέψεσθαι φάσκειν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ θαυμάζειν, τὰ δὲ ἤδη ποτὲ καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω διαλογίσασθαι. Καὶ τὸ ὅλον, δεινὸς τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι, Οὐ πιστεύω· Οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω· Ἐκπλήττομαι· καὶ λέγειν ἑαυτὸν ἕτερον γεγονέναι· καὶ μὴν, Οὐ ταῦτα πρὸς ἐμὲ διεξήει· παράδοξόν μοι τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἄλλῳ τινὶ λέγε· ὅπως δέ σοι ἀπιστήσω, ἢ ἐκείνου καταγνῶ, ἀποροῦμαι.

Ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ σὺ θᾶττον πιστεύῃς τοιαύτας φωνὰς καὶ πλοκὰς καὶ παλιλλογίας· οὗ χεῖρόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν οὐδέν. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ἠθῶν μὴ ἁπλᾶ, ἀλλ' ἐπίβουλα, φυλάττεσθαι μᾶλλον δεῖ ἢ τοὺς ἔχεις.

Β.

ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΛΑΚΕΙΑΣ.

ΤΗΝ δὲ κολακείαν ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις ὁμιλίαν αἰσχρὰν εἶναι, συμφέρουσαν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι. Τὸν δὲ κόλακα τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὥστε πορευόμενον ἅμα εἰπεῖν, Ἐνθυμῇ ὡς ἀποβλέπουσι πρὸς σὲ οἱ ἄνθρωποι; Τοῦτο οὐδενὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γίνεται πλὴν σοί. Ηὐδοκίμεις χθὲς ἐν τῇ στοᾷ· πλειόνων γὰρ ἢ τριάκοντα ἀνθρώπων καθημένων, καὶ ἐμπεσόντος λόγου τίς εἴη βέλτιστος, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀρξαμένους πάντας, ἐπὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ κατενεχθῆναι. Καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα λέγων, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱματίου ἀφελεῖν κροκίδα· καὶ ἐάν τι πρὸς τὸ τρίχωμα τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀπὸ πνεύματος προσενεχθῇ ἄχυρον, καρφολογῆσαι· καὶ ἐπιγελάσας δὲ εἰπεῖν,

Ὁρᾷς; ὅτι δυεῖν σοὶ ἡμερῶν οὐκ ἐντετύχηκα, πολιῶν ἔσχηκας τὸν πώγωνα μεστόν· καίπερ, εἴτις καὶ ἄλλος, ἔχεις πρὸς τὰ ἔτη μέλαιναν τὴν τρίχα. Καὶ λέγοντος δὲ Αὐτοῦ τι, τοὺς ἄλλους σιωπᾷν κελεῦσαι, καὶ ἐπαινέσαι δὲ ἀκούοντος· καὶ ἐπισημήνασθαι δὲ, εἰ παύεται, ὀρθῶς. Καὶ σκώψαντι ψυχρῶς, ἐπιγελάσαι, τό τε ἱμάτιον ὦσαι εἰς τὸ στόμα, ὡς δὴ οὐ δυνάμενος κατασχεῖν τὸν γέλωτα· καὶ τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας ἐπιστῆναι κελεῦσαι, ἕως ἂν Αὐτὸς παρέλθῃ. Καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις μῆλα καὶ ἀπίους πριάμενος, εἰσενέγκας δοῦναι, ὁρῶντος Αὐτοῦ· καὶ φιλήσας δὲ εἰπεῖν, Χρηστοῦ πατρὸς νεόττια! Καὶ συνωνούμενος δὲ κρηπῖδας, τὸν πόδα φῆσαι εἶναι εὐρυθμότερον τοῦ ὑποδήματος. Καὶ πορευομένου πρός τινα τῶν φίλων, προδραμὼν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Πρός σε ἔρχεται· καὶ ἀναστρέψας, ὅτι Προήγγελκα. Ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ γυναικείας ἀγορᾶς διακονῆσαι δυνατὸς ἀπνευστί. Καὶ τῶν ἑστιωμένων, πρῶτος ἐπαινέσαι τὸν οἶνον· καὶ παραπείμενος εἰπεῖν,

ὡς μαλακῶς ἐσθίεις! καὶ ἆρας τὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης, φῆσαι, τουτὶ ἄρα ὡς χρηστόν ἐστι! Καὶ ἐρωτῆσαι μὴ ῥιγοῖ, καὶ εἰ ἐπιβαλέσθαι βούλεται, καὶ ἔτι ταῦτα λέγων, περιστεῖλαι αὐτόν. Καὶ μὴν πρὸς τὸ οὖς προσπίπτων, ψιθυρίζειν· καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλέπων, τοῖς ἄλλοις λαλεῖν. Καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἀφελόμενος τὰ προκεφάλαια, αὐτὸς ὑποστρῶσαι. Καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν φῆσαι εὖ ἠρχιτεκτονῆσθαι, καὶ τὸν ἀγρὸν εὖ πεφυτεῦσθαι, καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ὁμοίαν εἶναι. Καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον, τὸν κόλακά ἐστι θεάσασθαι πάντα καὶ λέγοντα καὶ πράττοντα οἷς χαριεῖσθαι ὑπολαμβάνει.

Γ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΔΟΛΕΣΧΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ ἀδολεσχία ἐστὶ μὲν διήγησις λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων. Ὁ δὲ ἀδολέσχης τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οἷος ὃν μὴ γινώσκει, τούτῳ παρακαθεζόμενος πλησίον, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὸς εἰπεῖν ἐγκώμιον· Εἶτα ὁ τῆς νυκτὸς εἶδεν ἐνύπνιον, τοῦτο διηγήσασθαι· Εἶθ' ὧν εἶχεν ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα διεξελθεῖν. Εἶτα δὴ προχωροῦντος τοῦ πράγματος, λέγειν, ὡς πολὺ πονηρότεροί εἰσιν οἱ νῦν ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἀρχαίων· Καὶ ὡς ἄξιοι γεγόνασιν οἱ πυροὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ· Καὶ ὡς πολλοὶ ἐπιδημοῦσι ξένοι· Καὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐκ Διονυσίων πλώϊμον εἶναι· Καὶ εἰ ποιήσειεν ὁ Ζεὺς ὕδωρ, τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ βελτίω ἔσεσθαι· Καὶ ὅτι ἀγρὸν

εἰς νέωτα γεωργήσει· Καὶ ὡς χαλεπόν ἐστι τὸ ζῆν. Καὶ ὡς Δάμιππος μυστηρίοις μεγίστην δᾷδα ἔστησε· Καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ κίονες τοῦ Ὠιδείου; Καὶ χθὲς ἤμεσα· Καὶ τίς ἐστιν ἡμέρα σήμερον; Καὶ ὡς Βοηδρομιῶνος μέν ἐστι τὰ μυστήρια, Πυανεψιῶνος δὲ Ἀπατούρια, Ποσειδεῶνος δὲ τὰ κατ' ἀγροὺς Διονύσια. Κἂν ὑπομένῃ τις αὐτὸν, μὴ ἀφίστασθαι, Παρασείσαντα δὴ δεῖ τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ διαράμενον ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, ὅστις ἀπύρετος βούλεται εἶναι· Ἔργον γὰρ συναρκεῖσθαι τοῖς μήτε σχολὴν, μήτε σπουδὴν διαγινώσκουσιν.

Δ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΡΟΙΚΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ ἀγροικία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ἀμαθία ἀσχήμων. Ὁ δὲ ἄγροικος, τοιοῦτός τις οἷος κυπεῶνα πιὼν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν πορεύεσθαι. Καὶ τὸ μύρον φάσκειν οὐδὲν τοῦ θύμου ἥδιον ὄζειν. Καὶ μείζω τοῦ ποδὸς τὰ ὑποδήματα φορεῖν. Καὶ μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ λαλεῖν. Καὶ τοῖς μὲν φίλοις καὶ οἰκείοις ἀπιστεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς αὐτοῦ οἰκέτας ἀναποινοῦσθαι περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· καὶ τοῖς παρ' αὐτῷ ἐργαζομένοις μισθωτοῖς ἐν ἀγρῷ, πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας διηγεῖσθαι. Καὶ ἀναβεβλημένος ἄνω τοῦ γόνατος καθιζάνειν, ὥστε τὰ γυμνὰ αὐτοῦ φαίνεσθαι. Καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ μὲν μηδενὶ θαυμάζειν, μήτε ἐκπλήττεσθαι· ὅταν δὲ ἴδῃ ἐν

ταῖς ὁδοῖς βοῦν, ἢ ὄνον, ἢ τράγον, ἑστηκὼς θεωρεῖν. Καὶ προαιρῶν δέ τι ἐκ τοῦ ταμείου, δεινὸς φαγεῖν, καὶ ζωρότερον πιεῖν· καὶ τὴν σιτοποιὸν πειρᾶν λαθεῖν· κᾆτ' ἀλέσαι μετ' αὐτῆς, τοῖς ἔνδον πᾶσι καὶ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. Καὶ ἀριστῶν δὲ ἅμα τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις ἐμβαλεῖν τὸν χόρτον. Καὶ πόψαντος τὴν θύραν ὑπακοῦσαι αὐτός. Καὶ τὸν κύνα προσκαλεσάμενος, καὶ ἐπιλαβόμενος τοῦ ῥύγχους, εἰπεῖν, οὗτος φυλάττει τὸ χωρίον, καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, καὶ τοὺς ἔνδον. Καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον δὲ παρά του λαβὼν ἀποδοκιμάζειν, λίαν μὲν λυπρὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἕτερον ἅμα ἀλλάττεσθαι. Καὶ εἴ τῳ ἄροτρον ἔχρησεν, ἢ κόφινον, ἢ δρέπανον, ἢ θύλακον, ταῦτα τῆς νυκτὸς κατὰ ἀγρυπνίαν ἀναμιμνησκόμενος. Καὶ εἰς ἄστυ καταβαίνων, ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν ἀπαντῶντα, πόσου ἦσαν αἱ διφθέραι καὶ τὸ τάριχος· καὶ εἰ σήμερον ὁ ἀγὼν νουμηνίαν ἄγει· καὶ εἰπεῖν εὐθὺς ὅτι βούλεται καταβὰς ἀποκείρασθαι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁδοῦ παριὼν

κομίσασθαι παρ' Ἀρχίου τοὺς ταρίχους. Καὶ ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ ᾆσαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑποδήματα δὲ ἧλους ἐγκροῦσαι.

Ε.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΣΚΕΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ ἀρέσκεια ἔστι μὲν, ὡς ὅρῳ περιλαβεῖν, ἔντευξις οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἡδονῆς παρασκευαστική. Ὁ δὲ ἄρεσκος ἀμέλει τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος πόρρωθεν προσαγορεύσας, καὶ ἄνδρα κράτιστον εἰπὼν, καὶ θαυμάσας ἱκανῶς, ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς χερσὶ μὴ ἀφιέναι· καὶ μικρὸν προπέμψας καὶ ἐρωτήσας πότε αὐτὸν ὄψεται, ἔτι ἐπαινῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. Καὶ παρακληθεὶς δὲ πρὸς δίαιταν, μὴ μόνον ᾧ πάρεστι βούλεσθαι ἀρέσκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ, ἵνα κοινὸς εἶναι δοκῇ· καὶ τοὺς ξένους δὲ εἰπεῖν ὡς δικαιότερα λέγουσι τῶν πολιτῶν. Καὶ πεπλημένος δὲ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, κελεῦσαι καλέσαι τὰ παιδία τὸν ἐστιῶντα·

καὶ εἰσιόντα, φῆσαι σύκου ὁμοιότερα εἶναι τῷ πατρί· καὶ προσαγαγόμενος, φιλῆσαι, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸν καθίσαι· καὶ τοῖς μὲν συμπαίζειν αὐτὸς, λέγων, ἀσκός! πέλεκυς! τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς γαστρὸς ἐᾷν καθεύδειν, ἅμα θλιβόμενος. ..... Καὶ πλειστάκις δὲ ἀποκείρασθαι, καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας λευκοὺς ἔχειν· καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια δὲ χρηστὰ μεταβάλλεσθαι, καὶ χρίσματι ἀλείφεσθαι· Καὶ τῆς μὲν ἀγορᾶς πρὸς τὰς τραπέζας προσφοιτᾷν· τῶν δὲ γυμνασίων ἐν τούτοις διατρίβειν, οὗ ἂν ἔφηβοι γυμνάζωνται· τοῦ δὲ θεάτρου καθῆσθαι, ὅταν ᾖ θέα, πλησίον τῶν στρατηγῶν· Καὶ ἀγοράζειν ἑαυτῷ μὲν μηδέν, ξένοις δὲ εἰς Βυζάντιον ἐπιστάλματα· καὶ Δακωνικὰς κύνας εἰς Κύζικον· καὶ μέλι Ὑμήττιον, εἰς Ῥόδον· καὶ ταῦτα ποιῶν, τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει διηγεῖσθαι. Ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ πίθηκον θρέψαι δεινὸς, καὶ τίτυρον κτήσασθαι, καὶ Σικελικὰς περιστερὰς, καὶ δορκαδείους ἀστραγάλους, καὶ θηριακὰς τῶν στρογγύλων ληκύθους, καὶ βακτηρίας τῶν σκο-

λιῶν ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, καὶ αὐλαίαν ἔχουσαν Πέρσας ἐνυφασμένους, καὶ αὐλίδιον παλαιστρικὸν κόνιν ἔχον, καὶ σφαιρίστηριον· καὶ τοῦτο περιϊὼν χρᾶν ἀεὶ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, τοῖς σοφισταῖς, τοῖς ὁπλομάχοις, τοῖς ἁρμονικοῖς, ἐπιδείκνυσθαι. Καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιδείξεσιν ὕστερον ἐπεισελθεῖν, ὥστε εἰπεῖν τινα τῶν θεωμένων, πρὸς ἕτερον, ὅτι τούτου ἐστὶν ἡ παλαίστρα.

ΣΤ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΝΟΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ ἀπόνοια ἐστιν ὑπομονὴ αἰσχρῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων. Ὁ δὲ ἀπονενοημένος, τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ὀμόσαι ταχὺ, κακῶς ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ λοιδορηθῆναι δυνάμενος. Τῷ ἤθει ἀγοραῖός τις, καὶ ἀνασεσυρμένος, καὶ παντοποιός. Ἀμέλει δυνατὸς καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι νήφων τὸν κόρδακα, καὶ προσωπεῖον οὐκ ἔχων ἐν κωμικῷ χορῷ. Καὶ ἐν θαύμασι δὲ τοὺς χαλκοὺς ἐκλέγειν, καθ' ἕκαστον παριών· καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς τὸ σύμβολον φέρουσι, καὶ προῖκα θεωρεῖν ἀξιοῦσι. Δεινὸς δὲ καὶ παυδοκεῦσαι, καὶ πορνοβοσκῆσαι, καὶ τελωνῆσαι, καὶ μηδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν ἐργασίαν ἀποδοκιμάσαι, ἀλλὰ κηρύττειν, μαγειρεύειν, κυβεύειν, τὴν μητέρα

μὴ τρέφειν, ἀπάγεσθαι κλοπῆς, τὸ δεσμωτήριον πλείω χρόνον οἰκεῖν ἢ τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν.

Καὶ τούτων δ' ἂν εἶναι δόξειε τῶν περιϊσταμένων τοὺς ὄχλους, καὶ προσκαλούντων μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ παρερρωγυίᾳ, λοιδορουμένων καὶ διαλεγομένων πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ μεταξὺ οἱ μὲν προσίασιν, οἱ δὲ ἀπίασι πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀρχήν, τοῖς δὲ συλλαβήν, τοῖς δὲ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος λέγει, οὐκ ἄλλως θεωρεῖσθαι ἀξιῶν τὴν ἀπόνοιαν αὐτοῦ, ἢ ὅταν ᾖ πανήγυρις. Ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ δίκας τὰς μὲν φεύγειν, τὰς δὲ διώκειν, τὰς δὲ ἐξόμνυσθαι, ταῖς δὲ παρεῖναι· ἔχων ἐχῖνον ἐν τῷ προκολπίῳ, καὶ ὁρμαθοὺς γραμματιδίων ἐν ταῖς χερσίν· οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζων δὲ οὐδ' ἅμα πολλῶν ἀγοραίων στρατηγεῖν, καὶ εὐθὺς τούτοις δανείζειν, καὶ τῆς δραχμῆς τόκον τρία ἡμιωβόλια τῆς ἡμέρας πράττεσθαι· καὶ ἐφοδεύειν τὰ μαγειρεῖα, τὰ ἰχθυοπωλεῖα, τὰ ταριχοπωλεῖα· καὶ τοὺς τόκους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐμπολήματος εἰς

τὴν γνάθον ἐκλέγειν. Ἐργώδεις δέ εἰσιν οἱ τὸ στόμα εὔλυτον ἔχοντες πρὸς λοιδορίαν, καὶ φθεγγόμενοι μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ, ὡς συνηχεῖν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὰ ἐργαστήρια.

Z.

ΠΕΡΙ ΛΑΛΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ λαλιὰ, εἴ τις αὐτὴν ὁρίζεσθαι βούλοιτο, εἶναι ἂν δόξειεν ἀκρασία τοῦ λόγου. Ὁ δὲ λάλος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος τῷ ἐντυγχάνοντι εἰπεῖν, ἂν ὁτιοῦν πρὸς αὐτὸν φθέγξηται, ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει· καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς πάντα οἶδε· καὶ ἂν ἀκούῃ αὐτοῦ, μαθήσεται· καὶ μεταξὺ δὲ ἀποκρινομένου ὑποβάλλειν, εἴπας, σὺ μὴ ἐπιλάθῃ ὃ μέλλεις λέγειν· καὶ, εὖγε ὅτι μὲ ὑπέμνησας· καὶ, τὸ λαλεῖν ὡς χρήσιμόν που! Καὶ ὃ παρέλιπον· καὶ, ταχύ γε συνῆκας τὸ πρᾶγμα· καὶ, πάλαι σὲ παρετήρουν εἰ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοὶ κατενεχθήσῃ· καὶ ἑτέρας ἀφορμὰς τοιαύτας πορίσασθαι, ὥστε μηδὲ ἀναπνεῦσαι τὸν ἐντυγχάνοντα. Καὶ ὅταν γε τοὺς

καθ' ἕνα ἀποκναίσῃ, δεινὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀθρόους καὶ συνεστηκότας πορευθῆναι, καὶ φυγεῖν ποιῆσαι μεταξὺ χρηματίζοντας. Καὶ εἰς τὰ διδασκαλεῖα δὲ καὶ εἰς τὰς παλαίστρας εἰσιὼν, κωλύειν τοὺς παῖδας προσμανθάνειν, τοσαῦτα προσλαλῶν τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις καὶ διδασκάλοις· καὶ τοὺς ἀπιέναι φάσκοντας δεινὸς προπέμψαι, καὶ ἀποκαταστῆσαι εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν. Καὶ τυθόμενος τὰς ἐκκλησίας ἀπαγγέλλειν· καὶ προσδιηγήσασθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀριστοφῶντος ποτε γενομένην τοῦ ῥήτορος μάχην, καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ Δυσάνδρου· καὶ οὓς ποτε λόγους αὐτὸς εἴπας ἡυδοκίμησεν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ· καὶ κατὰ τῶν πληθῶν γε, ἅμα διηγούμενος, κατηγορίαν παρεμβαλεῖν· ὥστε τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἤ τοι ἐπιλαθέσθαι, ἢ νυστάξαι, ἢ μεταξὺ καταλιπόντας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. Καὶ συνδικάζων δὲ, κωλῦσαι κρῖναι· καὶ συνθεωρῶν, θεάσασθαι· καὶ συνδειπνῶν, φαγεῖν. Λέγων ὅτι χαλεπὸν τῷ λάλῳ ἐστὶ σιωπᾷν· καὶ

ὡς ἐν ὑγρῷ ἐστὶν ἡ γλῶττα· καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν σιωπήσειεν, οὐδ' εἰ τῶν χελιδόνων δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι λαλίστερος. Καὶ σκωπτόμενος ὑπομεῖναι· καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῦ παιδίων, ὅταν αὐτὸν ἤδη καθεύδειν βουλόμενα κελεύῃ, λέγοντα, Πάππα, λαλεῖ τι ἡμῖν ὅπως ἂν ἡμᾶς ὕπνος λάβῃ.

Η.

ΠΕΡΙ ΛΟΓΟΠΟΙΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ λογοποιΐα ἔστι σύνθεσις ψευδῶν λόγων καὶ πράξεων, ὧν βούλεται ὁ λογοποιῶν. Ὁ δὲ λογοποιὸς τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ὑπαντήσας τῷ φίλῳ, εὐθὺς μεταβαλὼν τὸ ἦθος, καὶ μειδιάσας, ἐρωτῆσαι, πόθεν σὺ, καὶ τί λέγεις; καὶ ἔχεις περὶ τοῦδε εἰπεῖν καινόν; καὶ ἐπιβαλὼν ἐρωτᾷν, μὴ λέγεταί τι καινότερον; καὶ μὴν ἀγαθά ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα· καὶ οὐκ ἐάσας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, εἰπεῖν, τί λέγεις; οὐδὲν ἀκήκοας; δοκῶ μοί σε εὐωχήσειν καινῶν λόγων. Καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ἢ στρατιώτης, ἢ παῖς Ἀστείου τοῦ αὐλητοῦ, ἢ Λύκων ὁ ἐργολάβος παραγεγονὼς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς μάχης, οὗ φησὶν ἀκηκοέναι. Αἱ μὲν οὖν

ἀναφοραὶ τῶν λόγων τοιαῦταί εἰσιν αὐταῦ, ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔχοι ἐπιλαβέσθαι. Διηγεῖται δὲ τούτους φάσκων λέγειν, ὡς Πολυσπέρχων καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς μάχῃ νενίκηκε, καὶ Κάσανδρος ἐζώγρηται· κἂν εἴπῃ τὶς αὐτῷ, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πιστεύεις; φήσει, τὰ πρᾶγμα βοᾶσθαι γὰρ ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐπεντείνειν· καὶ πάντας συμφωνεῖν, ταὐτὰ γὰρ λέγειν περὶ τῆς μάχης, καὶ πολὺν τὸν ζωμὸν (φόνον) γεγονέναι· εἶναι δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ σημεῖον τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν· ὁρᾶν γὰρ αὐτῶν πάντων μεταβεβληκότα· λέγει δ' ὡς καὶ παρακήκοε παρὰ τούτοις πρυττόμενόν τινα ἐν οἰκίᾳ, ἤδη πέμπτην ἡμέραν ἥκοντα ἐκ Μακεδονίας, ὃς πάντα ταῦτα εἶδε· καὶ ταῦτα διεξιὼν, ὡς οἴεται, πιθανῶς, σχετλιάζει, λέγων, δυστυχὴς Κάσανδρος! ὦ ταλαίπωρος! ἐνθυμῇ τὸ τῆς τύχης· ἀλλ' οὖν ἰσχυρός γε γενόμενος· καὶ δεῖ δὲ αὐτό σε μόνον εἰδέναι· πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει προσδεδράμηκε λέγων.

Τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων τεθαύμακα τί ποτε βούλονται, λογοποιοῦντες· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ψεύδονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλυσιτελῶς ἀπαλλάττουσι· πολλάκις γὰρ αὐτῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς βαλανείοις περιστᾶσεις ποιούμενοι, τὰ ἱματία ἀποβεβλήκασιν· οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ στοᾷ πεζομαχίᾳ καὶ ναυμαχίᾳ νικῶντες, ἐρήμους δίκας ὠφλήκασιν· εἰσὶ δ' οἳ καὶ πόλεις τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ κράτος αἱροῦντες, παρεδειπνήθησαν. Πάνυ δὴ ταλαίπωρον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα· ποίᾳ γὰρ οὐ στοᾷ, ποίῳ δὲ ἐργαστηρίῳ, ποίῳ δὲ μέρει τῆς ἀγορᾶς οὐ διημερεύουσιν, ἀπαυδᾷν ποιοῦντες τοὺς ἀκούοντας οὕτως, καὶ καταπονοῦντες ταῖς ψευδολογίαις.

Θ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΣΧΡΟΚΕΡΔΕΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ αἰσχροκέρδειά ἐστι περιουσία κέρδους αἰσχροῦ. Ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ αἰσχροκερδὴς, οἷος ἐστιῶν ἄρτους ἱκανοὺς μὴ παραθεῖναι· καὶ δανείσασθαι παρὰ ξένου παρ' αὐτῷ καταλύοντος· καὶ διανέμων μερίδας φῆσαι δίκαιον εἶναι δίμοιρον τῷ διανέμοντι δίδοσθαι, καὶ εὐθὺς αὐτῷ νεῖμαι.

Καὶ οἰνοπωλῶν, κεκραμένον τὸν οἶνον τῷ φίλῳ ἀποδόσθαι. Καὶ ἐπὶ θέαν τηνικαῦτα πορεύεσθαι, ἄγων τοὺς υἱεῖς, ἡνίκα πρῶτα ἀφιᾶσιν οἱ θεατρῶναι. Καὶ ἀποδημῶν δημοσίᾳ, τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐφόδιον οἴκοι καταλιπεῖν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν συμπρεσβευόντων δανείσασθαι. Καὶ τῷ ἀκολούθῳ ἐπιθεῖναι μεῖζον φορ-

τίον ἢ δύναται φέρειν, καὶ ἐλάχιστα ἐπιτήδεια ἄλλων παρέχειν. Καὶ τῶν ξενίων τὸ μέρος τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀπαιτήσας ἀποδόσθαι. Καὶ ἀλειφόμενος ἐν τῷ βαλανείῳ, καὶ εἰπὼν, σαπρόν γε τὸ ἔλαιον, τῷ παιδαρίῳ, τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλείφεσθαι. Καὶ τῶν εὑρισκομένων χαλκῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν, δεινὸς ἀπαιτῆσαι τὸ μέρος, κοινὸν εἶναι φήσας τὸν Ἑρμῆν.

Καὶ ἱμάτιον ἐνδοῦναι πλῦναι καὶ χρησάμενος παρὰ γνωρίμου ἐφελκῦσαι πλείους ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἀπαιτηθῇ· καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· φαιδωνίῳ μέτρῳ τὸν πύνδακα ἐγκεκρουσμένῳ, μετρεῖν αὐτὸς τοῖς ἔνδον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, σφόδρα ἀποψῶν· καὶ ὑποπρίασθαί τι, φίλου διδόντος πρὸς τρόπου, καὶ ἐπιβαλὼν ἀποδόσθαι. Ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ χρέος ἀποδιδοὺς τριάκοντα μνῶν, ἔλαττον τέτταρσι δραχμαῖς ἀποδιδόναι· καὶ τῶν υἱῶν δὲ μὴ πορευομένων εἰς τὸ διδασκαλεῖον τὸν μῆνα ὅλον διὰ τὴν ἀῤῥωστίαν, ἀφαιρεῖν τοῦ μισθοῦ κατὰ λόγον· καὶ τὸν Ἀγθεστηριῶνα μὴ πέμπειν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ μα-

θήματα, διὰ τὸ θέας εἶναι πολλὰς, ἵνα μὴ τὸν μισθὸν ἐκτίνῃ· καὶ παρὰ παιδὸς κομιζόμενος ἀποφορὰν, τοῦ χαλκοῦ τὴν ἐπικαταλλαγὴν προσαπαιτεῖν· καὶ λογισμὸν δὲ λαμβάνων παρὰ τοῦ χειρίζοντος. καὶ τοὺς φράτορας ἑστιῶν, αἰτεῖν τοῖς αὐτοῦ παισὶν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ ὄψον, τὰ δὲ καταλειπόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης ἡμίσεα τῶν ῥαφανίδων ἀπογράφεσθαι, ἵνα οἱ διακονοῦντες παῖδες μὴ λάβωσι· συναποδημῶν δὲ μετὰ γνωρίμων, χρήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκείνων παισὶ, τὸν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἔξω μισθῶσαι, καὶ μὴ ἀναφέρειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τὸν μισθόν. Ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ συναγόντων παρ' αὐτῷ ἀποθεῖναι τῶν αὐτῷ διδομένων ξύλων, καὶ φακῶν, καὶ ὄξους, καὶ ἁλῶν, καὶ ἐλαίου τοῦ εἰς τὸν λύχνον· καὶ γαμοῦντός τινος τῶν φίλων ἢ ἐκδιδομένου θυγατέρα, πρὸ χρόνου τινὸς ἀποδημῆσαι, ἵνα μὴ προπέμψῃ προσφοράν· καὶ παρὰ τῶν γνωρίμων τοιαῦτα κιχρᾶσθαι, ἃ μήτ' ἄν τις ἀπαιτήσαι, μήτ' ἀποδιδόντων ταχέως ἂν κομίσαιτο.

1.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΑΙΣΧΥΝΤΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ ἀναισχυντία ἐστὶ μὲν, ὡς ὅρῳ λαβεῖν, καταφρόνησις δόξης αἰσχροῦ ἕνεκα κέρδους. Ὁ δὲ ἀναίσχυντος τοιοῦτος, οἷος πρῶτον μὲν, ὃν ἀποστερεῖ, πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπελθὼν δανείζεσθαι. Εἶτα θύσας τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτὸς μὲν δειπνεῖν παρ' ἑτέρῳ, τὰ δὲ κρέα ἀποτιθέναι ἁλσὶ πάσας· καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος τὸν ἀκόλουθον, δοῦναι ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης, ἄρας κρέας καὶ ἄρτον, καὶ εἰπεῖν, ἀκουόντων πάντων, εὐωχοῦ Τίβιε. Καὶ ὀψωνῶν δὲ, ὑπομιμνήσκειν τὸν κρεωπώλην, εἴ τι χρήσιμος αὐτῷ γέγονε· καὶ ἑστηκὼς πρὸς τῷ σταθμῷ, μάλιστα μὲν κρέας, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὀστοῦν εἰς τὸν ζυγὸν ἐμβάλλειν· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν λαβῇ,

εὖ ἔχει· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἁρπάσας ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης χολίκιον, ἅμα γελῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. Καὶ ξένοις δὲ αὐτοῦ θέαν ἀγοράσας, μὴ δοὺς τὸ μέρος, θεωρεῖν· ἄγειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν, καὶ τὸν παιδαγωγόν. Καὶ ὅσα ἐωνημένος ἄξιά τις φέρει, μεταδοῦναι κελεῦσαι καὶ αὐτῷ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν ἐλθὼν, δανείζεσθαι κριθὰς, ποτὲ δὲ ἄχυρον· καὶ ταῦτα χρήσαντας ἀναγκάσαι ἀποφέρειν πρὸς αὐτόν. Δεινὸς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ χαλκεῖα τὰ ἐν τῷ βαλανείῳ προσελθὼν, καὶ βάψας ἀρύταιναν, βοῶντος τοῦ βαλανέως, αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ καταχέασθαι, καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι λέλουται, ἀπιὼν, κἀπεῖ, οὐδεμία σοι χάρις.



ΙΑ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΜΙΚΡΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ μικρολογία ἐστι φειδωλία τοῦ διαφόρου ὑπὲρ τὸν καιρόν. Ὁ δὲ μικρολόγος, τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ἐν τῷ μηνὶ ἡμιωβόλιον ἀπαιτεῖν, ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν. Καὶ συσσιτῶν, ἀριθμεῖν πόσας πύλικας ἕκαστος πέπωκε. Καὶ ἀπάρχεσθαι ἐλάχιστον τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῶν συνδεικνοῦντων. Καὶ ὅσα μικροῦ τις πριάμενος λογίζεται, πάντα φάσκειν εἶναι ἄγαν. Καὶ οἰκέτου χύτραν ἢ λοπάδα κατάξαντος, εἰσπρᾶξαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. Καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς ἀποβαλούσης τρίχαλκον, οἷος μεταφέρειν τὰ σκευὴ, καὶ τὰς κλίνας, καὶ τὰς κιβωτοὺς, καὶ διφᾶν τὰ καλύμματα. Καὶ ἐάν τι πωλῇ, τοσούτου ἀποδόσθαι, ὥστε μὴ λυσιτελεῖν τῷ

τι πωλῇ, τοσούτου ἀποδόσθαι, ὥστε μὴ λυσιτελεῖν τῷ πριαμένῳ. Καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαι οὔτε συκοτραγῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κήπου, οὔτε διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀγροῦ πορευθῆναι, οὔτε ἐλάαν ἢ φοίνικα τῶν χαμαὶ πεπτωκότων ἀνελέσθαι. Καὶ τοὺς ὅρους δὲ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι ὁσημέραι, εἰ διαμένουσιν οἱ αὐτοί. Δεινὸς δὲ καὶ ὑπερημερίαν πρᾶξαι, καὶ τόκον τόκου. Καὶ ἐστιῶν τοὺς δημότας, μικρὰ τὰ κρέα κόψας παραθεῖναι. Καὶ ὀψωνῶν, μηδὲν πριάμενος εἰσελθεῖν. Καὶ ἀπαγορεῦσαι τῇ γυναικὶ, μήτε ἄλας χρᾶν, μήτε ἐλλύχνιον, μήτε κύμινον, μήτε ὀρίγανον, μήτε οὐλὰς, μήτε στέμματα, μήτε θυλήματα· ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὅτι τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα πολλά ἐστι τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ.

Καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ, τῶν μικρολόγων καὶ τὰς ἀργυροθήκας ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν εὐρωτιώσας, καὶ κλεῖς ἰωμένας· καὶ αὐτοὺς δὲ φοροῦντας ἐλάττω τῶν μικρῶν τὰ ἱμάτια, καὶ ἐκ ληκυθίων μικρῶν πάνυ ἀλειφομένους, καὶ ἐν χρῷ κειρομένους, καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς ἡμέρας ὑπολυο-

μένους· καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γναφεῖς διατεινομένους, ὅπως τὸ ἱμάτιον αὐτοῖς ἔξει πολλὴν γῆν, ἵνα μὴ ῥυπαίνηται ταχύ.

ΙΒ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΒΔΕΛΤΡΙΑΣ.

ΟΥ χαλεπὸν δέ ἐστι τὴν βδελυρίαν διορίσασθαι· ἔστι γὰρ παιδία ἐπιφανὴς καὶ ἐπονείδιστος. Ὁ δὲ βδελυρὸς, τοιοῦτος, οἷος, ὑπαντήσας γυναιξὶν ἐλευθέραις, ἀνασυράμενος δεῖξαι τὸ αἰδοῖον. Καὶ ἐν θεάτρῳ κροτεῖν, ὅταν οἱ ἄλλοι παύωνται, καὶ συρίττειν οὓς ἡδέως θεωροῦσιν οἱ λοιποί· καὶ ὅταν σιωπήσῃ τὸ θέατρον, ἀνακύψας ἐρυγεῖν, ἵνα τοὺς καθημένους ποιήσῃ μεταστραφῆναι. Καὶ πληθούσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς προσελθὼν πρὸς τὰ κάρυα, ἢ τὰ μῆλα, ἢ τὰ ἀπρόδρυα, ἑστηκὼς τραγηματίζεσθαι, ἅμα τῷ πωλοῦντι προσλαλῶν. Καὶ καλέσαι δὲ τῶν παριόντων ὀνομαστί τινα, ᾧ μὴ συνήθης ἐστί. Καὶ σπεύδοντα δέ που

ὁρῶν, περιμεῖναι κελεῦσαι. Καὶ ἡττημένῳ δὲ μεγάλην δίκην ἀπιόντι ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου προσελθεῖν, καὶ συνησθῆναι. Καὶ ὀψωνεῖν αὐτὸς, καὶ αὐλητρίδας μισθοῦσθαι· καὶ δεικνύειν δὲ τοῖς ἀπαντῶσι τὰ ὠψωνημένα, καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ διηγεῖσθαι προστὰς πρὸς κουρεῖον, ἢ μυροπώλιον, ὅτι μεθύσκεσθαι μέλλει.

Καὶ εἰς ὀρνιθοσκόπου τῆς μητρὸς ἐξελθούσης, βλασφημῆσαι, καὶ εὐχομένων καὶ σπενδόντων ἐκβαλεῖν τὸ ποτήριον, καὶ γελάσαι ὡς τεράστιόν τι πεποιηκώς· καὶ αὐλούμενος δὲ κροτῆσαι ταῖς χερσὶ μόνος τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ συντερετίζειν· καὶ ἐπιτιμᾷν τῇ αὐλητρίδι μὴ ταχὺ παυσαμένῃ· καὶ ἀποπτύσαι δὲ βουλόμενος, ὑπὲρ τῆς τραπέζης προσπτύσαι τῷ οἰνοχόῳ.

ΙΓ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΚΑΙΡΙΑΣ.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπαιρία ἔστιν ἐπίτευξις λυποῦσα τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας. Ὁ δὲ ἄπαιρος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ἀσχολουμένῳ προσελθὼν ἀνακοινοῦσθαι. Καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐρωμένην κωμάζειν πυρέττουσαν. Καὶ δίκην ὠφληκότα ἐγγύης προσελθὼν καλεῦσαι αὐτὸν ἀναδέξασθαι. Καὶ μαρτυρήσων παρεῖναι, τοῦ πράγματος ἤδη κεκριμένου. Καὶ κεκλημένος εἰς γάμους, τοῦ γυναικείου γένους κατηγορεῖν. Καὶ ἐκ μακρᾶς ὁδοῦ ἥκοντας ἄρτι παρακαλεῖν εἰς περίπατον. Δεινὸς δὲ καὶ προσάγειν ὠνητὴν πλείω διδόντα ἤδη πεπρακότι. Καὶ ἀκηκοότας καὶ μεμαθηκότας ἀνίστασθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς διδάσκων. Καὶ πρόθυμος δὲ ἐπι-

μελη θῆναι ἃ μὴ βούλεταί τις γενέσθαι, αἰσχύνεται δὲ ἀπείπασθαι. Καὶ θύοντας καὶ ἀναλίσκοντας, ἥκειν τόκον ἀπαιτήσων. Καὶ μαστιγουμένου οἰκέτου, παρεστὼς διηγεῖσθαι ὅτι καὶ αὐτοῦ πότε παῖς οὕτω πληγὰς λαβὼν ἀπήγξατο. Καὶ παρὼν διαίτῃ συγκρούειν, ἀμφοτέρων βουλομένων διαλύεσθαι. Καὶ ὀρχησόμενος ἅψασθαι ἑταίρου μηδέπω μεθύοντος.

ΙΔ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΕΡΙΕΡΓΙΑΣ.

'ΑΜΕΛΕΙ περιεργία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι προσποίησίς τις λόγων καὶ πράξεων μετ' εὐνοίας. Ὁ δὲ περίεργος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι ἃ μὴ δυνήσεται. Καὶ ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ πράγματος δικαίου εἶναι, ἀναστὰς, ἐλεγχθῆναι. Καὶ πλείω δὲ ἐπαναγκάσαι τὸν παῖδα κεράσαι ἢ ὅσα δύνανται οἱ παρόντες ἐκπιεῖν. Καὶ διείργειν τοὺς μαχομένους, καὶ οὓς οὐ γινώσκει. Καὶ ἀτραποῦ ἡγήσασθαι, εἶτα μὴ δύνασθαι εὑρεῖν οὗ πορεύεται. Καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν δὲ προσελθὼν ἐρωτῆσαι, πότε μέλλει παρατάττεσθαι, καὶ τί μετὰ τὸν αὔριον παραγγέλλει. Καὶ προσελθὼν τῷ πατρὶ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἡ μήτηρ ἤδη καθεύδει ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ. Καὶ

ἀπαγορεύοντος τοῦ ἰατροῦ, ὅπως μὴ δώσει οἶνον τῷ μάλακιζομένῳ, φήσας βούλεσθαι διάπειραν λαμβάνειν, εὐτρεπίσαι τὸν καπῶς ἔχοντα. Καὶ γυναικὸς δὲ τελευτησάσης, ἐπιγράψαι ἐπὶ τὸ μνῆμα, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς, καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τῆς μητρὸς, καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς γυναικὸς τοὔνομα, καὶ ποταπή ἐστι· καὶ προσεπιγράψαι ὅτι οὗτοι πάντες χρηστοὶ ἦσαν· καὶ ὀμνύναι μέλλων, εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοὺς περιεστηκότας, ὅτι καὶ πρότερον πολλάκις ὀμώμοκα.

ΙΕ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΑΣ.

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἀναισθησία, ὡς ὄρῳ εἰπεῖν, βραδυτὴς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν. Ὁ δὲ ἀναίσθητος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος λογισάμενος ταῖς ψήφοις, καὶ κεφάλαιον ποιήσας, ἐρωτᾷν τὸν παρακαθήμενον, τί γίνεται; Καὶ δίκην φεύγων, καὶ ταύτην εἰσιέναι μέλλων, ἐπιλαθόμενος εἰς ἀγρὸν πορεύεσθαι. Καὶ θεωρῶν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ, μόνος καταλείπεσθαι καθεύδων. Καὶ πολλὰ φαγὼν, καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπὶ θάκον ἀνιστάμενος, ὑπὸ κυνὸς τῆς τοῦ γείτονος δηχθῆναι. Καὶ λαβὼν καὶ ἀποθεὶς αὐτὸς, τοῦτο ζητεῖν, καὶ μὴ δύνασθαι εὑρεῖν. Καὶ ἀπαγγέλλοντός τινος αὐτῷ ὅτι τετελεύτηκέ τις αὐτοῦ τῶν φίλων, ἵνα παραγένηται,

σκυθρωπάσας καὶ δακρύσας, εἰπεῖν, ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ. Δεινὸς δὲ καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων ἀργύριον ὀφειλόμενον, μάρτυρας παραλαβεῖν. Καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος μάχεσθαι τῷ παιδὶ, ὅτι σικύους οὐκ ἠγόρασε. Καὶ τὰ παιδία ἑαυτοῦ παλαίειν ἀναγκάζων, καὶ τροχάζειν, εἰς κόπους ἐμβάλλειν. Καὶ ἐν ἀγρῷ αὐτὸς φακῆν ἕψων, δὶς ἅλας εἰς τὴν χύτραν ἐμβαλὼν ἄβρωτον ποιῆσαι. Καὶ ὕοντος τοῦ Διὸς, εἰπεῖν, ἡδύ γε τῶν ἄστρων ὄζει, ὅτι δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι λέγουσι τῆς γῆς. Καὶ λέγοντός τινος, πόσους οἴει κατὰ τὰς ἡρίας πύλας ἐξενηνέχθαι νεκρούς; πρὸς τοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅσοι ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ γένοιντο.

ΙΣΤ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΘΑΔΕΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ αὐθάδεια ἐστιν ἀπήνεια ὁμιλίας ἐν λόγοις. Ὁ δὲ αὐθάδης τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ἐρωτηθεὶς, ὁ δεῖνα ποῦ ἐστιν; εἰπεῖν, πράγματά μοι μὴ πάρεχε. Καὶ προσαγορευθεὶς, μὴ ἀντιπροσειπεῖν. Καὶ πωλῶν τι, μὴ λέγειν τοῖς ὠνουμένοις, πόσου ἂν ἀποδοῖτο, ἀλλ' ἐρωτᾷν, τί εὑρίσκει; Καὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι, καὶ πέμπουσιν εἰς τὰς ἑορτὰς εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν γεύοιτο διδομένων. Καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν συγγνώμην οὔτε τῷ ἀπώσαντι αὐτὸν ἀπουσίως, οὔτε τῷ ὤσαντι, οὔτε τῷ ἐμβάντι. Καὶ φίλῳ δὲ ἔρανον κελεύσαντι εἰσενεγκεῖν, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν δοίη, ὕστερον ἥκειν φέρων, καὶ λέγειν ὅτι ἀπόλλυσι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον. Καὶ προσπταίσας ἐν

τῇ ὁδῷ, δεινὸς καταράσασθαι τῷ λίθῳ. Καὶ ἀναμεῖναι οὐκ ἂν ὑπομεῖναι πολὺν χρόνον οὐδένα. Καὶ οὔτε ᾆσαι, οὔτε ῥῆσιν εἰπεῖν, οὔτε ὀρχήσασθαι ἂν ἐθελήσαι. Δεινὸς δὲ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς μὴ ἐπεύχεσθαι.

IZ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΕΙΣΙΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ.

Ἀμελεῖ ἡ δεισιδαιμονία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι δειλία πρὸς τὸ δαιμόνιον. Ὁ δὲ δεισιδαίμων τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ἐπὶ κρήνην ἀπονιψάμενος τὰς χεῖρας, καὶ περιῤῥαινάμενος ἀπὸ ἱεροῦ, δάφνης εἰς τὸ στόμα λαβὼν, οὕτω τὴν ἡμέραν περιπατεῖν. Καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐὰν παραδράμῃ χαλῇ, μὴ πρότερον πορευθῆναι, ἕως διεξέλθῃ τις, ἢ λίθους τρεῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς ὁδοῦ διαβάλῃ. Καὶ ἐὰν ἴδῃ ὄφιν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, ἱερὸν ἐνταῦθα ἱδρύσασθαι. Καὶ τῶν λιταρῶν λίθων τῶν ἐν ταῖς τριόδοις παρίων, ἐκ τῆς ληκύθου ἔλαιον καταχεῖν, καὶ ἐπὶ γόνατα πεσὼν καὶ προσκυνήσας, ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. Καὶ ἐὰν μῦς θύλακον ἀλ-

φίτων διαφάγῃ, πρὸς τὸν ἐξηγητὴν ἐλθὼν, ἐρωτᾷν τί χρὴ ποιεῖν· καὶ ἐὰν ἀποκρίνηται αὐτῷ ἐνδοῦναι τῷ σκυτοδέψῃ ἀπορράψαι, μὴ προσέχειν τούτοις, ἀλλ' ἀποτραπεὶς ἐκθύσασθαι. Καὶ πυκνὰ δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν καθᾶραι, Ἑκάτης φάσκων ἐπαγωγὴν γεγονέναι. Κἂν γλαῦκα (διΐπτασθαι τύχῃ,) βαδίζοντος αὐτοῦ, ταράττεται, καὶ εἰπὼν, Ἀθηνᾶ κρείττων, παρελθεῖν οὕτω. Καὶ οὔτε ἐπιβῆναι μνήματι, οὔτ' ἐπὶ νεκρὸν ἐλθεῖν, οὔτε ἐπὶ λεχὼ, ἐθελῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ μιαίνεσθαι συμφέρον φήσας αὐτῷ. Καὶ ταῖς τετάρταις δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἑβδομάταις προστάξας οἶνον ἕψειν τοῖς ἔνδον, ἐξελθὼν ἀγοράσαι μυρσίνας, λιβανωτῶν πίνακα, καὶ εἰσελθὼν εἴσω στεφανοῦν τοὺς Ἑρμαφροδίτους ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν. Καὶ ὅταν ἐνύπνιον ἴδῃ, πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ὀνειροκρίτας, πρὸς τοὺς μάντεις, πρὸς τοὺς ὀρνιθοσκόπους ἐρωτήσων, τίνι θεῷ ἢ θεᾷ προσεύχεσθαι δεῖ. Καὶ τελεσθησόμενος πρὸς τοὺς Ὀρφεοτελεστὰς κατὰ μῆνα πορεύεσθαι μετὰ

τῆς γυναικός· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ σχολάζῃ ἡ γυνὴ, μετὰ τῆς τίτθης καὶ τῶν παιδίων. Καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς τριόδοις ἀπελθὼν κατὰ κεφαλῆς λούσασθαι. Καὶ ἱερείας καλέσας, σπίλλῃ ἢ σπύλακι κελεῦσαι αὐτὸν περικαθᾶραι· μαινόμενόν τε ἰδὼν ἢ ἐπίληπτον, φρίξας εἰς κόλπον πτύσαι.

ΙΗ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΜΕΜΨΙΜΟΙΡΙΑΣ.

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μεμψιμοιρία ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν διδομένων. Ὁ δὲ μεμψίμοιρος τοιόσδε τις, οἷος, ἀποστείλαντος μερίδα τοῦ φίλου, εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν φέροντα, ἐφθόνησάς μοι τοῦ ζωμοῦ, καὶ τοῦ οἰναρίου, οὐκ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καλέσας. Καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἑταίρας καταφιλούμενος, εἰπεῖν, θαυμάζω εἰ σὺ καὶ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς με φιλεῖς. Καὶ τῷ Διΐ ἀγαναπτεῖν, οὐ διότι ὗει, ἀλλὰ διότι ὕστερον. Καὶ εὑρὼν ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ βαλάντιον, εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ θησαυρὸν εὕρηκα οὐδέποτε. Καὶ πριάμενος ἀνδράποδον ἄξιον, καὶ πολλὰ δεηθεὶς τοῦ πωλοῦντος, θαυμάζω, εἰπεῖν, εἰ τὶ ὑγιὲς οὕτω ἄξιον ἐώνημαι. Καὶ πρὸς τὸν εὐαγγελιζόμενον ὅτι

υἱός σοι γέγονεν, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἂν προσθῇς, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἥμισυ ἄπεστιν, ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖς. Καὶ δίκην νικήσας καὶ λαβὼν πάσας τὰς ψήφους, ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ γράψαντι τὸν λόγον, ὡς πολλὰ παραλελοιπότι τῶν δικαίων. Καὶ ἐράνου εἰσενεχθέντος παρὰ τῶν φίλων, καὶ φήσαντός τινος, ἱλαρὸς ἴσθι, καὶ πῶς, εἰπεῖν, ὅτε δεῖ τὸ ἀργύριον ἀποδοῦναι ἑκάστῳ, καὶ χωρὶς τούτων, χάριν ὀφείλειν ὡς εὐηργετημένον.

ΙΘ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΙΣΤΙΑΣ.

Ἔστιν ἀμέλει ἀπιστία ὑπόληψίς τις ἀδικίας κατὰ πάντων. Ὁ δὲ ἄπιστος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος, ἀποστείλας τὸν παῖδα ὀψωνήσοντα, ἕτερον παῖδα πέμπειν πευσόμενον πόσου ἐπρίατο. Καὶ φέρων αὐτὸς τὸ ἀργύριον, κατὰ στάδιον ἀριθμεῖν πόσον ἐστί. Καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐρωτᾷν κατακείμενος, εἰ κέκλεικε τὴν κιβωτὸν, καὶ εἰ σεσήμανται τὸ κυλικεῖον, καὶ εἰ ὁ μοχλὸς εἰς τὴν θύραν τὴν αὐλείαν ἐμβέβληται· καὶ ἐὰν ἐκείνη φῇ, μηδὲν ἧττον αὐτὸς ἀναστὰς γυμνὸς ἐκ τῶν στρωμάτων, καὶ ἀνυπόδητος, τὸν λύχνον ἅψας, ταῦτα πάντα περιδραμὼν ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ οὕτω μόλις ὕπνου τυγχάνειν. Καὶ τοὺς ὀφείλον-

τας αὐτῷ ἀργύριον, μετὰ μαρτύρων ἀπαιτεῖν τοὺς τόκους, ὅπως μὴ δύναιντο ἔξαρνοι γενέσθαι. Καὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον δὲ ἐκδοῦναι δεινὸς, οὐχ [ἐκείνῳ] ὃς βέλτιστα ἐργάζεται, ἀλλ' οὗ ἂν ἧ ἄξιος ἐγγυητής. Καὶ ὅταν ἥκῃ τις αἰτησόμενος ἐκπώματα, μάλιστα μὲν μὴ δοῦναι..... Καὶ τὸν παῖδα δὲ ἀπολουθοῦντα κελεύειν αὐτοῦ ὄπισθεν μὴ βαδίζειν, ἀλλ' ἔμπροσθεν, ἵνα φυλάττηται αὐτὸν, μὴ ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ ἀποδράσῃ. Καὶ τοῖς εἰληφόσι τὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ λέγουσι, πόσου, εἰπεῖν, κατάθου, οὐ γὰρ σχολάζω πέμπειν.

Κ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΥΣΧΕΡΕΙΑΣ.

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ δυσχέρεια ἀθεραπευσία σώματος, λύπης παρασκευαστική. Ὁ δὲ δυσχερὴς τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος λέπραν ἔχων καὶ ἀλφὸν, καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας μεγάλους, περιπατεῖν· καὶ φῆσαι ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ συγγενῆ ἀῤῥωστήματα, καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἔχειν καὶ τὸν πάππον. Ἀμέλει δὲ δεινὸς καὶ ἕλκη ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικνημίοις, καὶ προσπταίσματα ἐν τοῖς δακτύλοις, καὶ ταῦτα μὴ θεραπεῦσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐᾶσαι θηριωθῆναι· καὶ τὰς μασχάλας θηριώδεις καὶ δασείας ἔχειν ἄχρις ἐπὶ πολὺ τῶν πλευρῶν· καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας μέλανας καὶ ἐσθιομένους, ὥστε δυσέντευκτος εἶναι καὶ ἀηδής.

Καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐσθίων ἀπομύττεσθαι· ἀρξάμενος προσλαλεῖν, ἅμα δ' ἀπορρίπτειν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος, ἅμα πιὼν προσερυγγάνειν. καὶ ἐλαίῳ σαπρῷ ἐν βαλανείῳ χρῆσθαι· καὶ ἱμάτιον κηλίδων μεστὸν ἀναβαλόμενος εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐξελθεῖν.

ΚΑ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΗΔΙΑΣ.

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἀηδία, ὡς ὅρῳ περιλαβεῖν, ἔντευξις λύπης ποιητικὴ ἄνευ βλάβης. Ὁ δὲ ἀηδὴς τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ἐγείρειν ἄρτι καθεύδοντα, εἰσελθὼν, ἵνα αὐτῷ λαλῇ. Καὶ ἀνάγεσθαι δὴ μέλλοντας κωλύειν, καὶ προσελθὼν δεῖσθαι ἐπισχεῖν ἕως ἂν περιπατήσῃ. Καὶ τὸ παιδίον τῆς τιτθῆς ἀφελόμενος, μασσώμενος σιτίζειν αὐτὸς, καὶ ὑποκορίζεσθαι ποππύζων. Καὶ ἐσθίων δ' ἅμα διηγεῖσθαι, ὡς ἑλλέβορον πιὼν, ἄνω καὶ κάτω καθαρθείη, καὶ ζωμοῦ τοῦ παρακειμένου ἐν τοῖς ὑποχωρήμασιν αὐτῷ μελαντέρα ἡ χολή. Καὶ ἐρωτῆσαι δὲ δεινὸς ἐναντίον τῶν οἰκείων, ὡς ποίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ με ἔτικτες; Καὶ ὅτι ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ ἐστὶ παρ' αὐτῷ λακκαῖον·

καὶ ὡς κῆπος λάχανα πολλὰ ἔχων καὶ ἀπαλά· καὶ ὅτι ἡ οἰκία αὐτοῦ πανδοχεῖόν ἐστι· καὶ ξενίζων δὲ δείξαι τὸν παράσιτον αὐτοῦ ποῖός τις· καὶ παρακαλῶν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου, ὅτι τέρψον τοὺς παρόντας.

ΚΒ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΜΙΚΡΟΦΙΛΟΤΙΜΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ μικροφιλοτιμία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ὄρεξις τιμῆς ἀνελεύθερος. Ὁ δὲ μικροφιλότιμος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος σπουδάσαι, ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθεὶς, παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν καλέσαντα κατακείμενος δειπνῆσαι. Καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκεῖραι ἀναγαγὼν εἰς Δελφούς. Καὶ ἐπιμεληθῆναι δὲ ὅπως αὐτῷ ὁ ἀκόλουθος Αἰθίοψ ἔσται. Καὶ ἀποδιδοὺς μνᾶν ἀργυρίου, καινὸν ποιῆσαι ἀποδοῦναι. Καὶ βοῦν θύσας, τὸ προμετωπίδιον ἀπαντικρὺ τῆς εἰσόδου προσπατταλεῦσαι, στέμμασι μεγάλοις περιδήσας, ὅπως οἱ εἰσιόντες ἴδωσιν ὅτι βοῦν ἔθυσε.

Καὶ πομπεύσας δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα δοῦναι τῷ παιδὶ ἀπενεγκεῖν οἴκαδε, ἀναβα-

λόμενος δὲ θοιμάτιον εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν περιπατεῖν. Καὶ κυναρίου δὲ τελευτήσαντος, αὐτῷ μνῆμα καὶ στηλίδιον ποιήσας, ἐπιγράψαι, Κλάδος Μελιταῖος. Καὶ ἀναθεὶς δακτύλιον χαλκοῦν ἐν τῷ Ἀσκληπιείῳ, τοῦτον ἐκτρίβειν στεφανῶν. Καὶ ἀλείφεσθαι ὀσημέραι. Ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ συνδιοικήσασθαι παρὰ τῶν Πρυτάνεων ὅπως ἀπαγγέλλῃ τῷ δήμῳ τὰ ἱερά· καὶ παρασκευασάμενος λαμπρὸν ἱμάτιον, καὶ ἐστεφανωμένος παρελθὼν εἶπεῖν, Ὦ Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐθύομεν οἱ Πρυτάνεις τὰ ἱερὰ τῇ μητρὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἄξια καὶ καλὰ, καὶ ὑμεῖς δέχεσθε τὰ ἀγαθά· καὶ ταῦτα ἀπαγγείλας, ἀπιὼν διηγήσασθαι οἴκαδε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὶ ὡς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν εὐημερεῖ.

ΚΓ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΕΛΕΤΘΕΡΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ ἀνελευθερία ἔστι περιουσία τις ἀφιλοτιμίας δαπάνης ἀπέχουσα. Ὁ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος νικήσας τραγῳδοῖς, ταινίαν ἀναθεῖναι ξυλίνην τῷ Διονύσῳ, ἐπιγράψας αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄνομα. Καὶ ἐπιδόσεων γινομένων, ἐκ τοῦ δήμου ἀναστὰς, σιωπᾷν, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἀπελθεῖν. Καὶ ἐκδιδοὺς αὐτοῦ θυγατέρα, τοῦ μὲν ἱερείου, πλὴν τῶν ἱερῶν, τὰ κρέα ἀποδίδοσθαι· τοὺς δὲ διακονοῦντας ἐν τοῖς γάμοις οἰκοσίτους μισθώσασθαι. Καὶ τριηραρχῶν, τὰ τοῦ κυβερνήτου στρώματα ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος ὑποστορέννυσθαι, τὰ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀποτιθέναι. Καὶ ἐξ ἀγορᾶς δὲ ὀψωνήσας, τὰ κρέα αὐτὸς φέρειν καὶ τὰ

λάχανα ἐν τῷ προπολπίῳ. Καὶ ἔνδον μένειν ὅταν ἐκδῷ θοιμάτιον ἐκπλῦναι. Καὶ φίλου ἔρανον συλλέγοντος, προιδόμενος, ἀποκάμψας ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ τῷ κύκλῳ οἴκαδε πορευθῆναι. Καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ δὲ μὴ πρίασθαι θεραπαίνας, ἀλλὰ μισθοῦσθαι εἰς τὰς ἐξόδους παιδίον συνακολουθῆσον. Καὶ ἀναστὰς τὴν οἰκίαν καλλῦναι, καὶ τὰς κλίνας ἐκπορῆσαι, καὶ καθεζόμενος παραστρέψαι τὸν τρίβωνα ὃν αὐτὸς φορεῖ.

ΚΔ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΛΑΖΟΝΕΙΑΣ.

Ἀ ΜΕΛΕΙ δὲ ἡ ἀλαζονεία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι προσδοκία (προσποίησις) ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ὄντων. Ὁ δὲ ἀλαζὼν τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ἐν τῷ Δείγματι ἑστηκὼς διηγεῖσθαι ξένοις ὡς πολλὰ χρήματα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ. Καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐργασίας τῆς δανειστικῆς διεξιέναι, ἡλίκη, καὶ αὐτὸς ὅσα εἴληφε. Καὶ συνοδοιπόρου δὲ ἀπολαύσας ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ, λέγειν ὡς μετ' Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐστρατεύσατο· καὶ ὅσα λιθοκόλλητα ποτήρια ἐκόμισε· καὶ περὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὅτι βελτίους εἰσὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, ἀμφισβητῆσαι. Καὶ γράμματα εἰπεῖν ὡς πάρεστι παρ' Ἀντιπάτρου τριταῖον δὴ λέγοντα παραγενέσθαι αὐ-

τὸν εἰς Μακεδονίαν. Καὶ διδομένης αὐτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς ξύλων ἀτελοῦς, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀπείρηται, ὅπως μηδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς συκοφαντηθῇ. Καὶ ἐν τῇ σιτοδείᾳ ὡς πλείω ἢ πέντε τάλαντα γένοιτο αὐτῷ τὰ ἀναλώματα διδόντι τοῖς ἀπόροις τῶν πολιτῶν· καὶ ἀγνώστων δὲ παρακαθημένων, κελεῦσαι θεῖναι τὰς ψήφους, καὶ τοσοῦν αὐτὰς καθ' ἑξακοσίους, κατὰ μνᾶν, προστιθεὶς πιθανῶς ἑκάστοις τούτων ὀνόματα, καὶ ποιῆσαι δέκα τάλαντα, καὶ τοῦτο φῆσαι εἰσενηνοχέναι εἰς ἐράνους αὐτόν. Καὶ τὰς τριηραρχίας εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐ τίθησιν, οὐδὲ τὰς λειτουργίας ὅσας λελειτούργηκε. Καὶ προσελθὼν δὲ τοῖς τοὺς ἵππους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πωλοῦσι προσποιήσασθαι ὠνητιᾶν. Καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πλίνας ἐλθὼν, ἱματισμὸν ζητῆσαι εἰς δύο τάλαντα. Καὶ τῷ παιδὶ μάχεσθαι ὅτι τὸ χρυσίον οὐκ ἔχων, αὐτῷ ἀκολουθεῖ. Καὶ ἐν μισθωτῇ οἰκίᾳ οἰκῶν φῆσαι ταύτην εἶναι τὴν πατρῴαν, πρὸς τὸν μὴ εἰδότα· καὶ ὅτι μέλλει πωλεῖν αὐτὴν διὰ τὸ ἐλάττω εἶναι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰς ξενοδοχίας.

ΚΕ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΥΠΕΡΗΦΑΝΙΑΣ.

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ὑπερηφανία καταφρόνησίς τις πλὴν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων. Ὁ δὲ ὑπερήφανος τοιόσδε τις, οἷος τῷ σπεύδοντι, ἀπὸ δείπνου ἐντεύξεσθαι φάσκειν ἐν τῷ περιπατεῖν. Καὶ εὖ ποιήσας, μεμνῆσθαι φράζειν, ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς, καὶ βιάζειν. Καὶ προσελθεῖν πρότερος οὐδενὶ θελῆσαι. Καὶ τοὺς πωλοῦντάς τι καὶ μεμισθωμένους δεινὸς κελεῦσαι ἥκειν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἅμ' ἡμέρᾳ. Καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς πορευόμενος μὴ λαλεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι, κάτω κεκυφὼς, ὅταν δὲ αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ἄνω πάλιν. Καὶ ἑστιῶν τοὺς φίλους, αὐτὸς μὴ συνδειπνεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑφ' αὐτόν τινι συντάξαι αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Καὶ προαποστέλλειν δὲ ἐπὰν πορεύηται τὸν

ἐροῦντα ὅτι ἔρχεται. Καὶ οὔτε ἐπ' ἀλειφόμενον αὐτὸν οὔτε ἐσθίοντα ἐᾶσαι ἂν εἰσελθεῖν. Ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ λογιζόμενος πρός τινα, τῷ παιδὶ συντάξαι τὰς ψήφους διαθεῖν· καὶ κεφάλαιον ποιήσαντι, γράψαι αὐτῷ εἰς λόγον. Καὶ ἐπιστέλλων μὴ γράψαι, ὅτι χαρίζοιο ἄν μοι, ἀλλ' ὅτι βούλομαι γενέσθαι· καὶ ἀπέστειλα πρός σε ληψόμενος· καὶ ὅπως ἄλλως μὴ ἔσται· καὶ τὴν ταχίστην.

ΚΣΤ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΕΙΛΙΑΣ.

ΑΜΕΛΕΙ δὲ ἡ δειλία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ὕπειξις τῆς ψυχῆς ἔμφοβος. Ὁ δὲ δειλὸς τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος πλέων, τὰς ἄκρας φάσκειν ἡμιολίας εἶναι· καὶ κλυδωνίου γενομένου, ἐρωτᾷν εἴ τις μὴ μεμύηται τῶν πλεόντων· καὶ τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἀνακόπτοντος πυνθάνεσθαι εἰ μεσοπορεῖ· καὶ τί αὐτῷ δοκεῖ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ· καὶ πρὸς τὸν παρακαθήμενον λέγειν, ὅτι φοβεῖται ἀπὸ ἐνυπνίου τινός· καὶ ἐκδὺς διδόναι τῷ παιδὶ τὸν χιτωνίσκον· καὶ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν γῆν προσάγειν αὐτόν. Καὶ στρατευόμενος δὲ προσκαλεῖν πάντας πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ στάντας πρῶτον περιϊδεῖν, καὶ λέγειν ὡς ἔργον

διαγνῶναί ἐστὶ πότερόν εἰσιν οἱ πολέμιοι· καὶ ἀκούων κραυγῆς, καὶ ὁρῶν πίπτοντας, εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοὺς παρεστηκότας, ὅτι τὴν σπάθην λαβεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς σπουδῆς ἐπελάθετο· καὶ τρέχειν ὑπὸ τὴν σκηνὴν, τὸν παῖδα ἐκπέμψας καὶ κελεύσας προσκοπεῖσθαι ποῦ εἰσιν οἱ πολέμιοι, καὶ ἀποκρύψας αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τὸ προσκεφάλαιον, εἶτα διατρίβειν πολὺν χρόνον. Καὶ ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ ὁρῶν τραυματίαν τινὰ προσφερόμενον τῶν φίλων, προσδραμεῖν, καὶ θαῤῥεῖν κελεύειν, καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύειν, καὶ περισπογγίζειν, καὶ μυίας σοβεῖν, καὶ πᾶν μᾶλλον ἢ μάχεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. Καὶ τοῦ σαλπιστοῦ δὲ τὸ πολεμικὸν σημήναντος, καθήμενος ἐν σκηνῇ, εἰπεῖν, Ἄπαγ' ἐς κόρακας, οὐκ ἐάσεις τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὕπνου λαβεῖν τυχὰ σημαίνων. Καὶ αἵματος δὲ ἀνάπλεως ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου τραύματος, ἐντυγχάνειν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἐπανιοῦσι, καὶ διηγεῖσθαι ὡς κινδυνεύσας ἕνα σέσωκε τῶν φίλων· καὶ εἰσάγειν πρὸς τὸν κατακείμενον σκεψόμενους τοὺς δημότας καὶ

Φυλέτας· καὶ τούτων ἅμα ἑκάστῳ διηγεῖσθαι ὡς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ χερσὶν ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἐκόμισεν.



ΚΖ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΟΨΙΜΑΘΙΑΣ.

Ἡ δὲ ὀψιμαθία φιλοπονία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν. Ὁ δὲ ὀψιμαθὴς τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ῥήσεις μανθάνειν ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονώς· καὶ ταύτας λέγων παρὰ πότον ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. Καὶ παρὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπὶ δόρυ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀσπίδα, καὶ ἐπὶ οὐράν. Καὶ εἰς ἀγρὸν ἐφ' ἵππου ἀλλοτρίου ὀχούμενος, ἅμα μελετᾷν ἱππάζεσθαι, καὶ πεσὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν κατεαγέναι. Καὶ μακρὸν ἀνδριάντα παίζειν. Καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀπόλουθον διατοξεύεσθαι, καὶ διακοντίζεσθαι· καὶ ἅμα μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἂν καὶ ἐκείνου μὴ ἐπισταμένου. Καὶ παλαιῶν ἐν τῷ βαλανείῳ πυκνὰ τὴν

ἕδραν στρέφειν, ὅπως πεπαιδεῦσθαι δοκῇ· καὶ ὅταν ὦσι γυναῖκες, μελετᾷν ὀρχεῖσθαι, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ τερετίζων.

ΚΗ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΚΑΚΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ.

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ κακολογία ἀγὼν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ χεῖρον ἐν λόγοις. Ὁ δὲ κακολόγος τοῖος δέ τις, οἷος ἐρωτηθεὶς, ὁ δεῖνα τίς ἐστι; καθάπερ οἱ γενεαλογοῦντες, πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους αὐτοῦ ἄρξασθαι, Ὁ μὲν πατὴρ Σωσίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκαλεῖτο· ἐγένετο δ' ἐν τοῖς στρατιώταις Σωσίστρατος· ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰς τοὺς δημότας ἐνεγράφη· ἡ μέν τοι μήτηρ εὐγενὴς Θράττα ἐστί· τὰς δὲ τοιαύτας ἐν τῇ πατρίδι εὐγενεῖς εἶναι φασίν· αὐτὸς δὲ οὗτος ὡς ἐκ τούτων γεγονὼς, κακὸς μαστιγίας· καὶ τούτοις διεξιὼν, εἰπεῖν αὗται αἱ γυναῖκες ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς παρίοντας ἁρπάζουσι. Καὶ κακῶς λεγόντων ἑτέρων συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ

αὐτὸς, λέγων, Καὶ ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον μάλιστα πάντων μεμίσηκα, καὶ γὰρ εἰδεχθής τις ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου ἐστίν· τῇ δὲ πονηρίᾳ οὐδὲν ὅμοιον· σημεῖον δὲ, τῇ γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὶ τρεῖς χαλκοὺς εἰς ὄψον δίδωσι, καὶ τῷ ψυχρῷ λούεσθαι ἀναγκάζει τῇ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἡμέρᾳ. Καὶ συγκαθήμενος δεινὸς περὶ τοῦ ἀναστάντος εἰπεῖν· καὶ ἄλλα πλεῖστα περὶ τῶν φίλων καὶ οἰκείων παρὰ εἰπεῖν, καὶ περὶ τῶν τετελευτηκότων κακῶς λέγειν.



ΚΘ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΟΛΙΓΑΡΧΙΑΣ.

ΔΟΞΕΙΕΝ ἂν εἶναι ἡ ὀλιγαρχία φιλαρχία τις ἰσχυρῶς κράτους γλιχομένη. Ὁ δὲ ὀλιγαρχικὸς τοιοῦτος, οἷος, τοῦ δήμου βουλευομένου τῷ ἄρχοντι τινὰς προσαιρεῖσθαι τῆς πομπῆς συνεπιμελησομένους παρελθὼν ἀποφῆνασθαι ὡς δεῖ αὐτοκράτορας τούτους εἶναι· κἂν ἄλλοι προβάλλωνται δέκα, λέγειν, Ἱκανὸς εἷς ἐστίν. Καὶ τῶν Ὁμήρου ἐπῶν τοῦτο ἓν μόνον κατέχειν, ὅτι

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη, εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω·*

τῶν δὲ ἄλλων μηδὲν ἐπίστασθαι. Ἀμέλει δὲ δεινὸς τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν λόγων χρήσασθαι, ὅτι δεῖ

* Il. lib. ii. 204.

ἡμᾶς συνελθόντας περὶ τούτου βουλεύσασθαι· καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὄχλου καὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀπαλλαγῆναι· καὶ παύσασθαι ἀρχαῖς πλησιάζειν. Καὶ ὅτι ὑπό τινων ὑβριζόμενος εἰπεῖν, Οὐ δεῖ αὐτοὺς κἀμὲ τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖν. Καὶ τὸ μέσον δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐξιὼν, καὶ μέσην κουρὰν κεκαρμένος, καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἀπωνυχισμένος σοβεῖν, τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους λέγων, Οὐκ οἰκητέον ἐστὶ τὴν πόλιν· καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις δεινὰ πάσχομεν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαζομένων· καὶ ὡς αἰσχύνεται ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅταν τις παρακάθηται αὐτῷ λεπτὸς καὶ αὐχμῶν· καὶ ὡς μισητὸν τὸ τῶν δημαγωγῶν γένος· τὸν Θησέα πρῶτον αἴτιον φήσας τῶν κακῶν τῇ πόλει γεγονέναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πρὸς τοὺς ξένους, καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ὁμοτρόπους.

Λ.

ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΠΟΝΗΡΙΑΣ.

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ φιλοπονηρία ἐπιθυμία κακίας. Ὁ δὲ φιλοπόνηρός ἐστι τοιόσδέ τις, οἷος ἐντυγχάνειν τοῖς ἠττημένοις, καὶ δημοσίους ἀγῶνας ὠφληκόσι, καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἐὰν τούτοις χρῆται, ἐμπειρότερος γενήσεσθαι καὶ φοβερώτερος· καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς χρηστοῖς εἰπεῖν, Ὡς γίνεται, καὶ φησὶν, ὡς οὐθείς ἐστι χρηστὸς, καὶ ὁμοίους πάντας εἶναι· καὶ ἐπισκῆψαι δὲ, ὡς χρηστός ἐστι· καὶ τὸν πονηρὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν ἐλεύθερον· Ἐὰν βούληταί τις εἰς πονηρὸν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁμολογεῖν ἀληθῆ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἔνια δὲ ἀγνοεῖν· φῆσαι μὲν αὐτὸν εὐφυῆ καὶ φιλέταιρον, καὶ ἐπίδοξον· καὶ διατείνεσθαι δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, ὡς οὐκ ἐντετύχηκεν ἀν-

θρώπῳ ἱκανωτέρῳ. Καὶ εὔνους δὲ εἶναι τῷ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ λέγοντι, ἢ ἐπὶ δικαστηρίῳ κρινομένῳ, καὶ προσκαθήμενος δὲ εἰπεῖν δεινὸς, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα κρίνεσθαι· καὶ φῆσαι αὐτὸν κύνα εἶναι τοῦ δήμου· φυλάττειν γὰρ αὐτὸν τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας· καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐχ ἕξομεν τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν συναχθεσθησομένους, ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους προώμεθα. Δεινὸς δὲ καὶ προστατῆσαι φαύλων, καὶ συνεδρεῦσαι ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἐπὶ πονηροῖς πράγμασι, καὶ πρίσιν κρίνων ἐκδέχεσθαι τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντιδίκων λεγόμενα ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον. Καὶ τὸ ὅλον, φιλοπονηρία ἀδελφή ἐστι τῆς πονηρίας· καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, Τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον πορεύεσθαι.

ΤΕΛΟΣ.

NOTES;

AND HINTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL VARIETIES OF HUMAN NATURE.

NOTES.

PAGE 3.

The Greeks inhabit the same climate, &c.

THE annotators upon the Characters of Theophrastus have been not less perplexed in endeavouring to free the first paragraph of this Preface from apparent solecisms, than he professes to have been by the fact to which it relates. Some of them have dismissed the difficulties under which it labours, by supposing the whole of the Dedication to be spurious. But the suspicion is unfounded, and, indeed, a preface is the last part of a book that ought to be condemned as not genuine, merely on the ground of incongruities, or apparent want of sense. Critics know, or might know, that when a preface must be written, it is too often some unmeaning fortuity of thought that is expanded and elaborated,—broken up and recomposed, until a complete disruption of all the natural and ordinary connections of ideas has taken place. I will not affirm that our author's dedicatory epistle ought to be considered as furnishing an

instance of this sort. Indeed I am rather disposed to think, that the difficulties which have exercised much learned ingenuity to little purpose, are more apparent than substantial; and that they arise from our want of familiarity with the colloquial sense of the phrases he employs. Most of my readers will be satisfied with a very brief account of this grave matter. It seems then, as if our author's initial proposition ought to have been the very reverse of what it is. He might, for example, very plausibly have said,—' No one who considers the influence of climate and of education upon the manners of a people, can wonder that, in Greece, where the climate is so various, and where each state has its peculiar institutions, every imaginable variety of individual character should be produced. For, where shall we find, within so small a space, a greater diversity of climate than is experienced in passing from Attica to Bœotia, or from thence to the Peloponnesus? or what people can we name, who are reared under systems of more opposite tendency than those which regulate the education of the Athenians, of the Spartans, and of the Thebans? But instead of this, our author speaks of Greece universally, as—ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀέρα κειμένης—*exposed to the same atmospheric temperament;* and of the Greeks, as being all ὁμοίως παιδευομένων—*similarly educated;* and then, taking these facts for granted, he is surprised to find that the people are not more alike in manners and character. It is not improbable that

Theophrastus here employs the general term—*the Greeks*, in a restricted sense, intending to refer only, or chiefly, to the *Athenians;* as Athens was emphatically called the Eye, and the Heart of Greece; so that in Athens might be seen τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὅλην, τὴν Ἰωνίαν, τὰς Κυκλάδας πάσας. Or perhaps those lesser differences which distinguished the several states of Greece, might wholly disappear from his view if he were comparing the Greeks collectively, with the barbarians of the north, or with the people of Africa or of Asia. The reader may adopt what supposition he pleases for the solution of this apparent difficulty; meantime, I must advance a new objection against this luckless exordium:—

It is this—that the perplexing fact to which our author adverts, so far from its having any relation to his present design, belongs to an inquiry of a widely different nature.—For those *generic* peculiarities in character and manners which may fairly be traced to the influence of climate and education, are *not* the subjects of these characteristics. The descriptions of Theophrastus are strictly *individual;* and the diversities of disposition which he so accurately marks are of the kind that are always antecedent to the earliest external influences,—are found within the narrow sphere of every family, and among those who have been exposed to the greatest imaginable identity of circumstantial causes. It is because these Characters are portraits of the permanent *individual* varieties of hu-

man nature,—not descriptions of national manners,—that they are recognizable in every age, and interesting to ourselves: and exactly for the same reason, this reference to the influence of climate and education is unphilosophical and impertinent. Besides;—every 'attentive observer of human nature' knows that individual diversities of character become wider and stronger in proportion as mind is developed by liberty, knowledge, and the sophistications of luxurious manners. Athens, therefore, was not the place where the existence of such diversities should have perplexed a philosopher. Uniformity is the concomitant of barbarism: it was in Egypt, not in Greece,—it is in China, not in England, that all eyes incline upon all noses in the same angle;—that all manners, and all dispositions are alike;—and that the opinions of millions of men may be comprehended in one half-dozen of propositions.

I am now in the ninety-ninth year of my age.

There is a discrepancy among the authorities relative to the age of Theophrastus. It seems that the point cannot be very satisfactorily determined. I therefore take the text as it stands,—ἔτη ἐννενήκοντα ἐννέα,—and leave the question in the hands of those who have zeal in controversies of this sort.

I have conversed familiarly with men of all classes, and of various climes.

Theophrastus, although the favoured disciple and successor of Aristotle, was as little like his master in intellectual conformation, as was Bacon to Descartes. The one created his own world of abstractions; the other was an observer and describer of individual facts. The subjects and the style of his remaining works would lead one to imagine that Theophrastus wanted nothing but more of the spirit of enterprise and more ambition to have become the founder of an Inductive Philosophy, directly opposed to the system of his master. But it seems that the same intellectual diffidence which operates to detain a man in the safe path of observation, is likely to render him averse to the hazardous labour of one who undertakes to be a reformer of prevalent opinions. From his own account it appears, that while the philosophers of his time were rapt in solitary speculation, or wrangling with each other upon subtilties, Theophrastus was 'conversing familiarly with men of every class,'—and learning the philosophy of human nature in the way in which alone it is to be learned,—by the extensive observation of individual character: he was, to use his own emphatic phrase, παρατεθειμένος ἐξ ἀκριβείας πολλῆς—*watching with the most exact care* the actual conduct of men. Instead of making the science of

mind to consist in the construction of an hypothesis for explaining the mechanism of thought,—or in the definition of abstract terms, he employed himself in the collection of facts, which might serve as the materials of a science afterwards to be digested and arranged. The expression, twice occurring in this preface, *κατὰ γένος*,—*according to its kind*, or genus,—seems to imply, an intended classification; and the words—*τὰ ἄλλα δὴ τῶν παθημάτων*,—*the other dispositions*,—may be fairly assumed as indicating a design that should be comprehensive and complete; perhaps commensurate with the Ethics of Aristotle. Whether the accomplishment of this design was prevented by the author's death; or whether the thirty chapters that remain to us are but the wrecks of the original work, it is not possible to determine. Both suppositions may be admitted: he probably left in the hands of his disciples a much larger volume than that which time has spared. Indeed the text has in numerous places the character of a faulty and disjointed excerption. I am also disposed to believe that it contains not a few bungling interpolations. But to point out these spurious portions, is a task which I have not presumed to undertake.

As well the profligate as the virtuous.

If the original work ever contained any sketches of the virtues, they have not come down to us: the

characters are all *nosological*. In truth, as individuality is marked more by defect, distortion, or excess, than by the predominance of right reason and goodness, the means of depicting individuals are lessened in proportion to the approximation of the character to the standard of moral and intellectual symmetry. And in proportion also to the symmetry of the character under observation, a nicer discrimination, and a higher analysis of phenomena are required to ascertain the elements of the individual conformation. But this nice discrimination, and this high analysis, demand, on the part of the observer, not merely fine perceptions, and a practised faculty of abstraction; but also a susceptibility to all that is just and noble in sentiment; and a sympathy with all that is good, and kind, and pure, in feeling: hence it is, that we shall find a hundred satirists sooner than one mind competent to the philosophical observation of the fair side of human nature. The natural attitude of inspection is prone: we do not often observe accurately any object that rises much above the level of the eye: the same is true of the moral sight: and it may be remarked of those who profess to be observers of human nature, that their own feelings fix the *upper* limit of their power of discrimination; and that they rarely fail to fall into egregious mistakes as often as they attempt to philosophise upon any sample of excellence that is above the rate of their personal character. The profligate, the acrimonious, and the ma-

lignant, are often very exact scrutinisers of actions and motives,—they discern the minutest objects, and distinguish the faintest differences in their own element,—which is Evil: but out of that element, they have no faculty of vision.

P. 4.

I shall first briefly define the term.

Our author's mind was not formed for logic; and it is but justice to him to observe, that he makes no pretension to the dialectic precision in which his master so much excelled. The definitions with which the chapters commence are usually introduced by some qualifying phrase, serving to skreen them from criticism;—such as,—*δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι—it may seem to be;* or, —*ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις—one might take it to be;* or,—*ὡς ὅρῳ περιλαβεῖν—as it might be defined;* or,— *εἴ τις αὐτὴν ὁρίζεσθαι βούλοιτο—if one wished to define it.* Some of these definitions are neat and pithy; but the greater part of them are mere exegetical expansions of a term: a few of them, it must be confessed, are too vapid and inane to bear literal translation. In rendering these initial sentences, or definitions, I should have felt myself embarrassed, unless I had used a much greater paraphrastic liberty than in translating any other part of the text: yet I have always endea-

voured fairly to *comprehend* the sense of the original in the paraphrase. The discrepancy between the Greek and the English, which may strike the reader at first sight, will, I believe, generally appear to belong rather to the structure of the sentence than to the substance of the thought. Excepting these definitions, I have taken as little liberty as any of the translators of Theophrastus: nothing is added in the version but a few connective phrases.

P. 6.

THE DISSEMBLER.

Constitutional simulation perhaps most often results from a malformation of the intellect; and becomes by consequence and habit a disease of the sentiments. It seems to have its origin in the faculty of abstraction: an excessive determination of thought

towards the relations of cause and effect will tend to carry the mind onward, beyond those that are obvious and natural, among those that are obscure, remote, and minute. The connections of cause and effect, observable in the world of human affairs, being much less constant, uniform, and simple, than those which are presented to our senses in the world of nature, this region of hidden causes and uncertain effects affords a peculiarly seductive field of exercise to malformed minds of the class above mentioned. The intricate complications that arise from the combined action of many individuals,—the concealed motives,—unknown circumstances,—and future conduct of other men, together with the many possible consequences of the words and actions of the individual, all yield abundantly the matter from which may be spun endless films of probability. A predominating taste for the pursuit of this gossamer stuff, and a facility in making retrograde calculations of conduct depending from it, are often the primary causes of habitual simulation. It is true, however, that a perverted taste of this sort cannot fail soon to corrupt the sentiments; nor, perhaps, does it ever take the lead in a mind that has by constitution the full pulse of kind and noble emotions.

This same tendency to pursue the remoter connections of causes may produce,—according to the direction that may be given to the character by its other component principles, or by external circumstances,

—either the dissembler and knave, or the abstruse thinker, and subtle sophist; and where there is this similarity in the intellectual conformation, there will often be a striking resemblance in manners and in forms, even between individuals who differ as widely as possible in moral character. I could place beside each other two persons,—the one a man of high integrity, the other a knave,—resembling each other physiognomically in a degree that can only be explained by tracing the two minds to their elements. The first named of this pair,—a man of unblemished honour and great simplicity of manners,—passes in society for a profound thinker: he is distinguished by his propensity to pursue the abstruse suggestions of causation: he is perpetually imagining connections among facts absurdly remote: he is an exact divider of hairs in metaphysical discussions; and a sophist in argument,—not because he wishes to mislead others, but because he is himself constantly misled by his own exquisite sagacity. The second is a thorough knave: —one who, while he pursues his object through the path of falsehood and fraud, delights more in the way than in the end: his pleasure is rather in his work than in his wages. Though the love of gain is ostensibly the leading motive of his life; it is in fact the developement and exercise of his *faculty* that is the ruling passion of his mind: and while successfully working the machinery of deception, he feels a zest and satisfaction akin to the enthusiasm of genius.

If the two faces are compared, I will not affirm that there will be no physiognomical indication of the vast moral difference between the two characters; but while this indication will be of the faintest kind, —difficult to be ascertained or described,—the identity of the intellectual element is declared by the prevailing similarity of form and expression. A physiognomical description of the two faces would agree in such particulars as the following:—A bony structure, more properly called slight than delicate; defective in symmetry, and graceless in its outlines. The integuments thin, redundant, and flaccid. In the complexion of the two men there is less resemblance;—that of the sophist being clear and cold; while that of the knave is lightly suffused with bile. In both faces the cartilages are sharply expanded. But it is chiefly in the habits of the muscles,—their action and subsidence,—that the two minds discover their elementary affinity. The specific nature of the intellectual conformation, as displayed in the state of the facial muscles, is, in most instances, easily perceived; and as easily distinguished from the indications of moral or animal dispositions. Muscular action in the face, accompanying *emotion*, is of a more perfect kind than that which attends simple *intellection*. During a purely intellectual operation, the muscles are held in a state of suspension, or of unsteady counteraction: there appears to be a contention, either between antagonist muscles, or between

the muscle and the weight of the part it sustains. This is to be remarked especially in the eye-lids, the brows, and the under jaw. And a suspensive habit of the muscles of these parts may be considered as the primary characteristic of the two faces of which I am speaking. A suspended, or dropping,—not a fallen, or motionless lid,—seems, alike in the sophist and the knave, to skreen the senses while the mind is gone in quest of some remote or minute suggestion. And a similar suspensive retraction of the jaw by the temporal muscles, and a puckered lip, all indicate that sort of groping alertness of thought which is the characteristic state of this class of minds. The contraction of the brows belongs more often to some imperfect emotion, than to intellection: it will be found oftener in the sophist than in the dissembler: as a concomitant of knavery, it belongs only to faculties of the lowest order. In such cases the action of the muscles of the brows is infirm, catching, and *unfinished:* the straitened intellect betrays its embarrassment as it works its way through the dimness of its own moral perversion.

It is generally true, that muscular action in the face, after deducting for the degree of present emotion and exertion, is in inverse proportion to the rate of intelligence; or, at least, to the soundness of the faculties: the more mind, the less exterior movement. Hence it is, as every observer of faces and characters knows, that the most able and accomplished dis-

sembler is the one who is the least likely to be detected by his physiognomical expression. Nor is this to be attributed so much to a higher proficiency in the arts of self-command and concealment, as to the excellence of the intellect. There are knaves whose tact is so nice, whose perceptions are so quick, and whose reasoning powers are so perfectly serene and free from obstructions, that, even while watching the crisis of a plot, or actually fingering the threads of a fraud—they might safely place their smooth, gay, and tranquil faces by the side of the open-eyed ingenuousness of youth; or challenge comparison with the bland smile of beneficence and integrity: on the other hand, there are to be found luckless faces, very likely to bring their owners under unfounded suspicion, which yet indicate nothing worse than the alternate perplexity and chuckling satisfaction of a petty mind,—childishly crafty, perhaps, in trifles, but thoroughly honest in matters of importance. If then, as there is reason to believe, the elements of the mental constitution prevail, in physiognomical expression, over the indications of the *actual moral condition* of the individual, it will follow that discriminations of moral character founded upon pretended physiognomical or craniological rules, have scarcely a chance of being correct. Such decisions are liable to error in many ways:—for even if the elements of mind were scientifically known; and if the constant external symbols of these elements were

ascertained; and if the results of individual combinations of these elements were understood; a capital source of misinterpretation would remain, because that which is most important in the *actual condition* of the mind is often very remotely connected with muscular action, and wholly independent of original conformation. And besides these uncertainties, belonging to the imperfect state of our knowledge of human nature, there is to be remembered the vagueness of even the most precise verbal descriptions of form; and the incorrect observation of him who applies the rule in each particular case. That sort of practised talent of observation which is usually called *tact*, is a better guide than any physiognomical rules can be: but this faculty is liable to much fortuity; and it is incommunicable. But in using either tact or rules for the discernment of character, we prosecute the study of human nature in the wrong direction.

P. 9.

THE ADULATOR.

It is not my intention to occupy the space allotted to these notes by observations upon those of the characters that are nearly allied to each other: I shall rather select such as may be assumed as leading examples of distinct classes. The Parasite is a Dis-

sembler, distinguished from his class only by the actual corruption of his sentiments, and the concentration of his faculties upon a particular object. If it were intended to adduce instances for the purpose of physiognomical analysis, a distinction must be observed: there are Flatterers from policy, who have a reserve of self-respect, and whose pride is crushed as often as they cringe: and there are Flatterers (the most proper examples of the class) who are trailed at the heels of a superior from mere abjectness of soul, and debility of volition. The profile (page 9) may perhaps be considered as an instance of this kind. Its obvious expression is that of abject devotion to a particular object,—animated by lurking treachery. The whole contour, especially of the nose, indicates a degree of enterprising cupidity, without which a mind so much paralysed in its emotions could not support the incessant labours of adulation.

P. 13.

THE GARRULOUS.

The distinction commonly made in the use of the terms *garrulity* and *loquacity*, is founded upon an essential difference between the two dispositions. Garrulity results from the relaxed condition of faculties which either have been, or which might become,—if

a touch could give equilibrium to the mind,—alert, and perhaps energetic. It is a case of debility. Loquacity is more constitutional: it is the habit of the faculties in their healthiest state. It is a case of excessive excitability, often connected with some original *excellence* in the organs of speech. Garrulity has its fits and its relapses: the peal of one hour will be followed by the torpor of the next: Loquacity is more equable; the velocity may vary, but the movement is constant. Men are liable to become garrulous: women are sometimes loquacious. A garrulous child may make a silent man: a loquacious child will be a talker to his latest breath. The talking of the garrulous is the jingling of bells loosely hung in the wind:—the talking of the loquacious is the vibration of chords too tightly strained. Garrulity is broken, abrupt, and always tending towards incoherency: the actual associations upon which the series of suggestions are linked together are commonly occult; and often not easily to be divined. The supply of thought seems never to rise much above the level of its exit. But loquacity is continuous, copious, exuberant,—the scatent stream boils out, and indicates a bursting pressure from within.

That current of ideas which flows on through the mind whenever it is undirected by volition, and undisturbed by emotion, has a character not difficult to be distinguished: it is to be known by the apparent prevalence of some of the simpler laws of sugges-

tion,—such as the proximity or contact of objects, in time or place; or the accidental consonance of words; or the perceptions of the instant. Although it may not be easy at once to detect the real links of connection in a garrulous effusion, we shall rarely fail to perceive the fact whenever the mind thus dreams aloud, and the tongue is tracking a series of fortuitous associations: in such a case we are permitted to inspect, through the organs of speech—as a transparent medium, what might be called, (if the allusion could be allowed,) the peristaltic motion of the mind. In this movement there is that peculiar character of even-pacedness which belongs to all the undisturbed operations of nature. This immediate connection of the faculty of speech with the involuntary current of thought always implies the natural infirmity,—the immaturity,—the temporary suspension, or the decay of the will: hence it is the frequent concomitant of infancy, of sickness, of constitutional weakness of mind, and of extreme age; but it occurs in no case of totally deficient or exhausted excitability.

The head (III. p. 13.) exhibits the symptoms of a high degree of constitutional excitability, together with a hopeless infirmity of will. The current of involuntary thought, though neither deep nor rapid, flows with a force too great to be arrested or diverted by the other faculties: Reason bends in the stream; and the slender emotions float like straws on the surface. The hair of the head falls from the

crown, as if it were the very symbol of a still and continuous rain of words: the sunken lids, the dropping lip, and the flaccid integuments, declare the entire relaxation of the muscular system, and the concomitant decay of the voluntary principle: at the same time the restless and sanguine temperament keeps the mind afloat above the level of inanity or torpor. This head may be compared with the outline beneath, which exhibits a near approach to idiotism. Here is the same debility, and a scarcely less sanguine temperament; but, from some physical straitness or obstruction in the mechanism of the mind, there is no reservoir of ideas capacious enough to supply a flow even of the most inane garrulity. The successive changes in the consciousness of this half-idiot consist of flashes of thought and emotion imperfectly indicated by a perpetual incoherent violence of muscular action.

If we had before us the originals of these two sketches, they might be assumed as proper instances in which to study the phenomena of the constant involuntary movement of the mind, exhibited in a nearly simple state, and developed in a way much better adapted to the purposes of philosophical analysis than our personal consciousness can ever be. These phenomena should be compared with those presented by the mind during infancy, when the current of thought depends more upon instant sensations than upon memory; and these again with the effects produced by the entire suspension of the voluntary principle in sleep, when the suggestions of memory prevail over those of sensation. The human mind,—complex in its original conformation, and almost infinitely complicated by the continued interaction of its elements, is very rarely exposed to our observation under any near approximation to a simple state; that is to say, when one of its elements is in undisturbed operation. Such instances, whenever they occur, deserve the special attention of the student of human nature. The time so often spent by the metaphysical inquirer in painful and unavailing efforts to hold asunder the elements of *his own consciousness*, would probably produce results more certain, intelligible, and useful, if employed in the analysis and comparison of other minds, as they are exposed to observation in the physical appearances, the words, and the conduct of the individuals who surround him.

In the former course,—as experience has amply proved, little can be gained beyond a higher elaboration, or a new combination of *abstract phrases*, which, after all, will be fully intelligible to no one but to their inventor. In the latter course, general facts might be gradually ascertained; and the science of the mind might be so constituted, as should render it wholly independent of logical niceties, or prudish delicacies of expression. It seems to have been too generally assumed as an obvious and unquestionable principle, that when Mind is to be made the subject of philosophical investigation, the sufficient materials of the inquiry are contained in every one's consciousness;—that the whole study is introspective; and that a perfect analysis of a single mind would yield us all that is attainable, or even desirable in this department of knowledge. It is true that it has been the common practice of metaphysical inquirers, especially in modern times, to make occasional references to facts gathered by observation; but this has only, or chiefly been done when such facts seemed conducive to the establishment and illustration of a theory which had been previously formed by an introspective analysis of its author's individual consciousness. It hardly needs to be shown that the analogy of the inductive philosophy points to a method directly the reverse of this. We must indeed learn, in the first instance, by the introspection of our own minds, to interpret the symbols of Mind as they are every where presented to our

observation in the forms and the actions of conscious beings. But having once mastered these symbols, we should henceforward be employed,—not in an inane measurement and remeasurement of our alphabet, but in actually perusing the great and various volume of nature.

The assumed principle that Mind is exclusively, or chiefly, to be learned by a continued analytical scrutiny of the phenomena of our own consciousness, has operated, not only to shut out the common light of day from the walks of the science, and to straighten its path; but it has tended to leave the study of human nature in the hands of that particular class of thinkers who are the least qualified to lead it forth from the nether world of solitary speculation. And, in fact, this department of science has always been a sequestered haunt of ill-grown intellects, from which men of sound understanding have been fain to keep aloof. If the science of Mind is ever to be placed upon terms of equality and correspondence with the sister sciences, this service will be performed not by dialecticians, but by philosophers:—not by those whose intellectual eminence results from the disproportionate enlargement of a single faculty—the power of abstraction; but by those who surpass other men simply in a high and rare perfection of common sense. There is, perhaps, no conjunction of faculties so rare as that of the power of abstraction, with the tact and the habit of

observation. But both are indispensable to the study of human nature. Without that power of abstraction by which the changes and the elements of our consciousness are held apart for separate examination, the substance that is the object of the science will never be distinctly apprehended; and without the disposition to be conversant with common facts, the mind will too quickly recede from the labours of observation, and amuse itself in a world of its own creation.

P. 16.

THE RUSTIC.

A state of perfectly balanced activity in the facial muscles,—without tension or rigidity, without relaxation or torpor, without the alternations of an ill-adjusted counteraction, indicates the symmetry of the intellectual conformation: a mind of this sort ripens early,—not precociously; and retains late the bloom and freshness of maturity. Minds that are not susceptible of finishing, rest nowhere between infancy and decay: after the first alertness of the powers is impaired, there is a constantly progressive deterioration, which is skreened from observation solely by the permanency of habits. The stiffening of the faculties holds the character in *form*, long after *movement*

has become impracticable. In cases of this sort it is the peculiarities of childhood, not those of youth, that are fixed upon the face, the manners, and the mind. The profile (IV. p. 16.) may be placed for a moment in comparison with the one beneath. Besides the more obvious contrast between the masculine and rude grossness of the one head, and the infantile and feminine delicacy of the other; we may remark the scarcely less obvious indications of the obtuse perceptions of the man, and of the fine and exact perceptions of the child;—of the ungoverned volitions of that, and of the tranquil self-command of this;—of the fixed and hopeless infancy of the adult, and of the certain promise of maturity in the infant.

In the character and physiognomy of the boor;—that is to say, of one who is such by nature,—not from the mere want of education;—it is not so much the obtrusive grossness of his appetites, and the heedless rudeness of his manners that are to be remarked, as that defect in his conformation, which renders him incapable of improvement. The true nature of the principle of improvement, as well as the source of this defect, would discover itself to us if we had frequent opportunity of bringing into comparison two cases similar to those which I have here adduced; in one of which the mind and the form present only a rude exaggeration of infancy; and in the other, where the mind and the form seem always to be a graceful step in advance of the actual years. A natural incapability of improvement often exhibits appearances very similar to those which proceed from infirmity of volition or paralysis of the faculties: the words and actions present the same denudation of the involuntary changes of the mind; but the cases are essentially different. It is neither the general weakness of the mind, nor the deficiency of particular powers that necessarily impedes its progress towards maturity. Instances of perennial infancy are not infrequent, in which the higher emotions, as well as the appetites, are vigorous;—the tone of the mind healthy, and the imagination and the reasoning powers not below mediocrity. It is perhaps upon the degree of ease or difficulty with which the mind can hold itself

for a length of time in a state of complex or multifarious intellection, upon which, chiefly, depends its susceptibility of improvement, or of advancement towards perfection. The doctrine that the human mind can be occupied with only one idea or emotion in the same instant, I believe to be an unfounded assumption. But if it were true, the fact remains the same, that the mind is often in a state which, if we were not taught to think it impossible, we should believe to be complex: that is to say,—a state in which various operations are *simultaneously* carried on. It is also a fact that minds differ very widely, both in the degree of complex or multifarious intellection of which they are capable; and in the length of time during which they can sustain and direct this complex state: and these differences measure, I think, the rate of their improvement. I do not pretend to trace the cause of the difference higher; although it would be easy to do so upon the beaten path of pure analysis: but deductions that are not the result of multifarious observation of individual cases, are of little value.

There is a rude, reckless, and infantile incoherency or extravagance of conduct which very often characterises those who are highly gifted in some single faculty. Indeed, men of eminent, but restricted genius,—such, for example, as mechanicians, artists, musicians, and second-rate poets, have, with few exceptions, a something about them either of fatuity or of ferocity; so that their familiar companions are

often in doubt whether the being with whom they have to do, is most of the babe or the bear. This peculiarity is frequently the consequence of the collapse and exhaustion of over-strained faculties: sometimes, no doubt, it proceeds from rank arrogance or affectation: but I am inclined to believe that, in most instances, it is intimately connected with the organic cause of a partial mental superiority. I mean to say, that the preponderating force of a *single faculty* in the mind is commonly in inverse proportion to its capability of remaining in a state of complex intellection: and it is this capability that I have assumed to be the element of general improvement, and of high finishing in the character.

P. 19.

THE PLAUSIBLE.

The latter half of this chapter, beginning at the words—*Καὶ πλειστάκις δὲ ἀποκείρασθαι*, appears to have been removed from its original place, and improperly joined to this chapter: the description would much better suit the character of the Vain, or the Ostentatious. Yet it did not seem necessary to make a conjectural transposition of the text; but in the translation, the two discrepant portions are tied together by the very admissible assertion that,—'a man of this temper is usually a fop.' The text of this latter

portion of the chapter has probably suffered from the carelessness or ignorance of transcribers; and it has perhaps sustained nearly equal injury from the ingenuity of editors. It contains also several phrases of rather doubtful meaning, upon the elucidation of which many closely-printed pages of learned Latin have been bestowed: for annotations of this sort I must refer my readers to the editions of Casaubon, Fischer, Morell, Needham, Duport, Schneider, Astius, Coray, &c. as well as for those which set forth the several claims and merits of the very numerous various readings. I may be permitted here to say, that though I do not obtrude critical details of this sort upon my readers, yet, in preparing the text for the press, I have collated all the principal editions with no little diligence. After a full and patient comparison of existing variations, and proposed emendations, I have, in most cases, avoided mere conjecture; and leaned to the readings adopted by the majority of editors. The text of, perhaps, few ancient authors has come down to us in a more mangled state than that of Theophrastus. The most sagacious and learned of his editors—Casaubon, is perpetually exclaiming—'conclamatus locus!—ulcus,—ulcus insanabile!—locus et mutilus et corruptus;—locus est vitii manifestus;—vel subobscurus, vel corruptus, vel utrumque;—sensum, puto, expressimus; verba autem valde sunt depravata:' and the most judicious of them,—Needham, frequently brings a laborious

criticism merely to this conclusion,—' Liberum esto lectori judicium.' In some instances, where a manifest depravation of the text exists, I have used a greater liberty of emendation in the translation than I could venture to admit in the Greek: and when there has been left, in the latter, uncured, a wound pronounced by the critics to be *insanabile;* I have, in the version, endeavoured to conceal the offence by giving a less specific turn to the passage.

The Plausible,—or the man who would fain please all the world,—differs from the Adulator in being a more trivial, and a less corrupted character. He may be thoroughly well-meaning: the Flatterer is always a knave.

P. 22.

THE RUFFIAN.

Ὁ Ἀπονενοημένος—a man who acts as if he were bereft of his understanding:—a madman, not by disease, but by temper. One may frequently meet with good-humoured and very reasonable men, whose rugged, mis-shapen and mobile faces might, in an instant of trivial agitation, be supposed to indicate the highest violence of temper: and there are others who, with faces almost as smooth and placid as that of the sleeping infant, are liable to frenzies of outrageous passion; or who, under the cloak of man-

ners that bespeak confidence, run about, with a sort of cheerful diligence, as the incendiaries of society. So little can we depend upon any supposed proportion between the *moral* qualities of the mind, and the strength, relief, or extravagance of its exterior symbols. I believe that, generally, the character of the malignant, brutal and *dangerous* ruffian will be much *less* strongly and obviously marked on the form, than that of one who is more troublesome, but less to be feared,—more noisy, brawling, and scurrilous, but less rational. The perpetrator of some appalling atrocity, instead of being distinguished by a physiognomy *picturesquely* horrific, shall escape the eye of an experienced observer who would detect him in a crowd. In fact, among the worst specimens of human nature we shall find many who seem to have become what they are, rather from the want of certain sensibilities, and from a peculiar restlessness of temper; than from any ungovernable constitutional propensities. It is no wonder that instances of this sort should perplex those who have adopted broad physiognomical rules, and apply them to individuals, without a comprehensive regard to the philosophy of human nature. In the examination of extreme cases,—such, for example, as that of a bold invader of property, or perpetrator of unusual barbarities, we are liable to very false conclusions by taking up that measurement of crime which is given to us by the verdict of a jury. In the eye of the philosophical moralist, or the physi-

ologist, this instance will, perhaps, appear to differ scarcely at all from a thousand other instances—of equal turpitude, that attract no attention, except in what is purely accidental or circumstantial. A man commits a murder, and is hanged for it; and the head is borne away in glee by eager speculatists upon the bony and medullary developement of organs:—the cast is taken with religious care; and the ominous protuberance of *destructiveness* is triumphantly pointed out, at the due degree of its latitude and longitude: and, forthwith, the instance goes to the corroboration of a system; and all this, upon the very inconsequential presumption, that a man who has caused the death of another, under the circumstances which bring the case within *a legal definition*, must be, by his physical conformation, a destroyer of life. But even supposing there to have been in this case plain indications of the existence of some original propensity to *destructiveness*, or *combativeness*, or what not, they ought to be considered simply as furnishing a suggestion for inquiry: it is egregiously unphilosophical to assume *overt acts*, indiscriminately, as the ground of scientific classifications of character. Before any general inductions relative to the correspondence between forms and dispositions can be established with precision, many correlative questions which have yet scarcely been distinctly stated, must be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. I am far from intending to affirm the non-existence of this cor-

respondence;—on the contrary, I have a strong belief in the existence of an absolute, perfect, and invariable relation, between the form, the complexion, the texture of the integuments, the chemical qualities solids and fluids, and the qualities of the mind. But I do not perceive that, hitherto, any approach has been made towards a scientific knowledge of the physical concomitants of mind. The system which has lately made great pretensions, is liable to obvious and capital objections. Such, for instance, as the following:—

That analysis of the human mind which is the basis of the system, and upon the *absolute perfection* of which the justness of its pretended interpretation of external symbols wholly depends, is,—to say nothing of the preposterous jargon in which it is conveyed,—at once defective, and redundant:—scanty without being simple; and full but not comprehensive.

Even admitting this wordy analysis of the elements of mind to be just, and sufficient, and expressed with the highest degree of precision and propriety, the system neither does, nor, with its exclusive means, can it calculate upon the derangements, obscurations, or mislocations of the symbols, consequent upon disturbing intercausations in each individual combination of the elements. If A. B. C. D. E, are the universal elements of the human mind, we may meet with a case in which B, and D, though not wholly wanting, shall be so far crushed, or impoverished by the over-

growth of A. C, and E, that A. C, and E, will be developed in forms totally different from those which would have belonged to them in a more symmetrical combination. Where numerous elements are actually liable to as many different combinations as they are mathematically capable of, general rules may be imagined; but they can never be inferred from *one class* of facts; for the exceptions will be vastly more numerous than the instances of conformity.

Besides this probable disturbance of the form of the cranium from the various combination of the elements of mind, it needs to be proved that it is not exposed to influences altogether unconnected with mind. If the figure of the medullary substance were related simply and exclusively to the *qualities of thought*, it would seem not impracticable to ascertain the location of the influence of these qualities upon the substance; but there is great reason to presume that this figure is liable to several independent disturbing causes; even admitting that the quality of thought *primarily* gives law to the form.

The two last-mentioned objections relate to the probable equivocation or disturbance of the *symbols*. But besides these sources of uncertainty, there is also reason to believe, (at least the contrary cannot be affirmed,) that the qualities of the mind are related to, dependent upon, or more or less remotely influenced by, such qualities of the organ of thought, as are wholly unconnected with the causes that determine the figure

of the brain. Many facts suggest the supposition that the force, the susceptibilities, the tendency and disposition, of the mind, are primarily determined by (or that they determine,) the chemical properties, not merely of the solids and fluids of the *cranium*, but of all the secretions of the body. It is to be presumed as possible, and even probable, that two minds, differing widely in force, tendency, or disposition, might be found, tenanting heads alike in dimension and figure; while the difference between them should proceed solely from some chemical differences in the secretions: and until it shall be *fully proved* that the qualities of the mind are influenced by no such chemical differences,—wholly independent of figure and dimension,—the interpretation of mind by mathematical symbols *alone* must be liable to indefinite uncertainty. A system for the interpretation of the qualities of the mind by external symbols, such as might merit to be called *phrenology*, must be founded upon the combined observation of all the physical concomitants of mind. It is an egregious misnomer to confer this title upon a system of observations and hypotheses relating exclusively to the figure of the skull. The *Craniologists* ought to return to craniology:—as collectors of facts in a single department, they might render important services to the general science of Human Nature.

P. 25.

THE LOQUACIOUS.



A skull without a record ought to be deemed of little value as a material of science: it should be used merely as affording an exercise of physiognomical tact. The one of which I here present an outline, seems to me to have belonged to a high-toned ner-

vous system; and to have been that of a female. Whatever may be its protuberances, or its concavities, the general character of the lines gives me the idea of propensities depending primarily, and chiefly, upon the qualities of the chylificative secretions. In this supposition there is an acknowledgment of the symbolic significance of the bony structure. But its meaning, in the present instance, seems to me to be rather reflected than direct: and if the living subject were under observation, the obvious course would be to turn from the obscurer inscription, written in bone, to the much more obtrusive and intelligible characters, every where to be read upon the exterior: and instead of fumbling for mysteries on the head, to seek, in the texture and colour of the integuments,—in the forms of the cartilages,—in the proportions and the habits of the facial muscles,—and in the condition of the teeth, for the unequivocal indications of the qualities of the secretions, and of the tone and susceptibility of the nervous system. In the interpretation of these concomitants of temper and faculty, we are liable to little error; because the symbol and its meaning are daily placed together under our observation. I have here introduced this outline because its prominent character appears to me to centre in the organs of speech, and to be that of indefatigable facundity,—sharpened by the acridness of the gastric fluids; and made shrill and continuous by a tight-strained nervous system. But all this is mere conjecture;—

another eye might read a wholly different meaning in the same symbols.

I have already distinguished the Loquacious from the Garrulous. There are distinct classes of the Loquacious: as,—the Trivial, whose loquacity is the indispensable vent of great excitability, unbalanced by reason or feeling;—the Social, whose loquacity results from an exaggeration of the sentiments that hold man in society;—the Eloquent, whose loquacity is inspired, either by a galloping imagination; or by the intensity of superficial and momentary emotions:—the Objurgative,—a class of the loquacious who find their never-failing materials among the mishaps and misdeeds of the domestic sphere. There is also, I think, a case of loquacity which immediately results from—I know not whether to call it a *disease* or a *perfection* of the organs of speech, and perhaps also of those of hearing,—which makes talking an instinctive and uncontroulable propensity, as jumping is to the squirrel, or running to the hind. To this case is applicable the expression attributed to the character by our author—*ὡς ἐν ὑγρῷ ἐστὶν ἡ γλῶττα—the tongue is hung flexibly.* The head (VII. p. 25.) indicates an unusual velocity of suggestion: this brain would whirl itself into insanity, if it were not happily checked by its connection with the necessarily slower oscillations of the tongue.

P. 28.

THE FABRICATOR OF NEWS.

There is no kind of mental pravity which, with whatever other qualities it may be joined, makes itself more distinctly visible in the face, than the propensity to lie: it lurks in every feature; and it communicates a sort of family likeness to faces that have no other point of resemblance. Although this peculiar physiognomical indication is so plain, I must confess myself to be quite unable to say in what it consists. The disposition itself has sometimes more of the character of an instinctive propensity, than of any definite or assignable motive. There are instances in which it appears to be nothing more than the exaltation of a cold imagination,—constantly hungering for excitement. This excitement the liar furnishes for himself; while the busybody runs about to seek for it in other men's affairs. When falsehood is designedly employed as the base means for accomplishing an unworthy purpose, it brings the individual under another order of character: it is the gratuitous, and almost involuntary liar, who must be taken as the proper specimen of his class. An inconsequential habit of thought—infirmity of will, together with a torpid or relaxed state of the sentiments—may, perhaps, be the most usual combination from which this

propensity results. This might be inferred from what seem to be the elements of the opposite disposition,—the love of truth, or, more properly, the love of veracity. The common phrase—the love of truth, is ambiguous; being as often employed to signify the desire of knowledge, as a moral regard to the exactness of our declarations;—two things wholly distinct, and often actually found apart. The philosophical love of truth, or knowledge, is a rare excellence, purely intellectual: it results from an original susceptibility in a high degree, to that pleasurable emotion which is concomitant with the perception of connections of cause and effect, or of any permanent abstract relation. In common minds this emotion is too weak to produce any habit that is perceptible in the character;—too weak to divert for a moment a trivial pursuit, or to repel the lightest prejudice. But in rarer instances it is strong enough to quench animal appetites,—to lift reason above the atmosphere of passion, and, in a word, to rule and absorb the whole being. And yet, such is the dimness of our present condition, and such the intricacy of the system of things with which we are surrounded, that minds, even thus eminently gifted, seem to be scarcely less liable to err than others. There is however this difference;—that, while with the mass of minds error, perpetually produced by confusion of thought, or by the bias of improper motives, accompanies every step;—with minds ruled by the sovereign desire of knowledge, error is

but, as it were, an unhappy accident, consequent upon the mistake of a cipher in the commencement of the process. This intellectual love of truth, when happily conjoined with that moral disposition which is more properly so denominated, produces one of the finest and the rarest combinations of which human nature is susceptible: even without the highest rate of intellectual power it suffices to give a dignity to the character that makes a man a seraph among his fellows. The being to whom a lie is possible, deserves to be called a slave,—*τὸ γὰρ ψεύδεσθαι δουλοπρεπὲς*,—and he who can acquiesce without regret in ignorance or error, is little better than an animal;—but a predominating appetite for knowledge, and a supreme regard to truth, are qualities which, when united, forestal the benefits of perfected knowledge, and of unerring intelligence. There is an obtrusive pretension to strict veracity, which is the indication of a trivial scrupulosity of temper, or of prosing loquacity: it will be minutely exact,—with its supplements, and its corrections, and its revisions of every statement,—from the mere love of prolixity. In a mind distinguished by a genuine regard to truth there will be found, besides the emotions of self-respect, and religious integrity, a firm and steady coherency of thought,—precision in the faculties of perception,—a great power of attention, and, in the habitual series of associations, much more of regular antecedence and consequence, than of fortuity, or instantaneous impulse.

P. 31.

THE SORDID.

This character, the two immediately following, and the twenty-third, are allied in their ostensible objects, and often pursue a similar course; yet in disposition they are distinguishable. The Sordid, or the man greedy of filthy lucre, and the Shameless, are influenced by the desire of acquisition: the Parsimonious and the Penurious,—by the fear of loss. But I have no intention to attempt to frame definitions, or to insist upon verbal distinctions. Although, in fact, it is a much easier thing to adjust the proprieties of a nomenclature, or to display the relative position of metaphysical terms, or to make artificial classifications of the qualities of mind, than to describe and to analyse the varieties of disposition as they are actually presented in living instances. The one process is a mere play of the mind with its own materials: the other is a labour that demands the intellectual habits of a secluded student in one who must be greatly conversant in the world. The difference between the two above mentioned methods, and their comparative merits, may here be well exhibited. The one method, consisting in the description and analysis of individual character, as pursued by Theophrastus; the other, consisting in the definition

and distribution of the qualities of the mind, considered abstractedly, as practised by Aristotle. In making this comparison it must be premised that, while the Ethics of Aristotle furnish, perhaps, the best extant specimens of the logical method of treating the science of human nature, the characters of Theophrastus are far from being equally proper and sufficient specimens of the method of observation and analysis: viewed in this light, they are defective in two respects: in the first place, these descriptions contain only, or chiefly, those symptoms of the individual case which are the most obviously characteristic of the predominant disposition; but, for the purposes of a scientific analysis, we need to have before us an *entire enumeration* of the symptoms of every case, —those that, at first sight, seem the least, as well as those that are the most obviously significant:—otherwise, we are exposed to the same source of error that forms the chief objection to the abstract method, namely,—a habit of regarding the qualities or dispositions of the mind in a form in which they never actually exist, that is to say—single and uncompounded. In the second place, these descriptions are not accompanied by intimations or instructions for instituting an analysis of the facts adduced. Although this process of analysis may be considered as more properly an afterwork; yet, unless some hints on which it may be commenced are noted while the individual case is under the eye, the clue is likely to

be lost irrecoverably. To these two defects might be added, the want of any notification of the physical concomitants of the individual character;—such as form, complexion, temperament, &c. Complete descriptions of individual cases, adapted to the purposes of philosophical analysis and classification, have never yet, as far as I know, been attempted.

It may, however, be allowable, as a matter of curiosity, notwithstanding the above-named grounds of exception, to place in contrast the two methods, as practised by the Master and his Disciple. The following quotation from the Ethics of Aristotle may be compared with the characters of the Sordid, the Shameless, the Parsimonious, and the Penurious, as described by Theophrastus. Having treated of Prodigality and its kindred vices,—affirming that, under proper direction, these propensities may be restrained and corrected; he says,

'But a sordid attachment to money is an incurable disease: it is generated by infirmity of mind,—whether resulting from extreme age, or other causes. This vice seems to find a much more congenial soil in the human heart, than the opposite propensity to profusion: for truly there are many more lovers of gain, than of giving, in the world. The disposition ramifies widely, and makes its appearance under a variety of forms. Many are the modifications of avarice: we may, however, consider all these modifications as comprehended under two general divisions; and as being either a defec-

tiveness in the bestowment, or an exorbitance in the acquisition, of property. Nor do we in fact usually find these two propensities conjoined in the same individual: for, while some men are distinguished by their eagerness in seeking gain, others are so, by their reluctance in spending what they possess. Those, for example, upon whom are bestowed the epithets—parsimonious, stingy, niggardly, and so forth, are faulty only by defect: they neither invade nor covet the property of others. Indeed, there are some persons of this sort who are remarkable for the equity of their dealings, and their careful avoidance of all dishonourable practices: and some also there are who seem, (so at least they profess,) to pursue a plan of excessive parsimony from this very motive,—that they may never be compelled by necessity to seek dishonest gains. To this general class are to be referred all those who derive some vulgar appellation from their excessive grudging of expense; such, for example, as the man who will divide a grain of cummin—the split-farthing, and so forth. Others there are who are restrained from invading the property of their neighbours, only by the fear of retaliation, knowing that it is not easy for him to retain his own, who makes free with the possessions of another: they content themselves, therefore, not to acquire, if they can avoid the hazard of loss. Under the second general division are found those who are distinguished by the indiscriminate greediness with which they grasp at gain, of

any kind, and from any quarter. Such are they that pursue disreputable callings,—panders, usurers,—those who would move the world to find a farthing:—all these receive, either *whence* they ought not, or *what* they ought not; and to all of them belongs the shame of being lovers of filthy lucre; for all of them, for the sake of gain, and even the smallest gain, are ready to incur reproach.'

Such is the method in which the dispositions of human nature are treated of in the Ethics of Aristotle. It is, in fact, little more than a classification *raisonnée* of abstract terms, often, in the highest degree acute and ingenious; purely dialectical in its style and spirit; and well adapted to gratify and exercise a logical taste. But even after a system of distinctions of this sort has been perfected, down to its minutest subdivisions, nothing substantial is added to our knowledge of human nature,—such as it actually exists in individual instances. Knowledge is increased by Enumeration, Description, and Analysis; not by Definition or Classification; which serve no other purposes than those of exercising the faculty of abstraction, or of aiding the memory in the retention of knowledge already acquired. The definitions and distinctions of Aristotle are too logical,—the descriptions of Theophrastus are rather too dramatic for the purposes of science.

In order to gain a complete and distinct knowledge of a single element of any compound body which does

not admit of an actual separation of parts, there are two methods to be pursued:—the first, is to watch those occasions when the element that is the subject of examination is in a state of full and undisturbed operation;—the second, is to note its changing appearances or modifications under the greatest possible variety of combination with other elements, or with extrinsic causes. It is in these methods of observation and experiment that the analysis of material substances is conducted; and thus also, if an element of mind is the subject of investigation, it must first be observed in those occasions when, either by its own predominating force, or by the decay or torpor of other faculties, it is exposed in a state of undisturbed action: and, having in this way learned its more striking and unequivocal characteristics, it then remains to identify the faculty or the motive in the greatest possible variety of instances, where it can be detected in combination with other elements of character; noting, at the same time, all the physical concomitants of every case. It is thus, and not by a forced analytical introspection of our own consciousness, that we may hope to gain a substantial knowledge of Mind. In the pursuit of these methods we can hardly fail of two results:—first, that we shall progressively, and without labour, gain intelligence in interpreting the external symbols of character:—and, secondly, that a true analysis of the universal elements of Mind will, by the frequent presentation of these elements under

different forms, obtrude itself upon our notice: that simplification of facts towards which so little progress has been made by the solitary efforts, even of the acutest minds, will gradually come out from a natural process of induction.

The greater part of this chapter—*περὶ Αἰσχροκέρδειας*, is derived from a manuscript copy of the Characters, discovered in the library of the Vatican, and first printed at Parma in the year 1786: of this chapter, as well as of the thirtieth, and some portions of others, no English translation has, I believe, before appeared.

P. 35.

THE SHAMELESS.

If this character is distinguished from the last, it is only by the addition of audacity, in the one, to the less courageous greediness of the other. It often happens that what is ostensibly the governing passion, is in fact nothing more than a *phasis* of the real leading motive of the mind. Many apparent contradictions in human character are to be explained on this principle. The ostensible motive gives the name to the character; and being thus assigned to its class, we examine it under a false supposition; and after

some unavailing efforts to explain the facts of the case upon the assumed hypothesis, conclude, that the instance is anomalous; or, in common language, that the character is full of inconsistencies. For example:—The conduct of two individuals under similar circumstances is as nearly alike as can be supposed: they are both called avaricious; and to one of them the epithet belongs with strict propriety; but if applied to the other, it is the name, rather of the *conduct* than of the *character;* for in this instance there is more of a rank, impudent, vulture-like delight in all that is gross and foul, than of the simple desire of acquisition: the man pounces in broad day-light upon the property of his neighbour,—less for the sake of the prey, than for the pleasure of the bold and shameless invasion: and if on some occasion we see him saucily grasp the offal, when he might with impunity have stolen the sheep, we are at a loss to account for the fact, while the love of gain is imagined to be his ruling passion.

The names of permanent qualities, or constitutional dispositions, are rather *forensic* than physiological: that is to say,—they are drawn from the *overt acts* of the life; not from any discrimination of motives: they must therefore be discarded, if we wish to carry inquiry beyond the colloquial distinctions of character. The confusion and obscurity that arise from this source, are still greater on the side of intellectual or moral excellencies; because, as the marking—the

show—the overt act is less strong and distinct, the terms themselves are less accurately framed; and they are also liable to be applied with much less propriety: hence, in part, is derived a common, but generally erroneous doctrine,—that the wise and good are more often inconsistent with themselves, than the foolish and profligate,—or that the conduct of the former is frequently more hard to be accounted for than that of the latter. It is indeed true, that folly and vice are *inconsistencies*, if supposed to be nearly associated with wisdom and virtue: but the apparent inconsistency in particular instances, arises as often from the vagueness of the terms by which character is designated, and from their improper application, as from any actual anomaly in the conduct of the individual. That a man of so sound a judgment should think or speak thus, and thus;—that one so eminently kind and generous should act thus, and thus;—that a head so cool and calculating should have erred so egregiously,—must be very perplexing, while we are vainly labouring to match colloquial descriptions of character, with the overt acts of the life.

P. 37.

THE PARSIMONIOUS.

If we look only at the mind, the effects of Fear, whether it be a momentary impulse, or a constitu-

tional propensity, are very nearly allied to those that accompany insanity. In the former case it operates, more than even stronger passions, to perturb the faculties of perception; or rather, to give a vividness to interior images that overpowers actual sensations. When fear is chronical, the disease falls inward, and deranges the reasoning powers: this is the case of the Miser. The understanding is frozen up in perpetual absurdities: its premises are false, and the inferences drawn from them stand in direct contradiction to the whole system of human affairs, and to every day's experience. To attribute a value, wholly fictitious, to the mere representative of the means of enjoyment,—to endure, voluntarily and constantly, the miseries of want,—lest want should come,—to be held in the unrelaxing grasp of a single motive, and to be fixed, without remission, upon one train of ideas, are the symptoms of a state of mind between which and madness the visible difference is not wide. A middle term is wanted, under which might be classed very numerous cases, that must be distinguished from actual madness, because they do not imply any derangement of the animal functions; and yet the enthralment of the understanding in these cases is as real; and the malady is less medicable. False judgements,—plainly springing up from some constitutional propensity,—produced, reproduced, and perpetuated, in the face of common sense and experience,—are insanities, that evince a palsy of the higher faculties of

the mind: the violences of madness are wanting; but reason seems to have passed, not less completely, beyond the influence of persuasion.

P. 40.

THE IMPURE.

The description of this character is rather incongruous: it has probably been made up of unconnected fragments, by a collector or transcriber. The sketch (XII.) must be viewed as belonging only to the first sentence of this chapter, and to the paragraph from which the quotation is taken. The physiognomical expression is that of the sensualist; and it indicates a union—not very frequent, of all the animal propensities, in nearly equal force. The exterior offensiveness of different vices is a very false rule by which to measure the degrees of moral turpitude: for the effects produced by excess in the indulgence of a single appetite will always be more disgusting than those which attend much more flagitious debauchery, when there is a balancing and a proportion among the propensities. So that this sort of symmetrical grossness,—although the degree of criminality, in the eye of God, and of man, (if he thinks justly,) is deeper, will be able to gloze and excuse itself in society; while

the wretched, but not more guilty victim of a single vice, is loathed and discarded. It is not without habitual reflection that we learn to repel that prejudice which inclines us to deal more hardly with the vices of the weak, than with those of the strong. The unbalanced preponderance of a single appetite bespeaks the natural weakness of the mind, and fails not soon to induce upon it a hideous decrepitude: but a well-proportioned and equipoised sensuality indicates some force of character; and it is often garnished by a sort of brute grace and alertness: we are disposed, therefore, in disregard of all justice,—while we make the one case an object of abhorrence, to bestow upon the other an affected reprimand, in which there lurks a spark of complacency.

P. 42.

THE BLUNDERER.

I have already had occasion to remark that, if we wish to study the mechanism of the mind upon the plan of actual induction, we must watch those instances in which it is exposed to observation by the defect, or the weakness, or the shrinking, or the yielding of some of its higher faculties. A perfectly sound mind is an unfit subject for analysis,—unfit, merely because difficult: the envelope is entire; and in at-

tempting dissection, we shall probably confound the parts: the most intelligible denudations of character are those that are performed by the hand of nature. Of the thirty characters described by Theophrastus, twenty are varieties of *infirmity;* and therefore furnish proper examples by which to illustrate the above-named principle. In pointing out these instances as being well suited to the objects of metaphysical examination, it must not be supposed that we are furnished in the text of our author with sufficient materials of study:—we have here nothing more than concise *diagnostics;* well serving the purpose of *specification,* —and nothing more. In referring to them we can go no further than to say,—the individual who acts and speaks thus, and thus, furnishes the proper subject in which to find the facts belonging to this, or that particular branch of inquiry: I aim at little more in these notes than to suggest hints of this sort.—Thus in the present instance—ὁ Ἄκαιρος—the Inopportune, or the Blunderer, is one in whom may be observed the several phenomena of simple intellection, ruled by suggestions from without, and made prominent by high excitability. The laws of involuntary thought are exposed to observation here by the force and velocity of the movement, as in other cases by its feebleness and slowness. The perceptions of the Blunderer are false, because incomplete; all his apprehensions are defective;—he never comprehends the actual circumstances by which he is surrounded: his con-

duct, therefore, being suggested instantaneously by objects on one side of his position, has no suitableness to those which stand upon the other side of it. He is not more capable of profiting by experience, or by instructions and admonitions, relative to certain proprieties of behaviour, than a chicken, that must be driven, with the same chastisements, through the same gap in a fence, twenty times in a day: his impulses are too simple to admit any concomitant recollection of consequences. If, to the character of the Blunderer be added some presumption, and a smack of conceit, —instead of being an object of mirth, or merely troublesome, he becomes a positive nuisance: such is the character described in the twenty-first chapter, —ὁ Ἀηδὴς—the Disagreeable.

A power of fine, exact, perfected, and multifarious perception is indicated by the delicate activity of the muscles of the mouth; while a torpid bulkiness in the lips, usually declares the straitened, inert, or perturbed state of this faculty. But let it always be remembered that physiognomical rules of this sort can never be employed, with safety, for the discrimination of character. Their only proper use is to furnish clues in the selection of objects fit for the illustration of particular branches of inquiry. For example:—with the aid of a rule, such as that given above, the student would be prepared to watch the conduct and manners of particular individuals, with the specific design of detecting a certain element of

character. The results of his observations would enable him to append to his rule the needful limitations and exceptions; and to make his subsequent observations more definite and intelligent.

P. 44.

THE BUSYBODY.

When the lovers of mystery, and of gratuitous difficulty, have before them parallel columns of an ancient inscription, the one consisting of unknown hieroglyphics, the other expressed in a familiar character, they must be permitted to place their sleeve over the latter; otherwise, they will not enjoy the full gratification of deciphering the former. The case is nearly the same with those who, after having indiscreetly called themselves *Phrenologists*, confine their attention to the obscurer and the less certain symbols, when the plainer and the more constant are within their reach. Need we, for example, grope upon the skull of such a face as that of the Busybody, (XIV.), in order to discover, either the actual condition, or the original dispositions of the mind? It may be affirmed, not only, that the facial indications are more obvious and intelligible than those of the cranium; but that they are of a kind which enable us to reason upward, from the present condition of the

mind, to its original conformation, in a way that can never be done from the permanent forms of the skull. Here, as in the case of the Loquacious, the character appears to be determined by the infirm irritability of the nervous system, and the concomitant chemical qualities of the several secretions. The sketch of the Loquacious (VII. p. 25) indicates an irritability that falls inward upon the imagination,—giving velocity to the current of thought, and therefore naturally venting itself through the organs of speech. But the outline—p. 44 suggests the idea of that sort of irritability which pervades the animal system;—agitating the faculties of perception,—creating a constant muscular restlessness, and leaving the mind to be snatched and driven from side to side, by every trivial impulse. It is from this unballasted excitability that the ineptitude of the Busybody results. A constitution that is incapable of *repose*, is incapable of efficient effort. This is a law of mind of wide operation. To be *ever moving* is the attribute, either of seraphic existence, or of the whirling life of a gnat. To man belongs the alternation of action and of rest. A high rate of productive force is nourished by a passive power of inane and prostrate torpor. Equable excitability can be rescued from the peril of insanity, only by constitutional and hopeless folly.

But the Busybody is also distinguished by the indirectness, or the unsoundness of his motives. Wherever the rate of excitability is such as to over-

balance the force of the mind, the emotions are liable to become either vapid or malign. A vapid officiousness, or unserviceable show of service in other men's affairs, is, perhaps, the most frequent appearance of this propensity in the male character; while a meddling temper, turned bitter or sour, oftener belongs to the female.

P. 46.

THE STUPID.

It might seem too much like an affected paradox to affirm, that our first lessons in the knowledge of *human* nature,—*intellectual* and *moral*, as well as physical,—ought to be drawn from the observation of inferior animals; and yet I believe that this principle,—freed from the taint of the fanciful analogies that it has often been attempted to establish,—must be laid at the foundation of a better, and a strictly inductive science of Mind. And this, not merely because the science can never be *complete* until it comprehend the knowledge of the inferior, as well as of the more perfect varieties of conscious being; but chiefly, because the universal laws of thought and emotion may be studied with much less liability to confusion and error, in their lower and simpler, than in their higher and more perfect forms: as well as that, in this lower

region, we are at the farthest remove from the intrusion of dialectical subtilties. The qualities of mind, as they are displayed in the habits and propensities of animals, can hardly be spoken of otherwise than in the plain language proper to a narration of intelligible facts; and in a style which has no congruity with the refinements of abstruse phraseology.

To attempt to trace resemblances or approximations between animals, and men distinguished by the force or grossness of their physical propensities, is mere common-place,—very proper, perhaps, to furnish a figure in an ethical essay, but wholly destitute of philosophical accuracy and significance. The case of the sensualist seldom bears any strict analogy to instances of brute indulgence of appetite: there may be much dramatic resemblance; but there is little actual similarity. It is *then* that human nature seems to touch upon the circle of the world of inferior beings, when a deficiency in some one of the *higher* faculties simplifies the machinery of mind, and at the same time exposes the commoner elements to observation. I have already noticed instances in which an effect of this kind is produced by the infirmity or decay of the principle of volition; and thus also, if we meet with instances in which the faculty of abstraction, for example, is remarkably deficient, we shall find a concomitant strength and perfection,—not of *animal appetites*, but of certain unreasoned impulses, having many of the characteristics of pure instinct. In the

predilections of such a person, in his antipathies, and in the blind and constant pursuit of objects that would never be sought after under the direction of mere reason, we shall continually be reminded of the imperturbable and infallible movements of animals; and this is not seldom observable in cases where the rate of intelligence and of feeling is high. I have seen more than one instance of this sort, in which the best emotions of the heart, and the powers of combination, were of the finest kind.

The proper beauty of the female character seems to depend, in great measure, upon what must not be called a *defect* in the faculty of abstraction, but rather, a graceful negation. To man belongs the power of holding in separation the closest associations of thought,—of analysing all that is complex in his consciousness,—of forming recombinations without limit, and of producing, by an artificial effort, a perfect disruption of the firmest links of habit and of feeling. But in the exercise of this faculty he is exposed to great moral and intellectual perils: his safety, amidst these hazardous excursions of thought, lies in his willingness to listen to that voice of constant and unreasoning wisdom which nature has placed by his side; and which, in order that it might, by all means, gain influence, has been invested with sovereign loveliness. Happy and wise is he, who, while he wanders in the region of speculation as he may, regards with respect the better taught suggestions of woman.

By the faculty of abstraction, man is qualified to reform and improve his lot; but woman, because she has this faculty in a lower degree, is fitted to hold, in permanence and consistence, what is already good and wholesome and worthy in that lot. A companion *meet* for him who thinks, is not a spirit of the same order; but a *woman* whose reasoning is all intuitive; whose affections are warmly and securely wrapt in the kind and right prejudices of the heart; and whose manners are ornately incrusted with domestic instincts. These instincts,—such, for example, as an attachment to places and things, endeared by long-standing associations,—a fond adherence to home usages,—a superstitious reverence for all the pure and respectful decencies of near intercourse, and a punctilious regard to order and cleanliness, are not, it is true, themselves, the first elements of happiness; but they are its indispensable, and most certain preservatives. This digression may seem out of place; yet it is connected with the observation, that useful instincts are rarely associated with a full developement of the powers of abstraction.

Again;—if the power of complex simultaneous perception, by which, through the organs of sense, the mind is kept on every side in perfect contact with the external world, be obstructed, or deficient, the manners of the individual, and his ill-directed movements, will suggest the same sort of comparison between himself and other men, which is often made between man

and animals; when, from the want of this power of complex perception, the much more perfect *senses* of animals avail them less than the very inferior senses of man. The brute has greatly the advantage, when fine and perfect perceptions *of one kind* are required; but man is immeasurably superior to the brute wherever several perceptions are to be entertained and compared at the same instant. Thus also, in things perfectly simple, it often happens that the stupid, the inept, or the half-idiot has greatly the advantage over his intellectual superiors; while in things complex he is utterly bewildered. These analogies might be pursued through cases of defect in all the higher faculties; and, in a systematic study of the mind, it would be necessary so to pursue them. Instances of this kind are breaches in the munition,—through which we may force our way into the citadel of Mind.

In the business of education it is often of great importance rightly to distinguish among cases of seeming intellectual deficiency. It is very true in education, as well as in medicine, that, when nature may be helped, she will, almost always, best help herself; yet the parent or teacher would wish that the tendency of his efforts should rather be in coincidence with, than in contravention of the sanative operations of nature. For this purpose it is necessary that we attribute the apparent want of mind to its true cause.

There are cases of early stupidity that are far more hopeful than any case of precocity can ever be: mon-

strous infantile intelligence is always the effect of some morbid determination in the system,—threatening its dissolution. Without pretending to great precision, the most usual cases of apparent stupidity in children may be distributed into three classes:—the first, comprehending those which arise from the non-developement of faculties:—the second, those attributable to a diseased or relaxed condition of the system;—and the third, cases of hopeless and original deficiency or obstruction in the organ of thought. Of these three classes, the first, and the third, are the most likely to be confounded: to attempt to discriminate between them by the aid of physiognomical or craniological rules, would be, in the present state of these pretended sciences, absurd and hazardous. Where dulness of apprehension, or apparent torpor of the mind, is precursive to the developement of extraordinary faculties, the real nature of the case will, generally, be indicated by an occasional display of *vigour of volition*,—directed, neither towards the gratification of animal appetites, nor of the vindictive passions; but spent upon some object which, to other children, would be utterly steril of pleasure or amusement: hopeless stupidity seldom exhibits any such perplexing incongruities of conduct. Cases of the second class are more easily known by physical indications; and they require the use of physical means for their remedy. If constitutional excitability is so great as to be always bordering upon hysteric agita-

tions, and to render, even the shortest continued effort of attention impossible,—or if the languor of the constitution is such, that the system is prostrated by the slightest mental exertion,—it is not the tutor, but the experienced mother, who must administer such aid as the case admits. To require bodily labours and exercises from a cripple, is not a greater barbarity, than to force intellectual efforts upon a child, in whom the organ of thought is malformed or diseased. The object of education is not to bring all minds up to a certain standard; but to do the best that nature permits, with each individual, separately. If the too zealous teacher could actually inspect the mechanism of thought, he would shudder to behold the torturing and destructive orgasms occasioned in a feeble system by ill-judged exactions.

P. 48.

THE MOROSE.

Facts would never lead to the belief that the physiognomical indications of the *intellectual* character are nothing more than effects gradually produced by certain habits of action in the facial muscles. But in the physiognomical indication of the *emotions*, there are much stronger appearances of this sort of causation. For example:—the face of one who is every hour

hurling wrath and curses upon his fellows, and flinging defiances to heaven, seems, in great measure, to have become what it is by the frequent repetition of certain violent movements.

If the head, p. 48, be compared with that of this sleeping female infant, the contrast is as great as can be imagined:—the one displays a greedy malignant vindictiveness:—in the other, all is bland and tranquil innocence: and yet, if this babe were suddenly wakened by a pang of hunger, and for a few moments withheld from the soft source of its aliment, we should behold a perfect resemblance, in miniature, of the same wrathful violence: each petty feature would seem wracked with the desire of vengeance, and writhing under a conscious inability to retaliate

wrong for wrong. Nor would it be difficult to anticipate, in imaginaton, the effects to be produced upon the muscles, the complexion, and the integuments, by twenty or thirty thousand repetitions of the same movements. But after we have attributed the utmost that facts allow us to attribute to this sort of causation, we are far from having satisfactorily explained the whole of the physiognomical indications which such a face exhibits. In the head of the Morose we cannot assign to the influence of repeated action,—either the stunted nasal bone; or the wide-planted nostril; or the dense-framed and knotted forehead; or the slim lips; or the small, well-enamelled, and compacted teeth; or the gnarled ear; or the eye,—with its minute pupil, and its iris,—showing the ominous grey of a turbid sea; or the dry, scanty, and frizzled hair;—*these* are indications of character, older in their origin than the earliest habits.

This sketch presents a variety of the same temper: its symbols are those of objurgative eloquence: a full current of thought, and a flow of language of equal depth and velocity, afford always a copious supply of pungent phrases, at the instigation of the vindictive passions. But in this example the domination of the ruling emotion is not ordinarily so single and overpowering as to preclude the easy play and graceful evolution of the faculties of wit and reason. He who dares to obstruct the will of this wilful and irritable personage, exposes himself, not to a hurricane of wrath, but to a hail-storm of sarcasm. The irony of this fierce jester strikes its victim with a point and quickness, like the glancing of his eye; and it comes as if loaded with all the weight of his bulky form. Amid the trivial and *unexciting* vexations of domestic life, this man is implacably morose: but under the irritation of an injury that is great enough to kindle all the soul, his ire works itself off in pleasantness: let him alone,—and the turbulence of indignation will end in a dance of savage mirth. A Bison spirit of this sort may be a very amusing thing to be seen through a grating; but it is a most horrible creature to live with in a parlour.

P. 50.

THE SUPERSTITIOUS.

The Enthusiast wooes his Genius:—the Superstitious cringes to his Demon. When either Fear or Hope is exalted by a prodigious imagination,—untaught by true religion, and unchecked by the spirit of science,—it will leave no region of nature, no physical energy, no fortuity, no familiar object, destitute of associations with invisible power. He who is ruled by the illusions of hope, fancies that he sees celestial tutelage in the morning mist; and Paradise in all that the sun shines upon: while the victim of fear beholds a portent of death in every shadow.

It must be granted that the Enthusiast and the Superstitious, though they may, in many respects, be contrasted, have an element of character in common: and, to use familiar terms, we should say, that the point of similarity in the two minds was the preponderance of the imagination. It might, therefore, seem reasonable to suppose, that we should find some obvious similarity in the exterior symbols of the two characters. All the observations I have had opportu-

nity to make, incline me to doubt if any such point of similarity is, in fact, to be found. The two *minds* are, indeed, distinguished by the vivid and copious production of unreal associations; but the *heads* will appear to have been moulded by influences that have no alliance or analogy. In the one case,—that of the Superstitious, the general feebleness and coldness of the constitution will seem to have allowed to the cerebrum, a bulging protuberance of form, in the loose contour of which all lesser indications are lost: while, in the head of the Enthusiast, a more vigorous and excitable temperament appears to have given a firm *architectural* precision to the figure of the skull, and yet with the same disregard of minor symbols.

But let us open our eyes to the light that has lately been poured upon the science of human nature by those who have taught us that,—imagination is not *imagination*, but—IMAGINATIVENESS; and that the power of recalling or of recombining ideas is,—IDEALITY. I say, under this guidance, in spite of the difficulties to which I have here adverted, we shall be able to pick from a crowd of persons, at discretion, either the Enthusiast, or the Superstitious: for both of them, having the biform organ of *Imaginativeness*, will have foreheads bulging at the corners like the bows of a Dutch Indiaman. Where we are to seek for the indication of the very essential difference between the two minds, I am not sufficiently versed in the system to be able to determine.

But what should we say if we were to meet with a case of eminent *Imaginativeness*, of that class, for example, in which the current of thought is evidently ruled by the suggestions of fear, which, instead of being indicated, *as it ought*,—by two walnut-like protuberances, just over the temples,—is, in fact, symbolised by an impending frontal mass that usurps the localities of some score of neighbour organs? Every one knows, indeed, that the Imagination is a bold faculty; but that it should be an invader of medullary freeholds to this extent, almost surpasses belief.

By the latest and the best authorities, we are informed that,—in the interval between the eye-brows and the insertion of the hair,—*twelve or fifteen distinct elements of mind*,—like so many petty feudal lords, cooped up between a forest and a marsh,—have 'a local habitation and a name;' where, fenced about by impassable, though imaginary partitions, they maintain their state; and whence, in proportion to their several forces, not being able to elbow space for themselves laterally, they impatiently drive bone before them, and obtrude their violence upon the superficies. If it be indeed true, that a symbolic chart of the human head must be as thick set with divisions, and as intricate, as a map of Germany; and that the entire surface, from ear to ear, is claimed by a clustering host of Dignities, Powers, Energies, Faculties, Functions, &c.,—it seems not less true, that what commonly takes place in politics, commonly takes

place, also, in phrenology; namely;—that the stronger powers are wont to drive the weaker from their patrimonies. If this be the fact, it will be very necessary to remember, that what might be laid down as an ideal phrenological topograph,—duly numbered and lettered,—will yield us as little information relative to the site of particular organs in any individual head, as we should gain from one of D'Anville's maps in Cæsar's Commentaries, if we wished to understand the *present* boundaries of the Electoral states: it is a map of the country; but not a map of its actual occupation.

The strength and quality of those prevailing emotions, which often, from the same intellectual elements, produce the widest varieties of character, are usually manifested, with little obscurity, in the lower part of the face. In the head, (XVII. p. 50.) the projecting and infirmly-built forehead declares a morbid preponderance of the imagination. The direction actually given to this excrescent faculty is indicated in the forms and expression of the features beneath, which seem as if staggering under the impending mass above. That mouth is incapable of expressing, either the excitation of hope, or the energy of despair: it is fit only for the gaspings of abject fear. If I were to allow myself the careless expression of fanciful assertions, I might say that the hair of this head indicates a mind rich in melancholy associations; and, at the same time, greatly debilitated by the damp

and chilly atmosphere of the sepulchral regions which are its constant haunt. The head of the Superstitious may be compared with that beneath, of the Enthusiast.

P. 53.

THE PETULANT.

'Omne infirmum, naturâ querulum.'—Nature has armed many of the smaller and weaker animals with a petulant vindictiveness of temper that makes them formidable, even to their superiors in bulk and strength: there are analogous cases of human character, in which the means of defence or aggression, the bad motive, and the force, are all so well proportioned to each other, that the petty feline being is much oftener the object of dread, than the victim of oppression. But it is not a case of this kind that we have here before us. The Character as described by our author, and as depicted in the sketch (XVIII. p. 53.) seems to be one of those most unhappy persons who possess gastric acrimony enough to keep a very high rate of intellectual and animal energy in constant activity; while the actual force of the constitution is so small, that this hot spring of acerbity is pent up in the system, without employment or means of exhaustion. Here, it corrodes every faculty, frets away the spring of life, and taints the breath of speech with a pestilent feculence.

There is much advantage in understanding the primary *physical causes* of our own ill tempers, or of those of our constant companions:—of the latter,—

because we shall thereby be the better disposed to exercise a wise forbearance towards the unhappy subjects of this sort of malign *possession;* and also gain skill in the management of the disease. Or if the case be our own, such a knowledge of its nature will greatly tend to dissipate those irritating illusions which are the unreal, and yet, in most instances, the *only* real objects of splenetic disquietudes. Under the influence of such an acquaintance with our physical constitution, we shall learn to whisper to ourselves,—'This is my infirmity;—let me make as little show of the feebleness of my nature as may be;'—we shall be induced to defer, for an hour, the expression of our discontent, (and the delay of gratification is often all that wisdom demands,)—when we know that a stomach-full of bland aliment will remove from our view much, if not the whole of the blackness of the offence under which we are suffering. When better motives fail us, considerations such as these may often avail to repress, at least the expression of evil tempers; and thus preserve the atmosphere of home from the taint of the most deleterious of all the *gases,* —the breath of strife. The gastric acrimony of an infirm constitution is more tolerable when it vents itself in instantaneous flashes of wrath, than when it works inwardly,—producing harboured, malignant surmisings: out of the heart, when thus envenomed, come murders, envyings, backbitings, seditions, and every evil work.

P. 55.

THE SUSPICIOUS.

This temper is akin to the last: suspicion usually results from the union of chronic fear and superabounding acrimony. I am not willing to affirm that every disorder of the moral powers has its origin in some intellectual defect; nor even that a correlative intellectual defect is a constant concomitant of a diseased state of the affections, or the moral habits. And yet, some qualified and guarded statement of this sort might be supported by a multiplicity of facts. We may take an example from one of the lighter vices of the mind: thus, if one whose whole conduct is ruled by groundless alarms, or false surmises, could be induced to reason justly in each instance, the preponderating motive, how strong soever it might be, would be counterpoised, and its influence gradually destroyed. But though, in single instances, such a man may be aided, or urged to carry on that necessary process of reasoning which would contravene the blind impulse; yet, as this aid or urgency is not ordinarily at hand, the decrepit intellect learns to yield to the constitutional motive; and reason is at length irremediably impaired by the habit of looking out passively upon glaring absurdities of conduct. If, in such a mind, the intellectual powers are ever called upon to take a more active

part, it is when the propriety of some point of conduct happens to be called in question: reason is then roused to become the ingenious and pertinacious apologist of actions that affront common sense. But we can never permit common sense to be insulted, without inflicting a lasting injury upon the understanding. Those minor absurdities of the daily life by which petty wishes are gratified, or by which groundless fears or groundless suspicions are appeased, are therefore to be avoided, not merely because they tend to cover the character with ridicule; but because they are excrescences, by nourishing of which, Reason is enfeebled. There are, perhaps, few individuals to be found whose domestic conduct is entirely free from some such unreasonable and inexplicable habits. Happily, neither the course of human affairs at large, nor private interests, are much under the direction of individual minds: it is the common sense of mankind in the mass, by which men, singly, are governed. The mere impulse of imitation, and the sway of social principles, operate to remedy the perversities and absurdities of individual minds. If the conduct of individuals were strictly *individual*, it is hard to imagine the spectacle of fantastic incongruity which the world would exhibit. For such, in the majority of instances, is the condition of human nature, that reason, instead of boldly swaying the life, ventures to creep abroad only in those rare moments, when every imperious passion, and every lordly impulse, great and small, and every

strong, and every feeble prejudice, is slumbering. Whoever is conscious that his decisions, in matters of conduct, constantly, or usually, fall into one and the same track, and are conformed to *any one order of ideas*, may be assured that, with him, reason is the mere drudge of some constitutional propensity. Reason, it is true, leads blind impulse by the hand; but it is blind impulse that actually commands the course.

P. 57.

THE FILTHY.

Strange as it may seem, it is true, that there are beings to be found who, far from resting in the direct gratification of animal appetites, revel, with a lively zest, among all the things that are most foul and loathsome in the sad conditions of our earthly nature. Sensuality, force of temper, inertness, obtundity of perception, personal idolatry, and the destitution of the higher and better emotions of humanity, are the ingredients of a constitution of this order.

Filth, and the Slavery of Woman, go together as the concomitants of brutal degradations of human nature. To Woman is entrusted the preservation of the dignity of Man: if she be degraded, he wallows in dishonour. Her duty and her interests require, that

she be the strict, if not the stern censor of manners; and so far as it may be done without prudery, and without affectation, it is her part to disguise all the circumstances of animal life by the elevation of her sentiments, or the adornments of her fancy. The domestic life touches closely, at many points, upon the less noble conditions of our physical existence; but woman, placed, as she is, in the very centre of this sphere, is endowed with purities of feeling, and graces of action, that enable her to redeem these humbling circumstances of our nature from disgust. Woman, then, is not a Sylph—the object of heartless and sensual idolatry; but the active steward of man's mixed œconomy,—a graceful mediatrix between mind and matter. It is from these hands that man is to receive the goods of sense,—by these hands that the ills of the body are to be assuaged: and as the office cannot confer honour upon the performer, the performer must be such as shall shed lustre upon the office. So long as woman is true to her duty, man is kept in alliance with the higher world of being; and she, as his companion, shares fully in the benefit. Neither poverty, nor sickness, nor age can despoil her of this, her true honour, and only practicable happiness: nothing can take it from her; unless, forgetful of herself, she permits the invasion of grossness, impurity, or disorder.

P. 61.

THE VAIN.

Perfection of character results from the union of the power of complex intellection, with habitual simplicity of motive. If a mind capable of carrying on, simultaneously, complex intellectual operations, is also liable to intricacies, combinations, and counteractions among its impulses, the result is likely to be knavery, mischief, intrigue, caprice, or inept versatility. Minds not capable of complex simultaneous intellection, and yet subject to some constant duplicity or triplicity of motive, will come under the class of those who make themselves troublesome or ridiculous, by their blundering interferences,—their ill-timed explanations,—their needless apologies,—their unsolicited cautions,—their sagacious intimations,—their learned prosings,—their vanity, egotism, ostentation, or foppishness. The characteristic mark of all minds of this class is, that they are never seen to act or speak under the *primary* and proper motive that belongs to the occasion; but always under some impulse of fourth or fifth-rate importance: nor will it ever be found possible to bring a great motive to the *focus* of their vision. While you are labouring to place strong reasons and right feelings before a man of this sort, he will be fixing his eye upon a mote or a midge; and

will *that* be the object of his pursuit. Where simplicity of intellection and simplicity of motive are conjoined, the result will be one of those varieties of character of which *perennial infancy* is the common mark: some cases of this sort I have already had occasion to point out.

There is a particular species of vanity, more appropriately called conceit, which results from the ready and perfect command of very limited faculties, and very superficial emotions. Characters of this sort are miniature models of human nature, which work so pleasantly, that they are, altogether, the most amusing things one can look at. Craft and apathy, added to this kind of vanity, form the peculiar national character of the Chinese. The head beneath, beside its Tartar character, is the very image of craft, apathy, vanity, and trivial sentiment.

P. 69.

THE PROUD.

A phrase of great significance is employed by St. James,—*ἐν πραΰτητι σοφίας—in meekness of wisdom:* There is a meekness that is the effect of natural sweetness and kindness of temper: there is a meekness that is produced by the continued influence of Chris-

tian principle; and there is a meekness, emphatically called, the 'meekness of wisdom:' it forms the distinction of the highest order of intelligence, and results immediately from the wide comprehension of the soul. Minds that are stored, in detail, or in abstract, with the sum of human knowledge,—that traverse with frequent and familiar step the boundaries of the fields of Science, and that, by being accustomed to trace with precision the line that divides the known from the unknown, estimate justly the vast disproportion between the former and the latter,—insensibly imbibe their governing intellectual sentiments, not from the consciousness of the things they know, but from their constant recollection of that impending universe which is hidden from mortal vision: they are, therefore, apt to assume the meek, docile, and abashed temper of a thoughtful child, who perceives that he is surrounded, on every side, by superior intelligence, and superior power. Such are not the sentiments of those who are resolved to see and to be conversant with no other world than that of which they can fancy themselves to be the centre. But this sort of self-deification is not practicable, unless the illusion on which it rests be favoured and protected by an original narrowness and rigidity of the intellect, such as renders enlargement of view, and expansion of thought physically impossible. If the proud or arrogant man could, for a moment, view things above him, and around him, as they are, and if he could once read his

own rank upon the scale of universal being, his utmost efforts would never avail to re-inflate the preposterous bubble of self-love.

The term *Pride* is too indefinite to be assumed as the designation of a distinct class of character. Sentiments and emotions that, for practical purposes, are, with great propriety, treated of by the theologian and the moralist as homogeneous, almost always require to be analysed with more exactness by the metaphysician and the physiologist. Thus, for example, the pride of rude and unintelligent force,—the pride of sensitive feebleness,—the pride of strenuous will,—the pride of pure malignity, are varieties of character that differ essentially in their elements; and will be found to differ as widely in their external symbols.

P. 71.

THE FEARFUL.

Reason is an unfit remedy for alarms that spring from the poverty of the animal system. The more the Coward reasons, the more he quakes: when danger must be met, the best course he can take is to leave reason and imagination behind, by a reckless leap into 'the very midst of things.' The only remedy that can be applied to the mind, is that which

is furnished by habit, and familiarity with danger. But it is the *body* that is chiefly in fault; and it should be corroborated by ample and generous diet, and a full measure of exercise in the open air. In the early cure of physical timidity, the different constitution and circumstances of the sexes must be observed: the fears of a girl may, with propriety, be allayed by reasoning; because it is not desirable, nor indeed possible, if it were desirable, to give hardy insensibility to the body; and also because the perils to which women are ordinarily exposed, more often allow of some recurrence to reason; and demand calm recollection, rather than force, or enterprise: but the fears of a boy ought never to receive so much attention and respect. Every motive of shame, every prudent familiarising with danger, and every physical corroboration, should be employed to conquer a defect which, so far as it prevails, renders a man miserable, contemptible, and useless.

P. 76.

THE DETRACTOR.

There are two suppositions relative to the interaction of mind and body, either of which might have some influence in checking the indulgence of malignant propensities. The one is, that the vice of the

mind is the first cause of that concomitant derangement of the animal system by which it is usually indicated; and that every act of indulgence diffuses a poison which operates as certainly and as destructively upon the functions of life, as any deleterious chemical agent. The other supposition is, that the vice of the mind is primarily occasioned by a constitutional derangement of some of the secreting organs; so that the vicious propensity of the mind is, properly, a symptom of the morbid condition of the body. Whichever may be the *first* cause, it is very evident, that there is always much re-action and intercausation in every unhappy instance of this kind; and on either supposition it is matter of fact, that the remedy of the evil is, in a great degree, within the power of the mind, by habitual corrective efforts: these efforts,—resting as they ought, primarily, upon moral considerations,—might be well aided by the knowledge and constant recollection of those unfavourable physical influences to which the mind is exposed. He who allows a vindictive remembrance of an injury, or an envious regard of another's prosperity, to shed venom through the turgid liver, or to wrack the intestines with scalding acrimony, sins against that first law of nature,—the impulse of self-preservation. It may be, that some spasmodic obstruction in the hepatic vessels, or that some half-putrescent crassity, of which the stomach cannot relieve itself, crowds the brain with images of evil, and oppresses the heart with

emotions of hatred: in such a case, it behoves a wise man to be aware of the misfortune of his constitution, and not to suffer the higher faculties of his nature to be obscured and infected by these fumes from the disordered laboratory of the body.

P. 78.—81.

THE OLIGARCH. THE MALIGNANT.

The pride of feebleness, or the pride of force, determines the party of those who choose opinions under the guidance of temper: the former influence produces the haughty assertor of exclusive privileges; the latter, inspires the public zeal of the turbulent demagogue. A Natural History of opinions would have quite as much to do with the *physical* diversities of human nature, as with the logical relations and dependencies of abstract propositions. Under changing names, and liable to the varieties of national character and institutions, all civilized societies have been divided into three, four, or five great parties, corresponding to the leading tendencies of the human mind. It is a subject worthy of the labour it would cost, to pass through the history of mankind, with the view to trace and exhibit the identity of these standing varieties of opinion,—to note the peculiarities which

have attended the partition of prevailing systems of science, or of religious belief, into sects; and then, by the observation of individual cases around us, to mark those diversities of influence under which opinions are sometimes the perfect representatives of temper, and sometimes the discordant product of temper, education, professional pursuits, or worldly interest. Such an inquiry would be amply rewarded, if it only served to establish and to exhibit in a strong light, two remarkable and highly significant facts, belonging to the history of Christianity,—namely, That, while this system, owing to its having within itself a vigour and a life which nothing but truth can impart, has always presented a strongly marked expression of the great standing varieties of human opinion; it has, at the same time, exhibited, (wherever its records have been familiarly known by the common people) a sovereign uniformity of influence upon manners, morals, and intellectual improvement. Under the Polytheism of Greece and Rome, sects were almost entirely confined to the educated class; because the system had not enough moral influence to urge the mass of the people into those diversities of opinion that result from ill-directed speculation. In the Mahomedan world, where the influence of the system was strong enough, and sufficiently popular in its nature, for this purpose, the sects that have arisen have always been connected with political changes: they have had the character of family feuds, and might appropriately

be called, patriarchal heresies; because fanaticism, which is the grand impulse of this false system, will always, if possible, ally itself with political or personal feelings, rather than with purely abstract principles.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE STUDY OF HUMAN NATURE.

GRATUITOUS hypothesis and presumptuous empiricism have now long been banished from the physical sciences. What is imperfectly known, is spoken of as imperfectly known; and even what is known, is not advanced without a circumspect reference to its possible connection with facts that are yet unexplained. In all those inquiries which have for their objects the laws of the material world, the spirit of caution triumphs over the spirit of adventure. But a very remarkable contrast must strike every one who compares the present state of the physical sciences, with that of the philosophy of the human mind. For while, on the one hand, those who stand forward as the qualified and acknowledged teachers of the science have, as it seems, from the dread of appearing to stand on the ground of vague hypothesis, deserted the more interesting departments of the study, and retreated to a barren spot, from which their utmost toils can produce nothing but a small number of meagre abstractions;—less scrupulous adventurers are rioting in a wide region of unclaimed wealth, and are actually gaining attention to systems

that might well have suited the days of alchymy and magic. That mass of facts, relating to the human mind, which one set of inquirers has abandoned, furnishes to another the means of supporting the most preposterous pretensions. It is strange, and yet true that, in these days of philosophical scepticism, theories of human nature are promulged, and maintained, and favourably received, which stand in direct opposition to the spirit of modern science, and to all its acknowledged rules of procedure.

Many causes might be assigned for the explanation of this anomaly in the world of science. One or two of these causes I propose to mention, which, though they may be obvious enough, are perhaps not duly considered. The chief of them is inseparable from the subject, and demands a change in our methods of study.

The physical sciences have for their objects universal or *generic* facts; and they advance by gradually assigning individual facts to previously formed classes: they have to do only with classes of bodies, or classes of facts. The business of the student in these sciences is to enumerate and to arrange those resemblances and differences, those connections and consequences, observable in the material world, which, by being more or less uniform, are susceptible of classification; and which, by being more or less constant, suggest the induction of general laws. The physical sciences go no further than to the boundary where classification

and generalization cease to furnish aid. But the knowledge of human nature is the knowledge of a single species, of which the individual diversities, while they are of the highest significance, and while they constitute the chief matters of observation, are wholly incapable of being brought under the ordinary methods of classification. Of the entire mass of facts that belong to the science of human nature, by far the greater number, and those which are the most worthy of philosophical explication, and the most practically important, instead of being constant or uniform, or frequently recurring in similar combinations, are diversified in as great variety as there are individual instances. It is evident, then, that a special modification of the methods of the inductive philosophy, adapted to the peculiarity of the case, must be framed and applied, before these individual diversities can be brought within the circle of regular science.

Those differences in disposition, power, habits, and external form, that distinguish man from man, are often wider, as well as more significant and important, than those which separate the several species of inferior animals. These diversities would long ago have been included within the forms of science, if, upon any known and familiar principle of generalization, the immeasurable and seemingly chaotic mass of particular facts could have been reduced to order; or if the true clue to the explication and arrange-

ment of these individual diversities had been sought for, and found. That it has not yet been found, is apparent: that it has ever been expressly sought for, the records of philosophy do not declare.

Minds cannot be sorted into *orders* and *families* without a manifest violence to each case that is so disposed of. Here we have no longer to do with *Genera* and *Species*; or with uniform combinations of known elements; or with the constant recurrence of the same antecedents and consequents. If general laws are inferred from a few apparently uniform instances, they are contradicted by innumerable exceptions; and the labours of the closet in system-making are deranged by one hour's actual converse with the world. The accustomed means and faculties of science are baffled on this peculiar ground; its wonted instruments are found inapplicable to the anomalous work; and it has turned aside from the hopeless toil, satisfied with briefly notifying some of the more simple and universal facts that have presented themselves in front of the confused mass.

To enumerate in a neat and unexceptionable phraseology, some half-dozen truisms, affectedly termed, 'the ultimate laws of mind,' to illustrate these 'laws' by scattered references to individual facts, or by multiplied quotations from works of imagination, occasionally to extort an inference of some seeming practical utility from these barren principles, and to expose the futility of the metaphysical systems

of former times; this is the allotted task of those who profess to teach all that is known of the most important, the most noble, and the most copious of the Sciences, the science of Mind. And so long as the study of human nature is restricted by an adherence to methods of study that are inapplicable to the subject, and by a timid and scrupulous avoidance of its *physiological* relations; and so long, also, as that spirit of good sense which prevails in other departments of science shall continue to prevent the return of the idle metaphysical disquisitions of past ages, Intellectual Philosophy can be nothing better than an elaborate negation. And it is not without excessive diffuseness of style, and the widest licence of digression, that such a system can assume a *bulk* which may serve to disguise its real poverty, and to give it an air of importance in the eye of the world: nor have all the attractions of genius, aided by the most exquisite ornaments of style, ever availed to render this department of learning generally interesting to men of sense.

In the mean time the builders of systems, especially those who advance to the study of the Mind on the path of physiological inquiry, do not fail to cover the space that has been abandoned to them, with every form of grotesque absurdity. An inventive genius will always find it easy to draw from the inexhaustible volume of facts, connected with the individual diversities of human nature, abundant materials

for the construction, the embellishment, and the defence of a theory. And, in fact, so luxuriant is this hitherto uncultivated region, so copious are the means which offer themselves to the speculatist, that minds, more ardent than comprehensive, are soon infatuated by their own apparent success; and burn with impatience till they have laid the mighty foundations of 'a New System.' It requires a rare degree of *philosophical continence* to pass, without danger of seduction, amid the waste opulence of that world of facts belonging to the knowledge of human nature which still lies unappropriated by science.

This failure of philosophy in regard to the first and chief object of curiosity—the human Mind, might be of small consequence to the substantial interests of mankind, if theories of evil tendency could be precluded from that ground which true science does not occupy. But when men do not think justly, they will think, not only falsely, but perniciously. Every false system, connected directly or indirectly with morals, is, to the extent of its influence, mischievous. Hence it often happens that the advancement of genuine science is desirable, less on account of its own immediate relation to the purposes of life, than because it serves to occupy the ground to the exclusion of dangerous speculations. This is eminently true of all those inquiries that relate to the human mind. A true Intellectual Philosophy, if reared and completed upon

the principles which, in modern times, have given stability to the physical sciences, ought to be considered chiefly as a *Fortification*, the direct utility of which may, perhaps, seem hardly to compensate the labour and cost of its construction; but its importance and value consist in its forming a bulwark, necessary to the good order and security of the region it encloses.

That the principles of good morals and social order are liable to be endangered by the absurd speculations of pretending philosophists, might be abundantly proved by a brief review of the flitting systems advanced by the dialecticians, the medico-metaphysicians, the infidel theologians, the physiognomists, craniologists, and phrenologists, and by those designated by the unmeaning term *materialists*, who have appeared in quick succession during the past sixty years, in Germany, France, and England. Whatever may have been the personal character or intentions of the men, it has usually happened, that these precocious theorists, while professing to explain the structure of the mind, the mutual dependence and interaction of mind and matter, the origin and combination of motives, or while pretending to interpret the exterior symbols of the qualities of mind, have seemed to involve some of the first principles of religion and morality in perplexing difficulties. Nor is it easy to estimate, duly, the amount and extent of the injury that has been inflicted upon

the unthinking, and the half-thinking masses of society, by these specious systems. These specious systems, it is true, have lasted, individually, but for a season; yet each expiring folly has breathed its spirit into a successor; and society has got no riddance by the change. It cannot be affirmed that these mischiefs have been counteracted, in any sensible degree, by the immediate influence or authority of true philosophy. They have either been left to destroy themselves by the sure operation of their own inherent absurdity; or they have been forcibly resisted and repelled by a blind, and yet a wise pertinacity on the part of the friends of religion, morality, and social order.

A true and complete Philosophy of Human Nature is, therefore, to be desired, because it would preclude the evils of reckless speculation. But the progress towards the accomplishment of so great a work is liable to be impeded by indirect motives, which belong peculiarly to the subject. It is not for the sake of its *ultimate uses* that any branch of science will ever be successfully cultivated. And it is simply as *a matter of science*, that an advancement in the knowledge of human nature ought to be sought after. The world of Mind is to be studied as the world of Matter,—under the influence of that one motive which, alone, is the proper incitement of philosophical labour,—namely, the purely intellectual desire to know. This motive must be unencumbered

by any regard to the fruits or the consequences of knowledge, when acquired. The spirit of science is free; it will submit to no subserviency to a second purpose. The faintest reference to some desired practical result, or the slightest bias of the mind towards a premised conclusion, infallibly produces its degradation, or perversion.

A fair and moderate estimate of the actual influence of philosophical systems upon society at large, should be formed at the commencement of our studies; and should be constantly kept in view throughout their progress. Nothing can be more fallacious or seductive than the expectation, that the moral condition of men as individuals, or that the state of political bodies is to be, in any considerable degree, meliorated by the *direct* influence of philosophical principles. Truly, the world is too stubbornly wrong to be reformed by *Philosophy;* yet, it is allowable to hope that, when the world shall be reformed by more efficient means, the establishment of a true Philosophy will be a helping concomitant of the happy change.

The sober inquirer in this department of science will wish, that the Natural History of Man should be as complete as that of flies and of flowers; and his ambition will be satisfied, if he succeeds in advancing it to an equal degree of perfection. He will not aspire to obtrude his discoveries and his instructions upon the statesman, or the political economist; much less upon the theologian, or the moralist. If, on any

occasion, he has to discharge a function of *direct* practical utility, it will be in the way alluded to above; when he is called upon to expose the absurdities of empirics who, so often, on the ground of pretended physiological facts, scruple not to offend the common sense and best feelings of mankind.

That student of human nature who would fain make himself an institutor of new modes of education, a regenerator of political systems, or a reformer of theology, wholly misapprehends the nature and the powers of the science to which he is devoted. And, in fact, it is the special characteristic of an order of intellect at once ardent, inventive, and contracted, to indulge exorbitant expectations of the beneficial consequences likely to result from improvements in particular branches of science. This sort of romantic zeal in the prosecution of a favourite inquiry indicates a diseased disproportion between the *enthusiasm* of the temper, and the compass and force of the intellect. He who has entertained the hope, that he should be able to conquer the evil propensities of mankind, or to banish delusion and prejudice from the earth by promulgating 'A New Theory of Human Nature,' might well be warned by this proof of the constitutional extravagance of his mind, to abandon for ever the business of philosophising.

But there are other perverting influences which have belonged peculiarly to this department of science. Some of the most distinguished writers on the

Philosophy of Human Nature have evidently been inspired by an eager ambition to establish, through the force and lustre of their genius, such a system as should perpetuate their fame by triumphing over the established principles of morals and religion: the sum of their reasoning, and all its subordinate parts have been made to suit this ruling design. Others, again, have been animated by a motive, more worthy indeed, but perhaps not more compatible with scientific equanimity,—the wish to refute the dangerous theories of the first-named class of writers. An indifferent observer cannot fail to perceive, on both sides, a frequent, if not a constant deviation from the straight path of induction; as well as a manifest want of that serene temper which is proper to the prosecution of scientific inquiries. On the one side the malignant motive, and the corrupt ambition, have seemed to impart a sort of ferocious activity to the intellect; while, on the other, the operations of reason have been disturbed by a too anxious zeal, fettered by indirect solicitudes, and enfeebled by groundless fears.

From these, and similar causes, it has happened that the Philosophy of Human Nature has always been much more encumbered by foreign difficulties than any other department of knowledge; and it must be confessed, that those difficulties which inseparably belong to it, are great enough to keep it constantly in the rear of the sister sciences. That

it should soon be extricated from these entanglements is, perhaps, more than can be hoped. The necessary qualifications for the task seem to be incompatible: for a mind that should possess the requisite philosophic equanimity by being actually indifferent to the implied interests of morality and religion, is itself really subject to the greatest and the worst of all possible perversions; while one duly alive to the supreme importance of these higher interests will be likely to faulter and recede, whenever, as must often happen, the course of investigation may seem to put them in hazard.

In advancing the preceding remarks on the present state of Intellectual Philosophy, I offer no apology for the boldness of thus venturing to bring a charge of capital error and deficiency against established systems,—'non ingeniorum aut facultatum inducitur comparatio, sed viæ.' If an apology is really needed, nothing could make it sufficient and availing. Let the reader inquire whether he finds in the present system of intellectual science any solution, or even any definite recognition, of the many interesting questions which relate to the dependence of mind upon the laws of animal life; or any clue to the explication and arrangement of those important individual diversities by which human character is marked; or any specification of the laws of mind, as developed in the inferior ranks of being; or even, if the narrow department of dialectical metaphysics, to which the

science has been so improperly confined, exhibits any very substantial improvements.

If it appears that challenges such as these cannot be accepted by the reputed authorities in this department of science; let the reader again ask, whether he can be satisfied with the solution given of some of the above-named questions in the crude theories that are every day gaining and losing a brief notoriety: and if he can obtain no instruction on these points from the one party, and if he cannot accept that which is offered by the other, he must acknowledge, that there yet exists no adequate Science of Human Nature.

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